



# RESERVE COMPONENT PROGRAMS

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Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board  
Fiscal Year 1989

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“Under the Total Force Policy, the National Guard and Reserve are now recognized for their importance to national security and have been modernized and integrated into a combat-ready force. The progress achieved by the reserve components during the past four years has been greatly facilitated by the Reserve Forces Policy Board.”

George Bush  
President of the United States

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

6 APR 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Annual Report of the Department of Defense Reserve  
Forces Policy Board for Fiscal Year 1989

The Department of Defense Reserve Forces Policy Board's Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1989 is hereby provided.

This comprehensive report reviews National Guard and Reserve programs, noting the great progress that has been achieved in improving Reserve component readiness. Also, problem areas are addressed, and recommendations presented on how to make the Reserve components more effective members of the Total Force.

The report represents the collective views of the Board members, and not necessarily official policy positions of the Department of Defense, or any other department or agency of the United States government.

The Board has made excellent contributions to our efforts to ensure that the National Guard and Reserve are adequately manned, equipped, trained, and ready as part of the Total Force.

Attachment:  
As Stated

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Dick Cheney".



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

6 APR 1990

Honorable Dan Quayle  
President of the Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. President:

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Dick Cheney".

Enclosure:  
As Stated





THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

6 APR 1990

Honorable Thomas S. Foley  
Speaker of the House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

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A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Dick Cheney".

Enclosure:  
As Stated




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
# **Reserve Component Programs Fiscal Year 1989**

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**The Annual Report of the  
Reserve Forces Policy Board**

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Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Washington, DC 20301-7300



The Reserve Forces Policy Board, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, is by statute the "principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the reserve components" (10 USC 175(c)). This Annual Report, as required by law (10 USC 113(c)(3)), presents the Board's independent evaluation of National Guard and Reserve programs. The report includes recommendations for changes to policies, procedures, or laws which affect the reserve components of the total military force of the United States.

This report represents the collective view of the members of the Reserve Forces Policy Board and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Department of Defense or any other department or agency of the United States government.

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The logo of the Reserve Forces Policy Board represents the total military force as the shield for the nation. The United States is identified by its national symbol, the eagle. The blue field represents the military departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Marine Corps is a part of the Navy Department. The Coast Guard becomes a part of that department in time of war. Integrated in that field are three stars depicting the Active Component, National Guard, and Reserve of the departments. The seven vertical stripes of the shield stand for the seven reserve components—Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Naval Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve.

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Photographs in this report are of reserve component personnel, training, equipment, operations, and facilities.



## Reserve Forces Policy Board Members

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**Honorable  
John O. Marsh, Jr.**

Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board. Legislative Counsel to the Secretary of Defense. Secretary of the Army 1981-1989. Member of the House of Representatives from Virginia 1963-1971. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs. Assistant for National Security Affairs to the Vice President of the United States. Counselor, with Cabinet rank, to President Gerald Ford. Appointed Chairman November 16, 1989.

*John O. Marsh, Jr.*



**Major General  
William R. Berkman  
United States Army**

Military Executive, Reserve Forces Policy Board. Chief, Army Reserve, 1979-1986. Attorney-at-law, Morrison & Foerster, San Francisco, California, 1957 to 1979. Assigned to Board, August 1, 1986.

*William R. Berkman*



**HONORABLE G. KIM WINCUP**

Assistant Secretary of the Army, (Manpower and Reserve Affairs),  
Washington, D.C. Assigned to Board November 22, 1989.

*G. Kim Wincup*



**LIEUTENANT GENERAL GORDON R. SULLIVAN  
UNITED STATES ARMY**

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. Assigned to Board July 24, 1989.

*Gordon R. Sullivan*



**MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT F. ENSSLIN, JR.  
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD OF THE  
UNITED STATES**

The Adjutant General for the State of Florida, St. Augustine, Florida.  
Assigned to Board February 12, 1987.

*Robert F. Ensslin Jr.*



**MAJOR GENERAL GREGORY P. BARLOW  
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD OF THE  
UNITED STATES**

The Adjutant General for the State of Washington, Tacoma,  
Washington. Assigned to Board August 14, 1987.


*Gregory P. Barlow*



**MAJOR GENERAL JACK STRUKEL, JR.  
UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE**

Commanding General, 122d Army Reserve Command, North Little Rock, Arkansas. General Director of Central Services and Facilities Planning, Topeka Public Schools, Topeka, Kansas. Assigned to Board April 11, 1988.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jack Strukel Jr".



**MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPH G. GRAY  
UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE**

Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (Mobilization), Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. Vice President of Economic and Industrial Development, Chamber of Commerce, Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Assigned to Board December 1, 1987.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Joseph G. Gray".



**HONORABLE BARBARA SPYRIDON POPE**

Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Washington, D.C. Assigned to Board November 22, 1989.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Barbara Spyridon Pope".



**MAJOR GENERAL EDMUND P. LOONEY, JR.  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS**

Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, for Reserve Affairs, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C. Assigned to Board January 1, 1989.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Edmund P. Looney Jr".



**REAR ADMIRAL JOHN J. SWEENEY**  
**UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE**

Commander, Military Sealift Command, Europe (Mobilization).  
Principal, Mercer-Meiding-Hansen, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  
Assigned to Board March 7, 1988.



**REAR ADMIRAL SAMUEL E. McWILLIAMS**  
**UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE**

Commander, Naval Reserve Readiness Command, Region Twenty,  
Naval Station, Treasure Island, California. Deputy Commander, U.S.  
Maritime Defense Zone Pacific. Captain, United Airlines. Assigned to  
Board May 1, 1989.



**MAJOR GENERAL G. RICHARD OMROD**  
**UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS RESERVE**

Deputy Commander, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia.  
Consultant, Self-employed, Haddonfield, New Jersey. Assigned to  
Board August 14, 1987.



**HONORABLE J.G. COOPER**

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower, Reserve Affairs,  
Installations, and Logistics), Washington, D.C. Assigned to Board  
November 22, 1989.





**MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM J. PORTER  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE**

Director of Personnel Plans, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Department of the Air Force, Washington, D.C. Assigned to Board August 4, 1989.

*William J. Porter*



**MAJOR GENERAL JOHN L. MATTHEWS  
AIR NATIONAL GUARD OF THE  
UNITED STATES**

The Adjutant General for the State of Utah, Draper, Utah. Assigned to Board February 1, 1988.

*John L. Matthews*



**MAJOR GENERAL HARVEY J. McCARTER  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE RESERVE**

Mobilization Assistant to Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. Captain, Trans World Airlines. Assigned to Board September 13, 1989.

*Harvey J. McCarter*



**REAR ADMIRAL JOHN N. FAIGLE  
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD**

Chief, Office of Readiness and Reserve, United States Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C. Assigned to Board July 14, 1989.

*John N. Faigle*



**REAR ADMIRAL DANIEL J. MURPHY**  
**UNITED STATES COAST GUARD RESERVE**

Senior Reserve Officer, Pacific Area Coast Guard Island, Alameda, California. Deputy Sector Commander, U.S. Maritime Defense Zone Pacific, Northern California Sector. Assigned to Board February 2, 1988.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Daniel J. Murphy". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style. The first name "Daniel" is written in a larger, more prominent script, followed by "J." and "Murphy".

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There were three vacancies on the Board as of December 31, 1989.

The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board is a reflection of the consensus of the 22-member Board. Although most recommendations and policy changes have unanimous support, neither this report nor the signature of the members purport to indicate that the signers, services, or the Department of Defense concur with every recommended action or position.



# Executive Summary

## General

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (Board), acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, is by statute the "principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the reserve components". (10 USC 175(e)). The Board is required by statute to prepare an annual report which the Secretary of Defense provides to the President and Congress (10 USC 113(c)(3)). The report details contributions of the reserve components to the total force and addresses matters pertaining to National Guard and Reserve readiness.

The Department of Defense (DoD) implemented the Total Force Policy in 1973. It has been fundamental to U.S. national security policy ever since. Today, National Guard and Reserve forces are full partners with the active forces. Reserve component units are integrated into many theater operational plans. Large-scale combat operations could not be successfully conducted without the reserve components. Since the Total Force Policy was implemented, the reserve components have achieved unprecedented levels of capability and readiness.

In the recently enacted Defense Authorization Act, Congress stated that "there has been no comprehensive, authoritative study of the Total Force Policy since its inception." Congress directed that a study group review the operation and effectiveness of the Total Force Policy. The report is due to Congress by December, 1990. The Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum dated December 26, 1989, established a Total Force Policy study group. The Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board has been appointed as a member of the study group.

Potential threats to United States interests should be the primary factor in shaping force mix decisions. Sufficient active component forces must be immediately available to respond to low intensity conflicts. However, there are important and unique capabilities in the reserve components which may be required. The reserve components have historically provided a cost-effective means for augmenting the active components and maintaining a strong national defense. They provide a means to maintain the nation's military force structure while responding to changing requirements and budget mandates. If a decision is made to add missions and force structure to the reserve components, they must be adequately resourced and supportable within the parameters of reserve component recruiting, retention, and training.

Implementation of the President's National Drug Control Strategy became a Department of Defense mission in FY 1989 and includes a major role for the reserve components. The FY 1989 Authorization Act provided over \$40 million to the National Guard in support of law enforcement agencies. Reserve component personnel are actively engaged in detecting and countering the production and trafficking of illegal drugs.

### **Resourcing the Reserve Components**

The DoD Authorization Act and the DoD Appropriation Act for FY 1989 did not adequately fund reserve component programs. This seriously curtails force modernization efforts. Presently, there are authorized officer positions in National Guard and Reserve units which cannot be filled because of insufficient officer drill pay. Modern equipment cannot be purchased, and military construction continues to be seriously underfunded. To maintain readiness, it is essential to resource the National Guard and Reserve with the necessary personnel and equipment. Particular attention should be given to properly equipping combat support and combat service support units, since such a large portion of these assets are in the National Guard and Reserve.

### **Force Structure**

The mission of the reserve components is to provide trained, well-equipped units and individuals for active duty in time of war, national emergency, or at such other times as the national security requires. In addition to this federal mission, the National Guard has a state mission to provide an organized, trained, and equipped force to protect life and property; and to preserve peace, order, and public safety under state authority. There are capabilities in the National Guard and Reserve which do not exist in the active components.

Over one-half of Army force structure is in the reserve components. Army National Guard and Reserve units provide essential combat, tactical support, and general support units to both active and reserve component forces. Over the next several years, the Army plans to modernize its aviation fleet. In some Army National Guard and Army Reserve units, older aircraft are being removed before replacement aircraft are available. The services should be cautious in removing aging, yet capable, equipment from units scheduled for equipment modernization until the new equipment is on hand.

Naval Reserve units are an integral part of most mission areas of the Navy. The Naval Reserve Force (NRF) has 24 frigates and three amphibious ships, as well as 18 minesweepers and three salvage ships. Two of the Navy's 15 carrier air wings are in the Naval Reserve. Current plans are to place, one out of every 10 ships, and nearly one-half of the Navy's frigates, in the NRF. One-third of Naval maritime patrol squadrons are already in the Naval Reserve.

The Marine Corps Reserve includes a division, an air wing, and a force service support group which provide combat, combat support, and combat service support similar to the active component.

Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units support many combat and combat support missions, including tactical fighter, air reconnaissance, strategic and tactical airlift, aerial refueling, aeromedical evacuation, and aerospace rescue and recovery.

The Coast Guard Reserve provides port security elements and augmentation personnel for the active Coast Guard.

Special Operations Forces (SOF) from both the active and reserve components can be used in peacetime and at all levels of conflict, either independently or in concert with other forces. Special Operations Forces include Army special forces and rangers, special operations aviation, psychological operations, civil affairs, electronic combat, gunships, and special boat units.

The Board believes that automatically reducing the reserve components by some percentage when the active component is reduced is not prudent. Reductions should be based on some objective rationale. Careful analysis of force structure requirements should be conducted before approving such reductions. This analysis will ensure full consideration of reserve component cost effectiveness and force capability requirements based on the threat.

### **Personnel**

All of the reserve components were successful in attaining their Selected Reserve strength goals in FY 1989, however, authorized strength is typically less than actual wartime requirements. Funding levels prevent the reserve components from manning to wartime requirements and, in some cases, to authorized peacetime levels.

The wartime requirement for the Coast Guard Selected Reserve is 27,500. The Coast Guard Ten-Year Plan calls for a strength of 12,750 for FY 1989. However, funds were appropriated for only 12,100 Selected Reservists. The result is that the Coast Guard Selected Reserve has less than one-half of strength required for mobilization. The Coast Guard Reserve Ten-Year Plan should be fully funded to alleviate this situation.

Attrition from the Selected Reserve results in a loss of trained personnel. Replacement training is time consuming and expensive. The most common reasons for attrition include family and job conflicts, lack of meaningful training, lack of communication up and down the chain of command, slow pay, and a lack of advancement opportunities. However, there are indications that retention in the reserve components is improving. This can be attributed to improvements in training, pay systems, benefits, incentives, advancement opportunities, and reenlistment bonuses.

Full-Time Support (FTS) personnel are essential if reserve component units are to meet readiness requirements. They are assigned to reserve component units to provide assistance in administration, logistics, personnel management, recruiting, retention, and training. Additional FTS personnel are needed to fill unresourced requirements and to support new missions and force structure. Senior leadership in the reserve components are concerned about inadequate funding of FTS requirements and the inadequacy of management systems for current FTS personnel. FTS programs should be adequately funded and intensively managed.

Over 12 percent of Select Reservists are women. Women are fully integrated into those career fields available to them. Statutes and service combat exclusion policies define those combat related career fields to which women cannot be assigned.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs initiated mandatory annual screening of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) in 1987. As a result, data on IRR members is greatly improved.

In its FY 1987 report, the Board recommended that a standard identification card be adopted for commissary access by reserve component members. Use of the new cards began on January 1, 1990.

The passage of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) in 1980 for active component personnel was to be followed by a Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) for the reserve components. Proposed ROPMA legislation was initially introduced in Congress in 1987. In 1989, Congressman G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery reintroduced the legislation for consideration by the 101st Congress. The Board recommends that ROPMA be passed by the 101st Congress.

## **Training and Mobilization**

If the United States were to become involved in a large-scale conflict, about 30 percent of the total mobilizable personnel would come from the Ready Reserve. Consequently, training and mobilization issues must continue to receive top priority in today's National Guard and Reserve.

One of the greatest problems facing the reserve components is having enough time available to train. Greater availability and utilization of training simulators would help alleviate this problem. The use of training simulators and devices is very cost-effective and increases combat readiness in the reserve components. The reserve components do not receive adequate funding for training simulators and devices.

All of the reserve components, except the Coast Guard Reserve, use civilian contract training. Such training is often less expensive and in some cases is more effective. Increased funding for civilian contract training is needed.

Training with live ammunition and ordnance improves readiness by increasing skill levels. It also improves retention through realistic and motivating training. It is important to ensure that sufficient live ammunition is available for training reserve component personnel.

The enhanced role of the National Guard in drug enforcement support operations has not degraded reserve component training or mobilization readiness. In fact, it has provided valuable training and produced a positive impact in terms of morale and esprit de corps. It also has enhanced the stature of the National Guard in the communities it serves. The reserve components should provide maximum support of the drug interdiction effort, consistent with readiness requirements.

Overseas training provides some of the most effective training available for the reserve components. Over 86,000 reserve component personnel trained in 96 overseas areas during FY 1989. Preparing for and executing an overseas training mission is very similar to actual mobilization and deployment. Overseas deployments build morale and increase retention. Civic action and technical assistance to friendly nations supports foreign policy and increases United States stature abroad. Additionally, overseas training demonstrates to allies and potential adversaries the ability of the United States to execute its defense strategy.

Given the current world situation, which will likely result in fewer forward deployed forces and smaller forces overall, the ability to effectively mobilize reserve component forces will become an even more important deterrent to aggression. The reserve components participated in a variety of mobilization exercises during FY 1989; lessons learned will further enhance the ability to mobilize reserve component forces.

Airlift and sealift capabilities are inadequate to meet either active or reserve component wartime mobilization requirements. Increased attention needs to be given to airlift and sealift requirements, particularly as they impact the reserve components.

## **Equipment**

DoD policy is to equip first those units that will fight first. Under this policy, the reserve components have received substantial amounts of modern equipment. Reserve component units that are not scheduled to deploy early are provided minimum essential equipment for training.

Modern equipment has significantly increased the readiness of National Guard and Reserve units. Although excellent progress has been made in equipping reserve component units, significant equipment and spare parts shortages remain. Some equipment incompatibility continues to exist between the active and reserve components. These shortages adversely impact the ability of the reserve components to interface and conduct joint operations.

During FY 1989, the Army National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard reduced their equipment shortages by 6, 22, and 35 percent respectively. Congressionally-added National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations have complemented service appropriations and have been used to reduce critical equipment shortages.

The lack of adequate electronic defensive warfare equipment for reserve component aircraft is of continuing concern. Reserve component aircraft need modern defensive systems to allow aircrews to conduct effective training and to enhance their survivability in a high-threat electronic environment. Only limited progress has been made to date.

## **Medical**

The reserve components provide more than two-thirds of wartime medical personnel and approximately three-fourths of the medical evacuation crews. Although significant progress has been made in reducing overall Selected Reserve medical manpower shortages, shortages in critical skills and shortages against wartime requirements remain.

Recruiting incentives have helped to reduce medical personnel shortages. As Selected Reserve medical recruiting success continues, there is a concurrent need for increases in officer drill pay accounts to provide for increases in officer strength.

The opportunity to attend Continuing Health Education (CHE) programs is an important reason for health care professionals to join and remain in a National Guard or Reserve unit. There are over 40,000 Army Reserve health care professionals eligible for CHE. However, in FY 1989, the Army Reserve had CHE funding for only about 2,500.

Deployable Medical Systems (DEPMEDS) equipment consists of standardized modules such as operating rooms, laboratories, x-ray facilities, and patient wards. It utilizes the latest medical technology and support equipment and can be configured to varying types and sizes of hospitals or clinics. Excellent progress is being made on the DEPMEDS distribution plan. The opportunity to train on DEPMEDS equipment is having a positive impact on morale, retention, and medical readiness.

At the request of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Board completed a study on reserve component medical personnel readiness. The study focused on reserve component medical personnel shortages that exist, DoD-Wide, in physician and nurse surgical specialties, and the nurse requirement overall. The report, containing 28 recommendations, was submitted to the Secretary of Defense in October 1989.

## **Facilities**

Reserve component readiness is directly affected by the adequacy of facilities. The reserve components rely on a large number of widely-dispersed facilities in over 5,300 locations and more than 4,500 communities to provide for training, maintenance, equipment storage, and administration. Over 1,000 of these facilities are jointly used by more than one reserve component. Joint use is economical and should be further exploited.

Although many new facilities have been provided, the construction backlog still exceeds \$7.5 billion. Construction backlogs force the reserve components to lease facilities which reduces operations and maintenance funding. This situation is particularly acute in the Army Reserve.

Maintenance and repair of existing facilities is underfunded. Maintenance and repair funding competes against operational, equipment maintenance, and training requirements. The longer maintenance is deferred, the more the repair eventually costs. Increased funding is also required to bring reserve component facilities into compliance with environmental laws.

## **Readiness**


There is no single system for measuring and reporting reserve component readiness.

The Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) is not intended to be the sole indicator of reserve component readiness. In addition to SORTS, the results of mobilization tests, readiness evaluations, operational readiness inspections, and other criteria should be used to determine total combat readiness.

Many other factors, which are delineated throughout this report, can impact a unit's readiness. They include individual skill qualification levels, shortages of full-time support personnel, personnel shortages, personnel turnover, equipment shortages, force structure changes, incompatible equipment, inadequate facilities, and a variety of training issues. Intangible factors such as leadership, morale, cohesiveness, skill retention, and physical fitness of individual members also have an impact on readiness.

When all indicators are considered, the Board believes that, although there are problem areas, the reserve components are generally ready and in a better posture to mobilize and accomplish their wartime missions than during any previous period reviewed by the Board. (M)





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## Preface



### **Background of the Reserve Forces Policy Board**

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (Board) traces its origin to the Committee on Civilian Components, established by President Truman's Executive Order 10007 in 1947. That committee became the Civilian Components Policy Board in 1949 and was established by statute as the Reserve Forces Policy Board in 1952. The Board, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, is "the principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the reserve components." (10 USC 175(c)).

To fulfill its charter, the Board melds the expertise of members of the reserve components with that of representatives from the active components and secretariat appointees who have responsibility for National Guard and Reserve matters.

The Board considers issues from many sources including: Congress; Office of the Secretary of Defense; the services; service committees, councils, or boards; theater commanders; and individual National Guard or Reserve members. The Board establishes and maintains communications with public and private individuals and agencies outside the Department of Defense, as necessary, to accomplish its mission.

The law requires "an annual report from the Reserve Forces Policy Board on the reserve programs of the Department of Defense . . ." (10 USC 113(c)(3)). The report includes the Coast Guard Reserve which is in the Department of Transportation in peacetime. The report is submitted annually, by the Secretary of Defense, to the President and Congress. The report includes recommendations for changes to policies, procedures, or laws which affect the reserve components of the total military force of the United States. The Board also publishes reports following field studies.




This report represents the Board's independent review of reserve component issues, and provides a consensus evaluation of reserve component programs. It also reflects the input and status of the reserve components and how they have achieved readiness. This report does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Department of Defense or any other department or agency of the United States government.

### **Prologue**

This report reflects the activities of the Board during Fiscal Year 1989 (October 1, 1988 through September 30, 1989). During that period, the Board was chaired by the Honorable Will Hill Tankersley. Chairman Tankersley's term concluded in October, 1989. His successor is the Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr.

The Board is aware that major changes in world events occurred while this report was being prepared for publication (October-December 1989). Likewise, major reductions in defense spending have recently been announced. While the exact impact of these events on the reserve components cannot be predicted, they will very



likely be significant. Consequently, this report includes a December 1989 resolution of the Board concerning reserve component budget and force structure reductions. That resolution appears at the end of the Force Structure chapter.

### **Organization of the Report**

The Report is divided into eight chapters (Introduction, Force Structure, Personnel, Training and Mobilization, Equipment, Medical, Facilities, and Readiness). Board recommendations are summarized at the conclusion of each chapter. An Executive Summary is also provided. Appendices include a summary of Board activities during FY 1989, Board staff, and former Board members and staff whose terms were completed during FY 1989. A new addition is the reserve component legislative summary on the inside back cover.

All data contained in this report is as of September 30, 1989, unless otherwise indicated.

### **Comments**

The Board appreciates the helpful comments and recommendations that followed previous reports. Comments are invited and should be addressed to:


**Reserve Forces Policy Board  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Room 3E330, Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-7300** (U)





# Introduction 1

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*"Although much has changed since our founding fathers penned the Constitution, one thing has not—that is our nation's reliance on its citizen soldiers."*

*General John L. Piotrowski, USAF  
Commander-in-Chief  
NORAD and the U.S. Space Commands*



## **Total Force Policy**

The Department of Defense (DoD) defines the Total Force as "The totality of organizations, units, and manpower that comprise the Defense Department's resources for meeting the national military strategy. It includes the manpower resources comprising DoD active and reserve military personnel, DoD civilian personnel, contractor staff, and host-nation support personnel." The DoD implemented the Total Force Policy in 1973. It has been fundamental to U.S. national security policy ever since.

Today, the National Guard and Reserve are full partners with the active components. Reserve component units are integrated into many theater operational plans. Large-scale combat operations could not be successfully conducted without the reserve components. They contribute significantly to our combat, combat support, and combat service support elements. Since the Total Force Policy

was implemented, the reserve components have achieved unprecedented levels of capability and readiness.

In the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990-91, Congress stated:

"(1) Citizens and nationals of the United States have taken up arms to defend their homes and communities, and to secure and preserve the independence of the United States, from the earliest days of the Nation.

"(2) The concept of the citizen-soldier has been a keystone of the defense strategy of the Nation.

"(3) Members of the National Guard and Reserve have served proudly and honorably in every war or conflict involving United States Armed Forces.

"(4) The Total Force Policy of the United States, by placing significant



portions of wartime mission capability and selected day-to-day operations in the National Guard and Reserve, has reinforced the proposition that the Guard and Reserve are essential elements of the national defense establishment of the United States.

"(5) During the 1980's, Congress and the Department of Defense have demonstrated their increasing reliance and confidence in the National Guard and Reserve by expanding missions, increasing training requirements, and providing new state-of-the-art weapons and support equipment.

"(6) The National Guard and Reserve represent a very cost-effective arm of the Total Force, preserving combat capability and retaining valuable trained human resources, especially during periods of austere defense budgets.

"(7) Participation by citizens in the National Guard and Reserve enhances the military readiness of the United States and demonstrates the resolve of the citizenry to protect and preserve American values.

"(8) Participation in the National Guard and Reserve improves the economy by providing individuals with job skills and education."


Additionally, Congress stated that it:

"(1) reaffirms that service in the National Guard and Reserve is in the highest traditions of military service to the country and acknowledges the valuable contribution that men and women who serve in the National Guard and Reserve are making to their country;

"(2) encourages Guard and Reserve participation by all elements of American society; and

"(3) continues to support reliance on the National Guard and Reserve as full partners in the Total Force."

In the recently enacted Defense Authorization Act, Congress stated that there has been no comprehensive, authoritative study of the Total Force Policy since its inception. Congress directed that a study group review the operation and effectiveness of the Total Force Policy. The report is due to Congress by December 1990.





At its December 1989 quarterly meeting, the Reserve Forces Policy Board (Board) adopted the following resolution:

"The Total Force Policy Study directed by Congress will address the issues about which the Board is concerned. The Board believes that its statutory charter to advise the Secretary of Defense on reserve component matters requires participation in the Total Force Policy Study. The Board recommends that a mechanism be developed so that the Board can be

an effective participant in the Congressionally directed Total Force Policy Study."

The Secretary of Defense established a Total Force Policy study group by memorandum dated December 26, 1989. The Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board was designated a member of this study group.


### **Total Mobilizable Personnel**

Table 1 provides the percentages of personnel, by category, who are available for mobilization.

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**Table 1**  
**TOTAL MOBILIZABLE PERSONNEL**

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Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.  
The Coast Guard.

Data as of September 30, 1989.

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### Composition of the Reserve Components

The seven reserve components are the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve.

All National Guard and Reserve personnel are assigned to one of three categories—the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, or the Retired Reserve. All National Guard members are in the Ready Reserve.

The Ready Reserve consists of the Selected Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve, and the Inactive National Guard. It is comprised of military members of the National Guard and Reserve. Some are organized in units, others train as individuals. All are subject for order to active duty in time of war or national emergency.

Table 2 provides the personnel strength for the various categories of the Ready Reserve.

**Table 2**  
**COMPOSITION OF THE READY RESERVE**

Ready Reserve 1,648,700			
Selected Reserve 1,182,600 <sup>1</sup>			Individual Ready Reserve/Inactive National Guard 466,100
Units & Full-Time Support 1,153,900 <sup>2</sup>		Individual Mobilization Augmentees 28,700	
Units (Paid Drill Strength Only) 1,022,400	Full-Time Support (AGR, TAR, & Military Technician Only) <sup>3</sup> 131,500		
Military Technicians 70,100			

Notes: 1. Includes 88,100 in the training pipeline, and 12,000 members of the Coast Guard Reserve.

2. Military Technician strength counted only once.

3. AGR — Active Guard/Reserve; TAR — Training and Administration of the Reserve.

4. Numbers rounded to nearest hundred.

Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.  
The reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1989.



The Selected Reserve is comprised of personnel assigned to units, personnel in the training pipeline, individuals who serve as Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA), and Full-Time Support (FTS) Personnel. Early deploying Selected Reserve units may mobilize and deploy simultaneously with the active component. The Personnel Chapter further details National Guard and Reserve personnel categories.


Selected Reserve units may be either operational or augmentation units. Operational units train and deploy as

units. Augmentation units train together in peacetime, but are absorbed into active units upon mobilization. Selected Reserve units are manned by drilling members of the National Guard or Reserve and by FTS personnel.

Selected Reservists undergoing initial training are mobilizable, but cannot be deployed on land outside the United States until completion of minimum training requirements.

Table 3 shows Selected Reserve contributions to the Total Force, by service.

**Table 3**  
**PARTNERS IN THE TOTAL FORCE**  
**(Active and Selected Reserve Assigned Strength)**



Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

Data as of September 30, 1989.

The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Inactive National Guard (ING) are composed of reserve component members not assigned to units. Most IRR/ING members are trained individuals who previously served in the active component or Selected Reserve. IRR/ING members usually have a remaining military service obligation. They are liable for mobilization and for limited involuntary active duty for training. They may train voluntarily for retirement points and promotion, with or without pay.

The Standby Reserve is a pool of trained individuals who could be mobilized to fill specific manpower needs. The Standby Reserve consists of personnel, such as key federal employees, who are not required to train and are not assigned to units. The size of the Standby Reserve is kept small, as a result of DoD policy which emphasizes accession and retention of personnel in the Ready Reserve.

The Retired Reserve is comprised of all reserve personnel who are receiving retired pay resulting from active or

reserve service; all reserve personnel who are otherwise eligible for retired pay but have not reached age 60, have not elected discharge, and are not voluntary members of the Ready or Standby Reserve; and retired enlisted members who retired with 20 or more years of active duty. When members in the last category complete a total of 30 years of service, they are placed on the appropriate regular or reserve retired list. All retired members who have completed at least 20 years of active federal service (Regular or Reserve), regardless of the retired list to which they are assigned, may be ordered to active duty (under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense) whenever required as determined by the Secretary of the military department in accordance with 10 USC 688.

### **Employment of the Reserve Components**

The likelihood of reduced active component forces will likely result in an increased emphasis on a strong National Guard and Reserve to ensure national security. Selected Reserve units





and personnel, with their increased capabilities, may be a feasible alternative to maintaining a large active component force.

Potential threats to United States interests should be the primary factor in shaping force mix decisions. Sufficient active component forces must be immediately available to deal with low intensity conflicts. However, there are important and unique capabilities in the reserve components which may be required.

Increased dependence on the National Guard and Reserve is having a dramatic impact on the way planning, training, and operations are conducted. The reserve components routinely accomplish an unprecedented variety of training and operational tasks in locations around the world. Numerous examples are cited throughout this report. Such varied and challenging training and operational missions enhance the readiness of the reserve components.

Implementation of the President's National Drug Control Strategy became a Department of Defense mission in FY 1989 and includes a significant role for the reserve components. Reserve component personnel became actively engaged in detecting and countering the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs.

### **Resourcing the Reserve Components**

The reserve components provide a cost-effective means for augmenting the active components and maintaining a strong national defense. The reserve components stand ready to accept additional responsibilities. However, added missions and force structure must be adequately resourced, and they must be of the type that are supportable within the parameters of reserve component recruiting, retention, and training. Reserve component units are expected to train and maintain readiness in less than 20 percent of the time available to active component units. To demand more could adversely impact recruiting and retention. To allow less would degrade readiness.

For the past five years, military spending in real terms has declined. The DoD Authorization Act and the DoD Appropriation Act for FY 1989 did not adequately fund reserve component programs. This will seriously curtail force modernization. Currently, there are authorized officer positions in National Guard and Reserve units which cannot be funded or filled because of insufficient funds for officer drill pay. Needed modern equipment cannot be purchased. Military construction continues to be seriously underfunded.



Personnel accounts increased over FY 1988 levels for all components except the Army Reserve, which remained at the FY 1988 level. The Operations and Maintenance accounts increased for all except the Army's reserve components. Only the Army National Guard and Air National Guard Military Construction accounts increased over FY 1988 levels. The Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, and Air Force Reserve Military Construction appropriations decreased. The Marine Corps Reserve Military Construction is included with Navy Department data. The Coast Guard Reserve does not fund Military Construction.


Budget cuts should be based on the threat and reserve component missions. An "equal share" approach to budget reduction among active and reserve components may not be cost-effective nor prudent and could lead to the "hollow", non-ready force that was prevalent at the beginning of the last decade.

The Board recommends against the concept of "equal cuts" in active and reserve component budgets.

The Board considers it essential to resource the National Guard and Reserve with the necessary personnel and equipment; to provide training support through adequate facilities, ranges, and schools; and to provide sufficient ground vehicle miles, flying hours, and steaming days to maintain individual and unit proficiency. Particular attention should be given to properly equipping combat support and combat service support units, since such a large portion of these assets are in the National Guard and Reserve.

The reserve components are funded by three separate budget appropriations—Personnel, Operation and Maintenance, and Military Construction. In addition, equipment procurement funds are provided by the services. Service procurement funding has been supplemented by dedicated Congressional appropriations each year since FY 1982. Dedicated procurement data is contained in Table 32 and discussed in the Equipment Chapter.

Table 4 displays reserve component appropriations for FY 1989 and provides comparable data for recent years. Amounts shown for procurement reflect the combined total of service and dedicated procurement funding.





**Table 4**  
**RESERVE COMPONENT APPROPRIATIONS**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

		FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1990	Percent Change FY 1988-89
Army National Guard	Personnel	3,207.9	3,297.8	3,246.7	3%
	Operation and Maintenance	1,859.7	1,826.9	1,859.1	-2%
	Military Construction	184.4	229.2	205.2	24%
	Procurement	757.9	1,436.0	2,248.8	89%
Army Reserve	Personnel	2,222.9	2,240.8	2,201.1	1%
	Operation and Maintenance	859.4	810.8	872.1	-6%
	Military Construction	95.1	85.8	79.5	-10%
	Procurement	273.6	203.7	313.2	-26%
Naval Reserve	Personnel	1,509.2	1,588.4	1,572.2	5%
	Operation and Maintenance	924.4	955.7	923.5	3%
	Military Construction	73.7	60.9	56.6	-17%
	Procurement	211.5	234.2	179.0	11%
Marine Corps Reserve	Personnel	294.2	315.0	314.5	7%
	Operation and Maintenance	68.9	77.4	77.4	12%
	Military Construction <sup>1</sup>	—	—	—	
	Procurement	73.4	105.8	134.9	44%
Air National Guard	Personnel	987.7	1,032.9	1,057.5	5%
	Operation and Maintenance	1,957.7	2,021.9	2,021.5	3%
	Military Construction	151.3	158.0	199.0	4%
	Procurement	864.9	1,095.6	1,010.5	27%
Air Force Reserve	Personnel	615.0	654.2	662.8	6%
	Operation and Maintenance	999.7	1,072.5	1,008.5	7%
	Military Construction	79.3	70.6	46.2	-11%
	Procurement	352.0	444.6	281.5	26%
DoD Total	Personnel	8,836.9	9,129.1	9,054.8	3%
	Operation and Maintenance	6,669.8	6,765.2	6,762.1	1%
	Military Construction	583.8	604.5	586.5	4%
	Procurement	2,533.3	3,519.9	4,167.9	39%
Coast Guard Reserve	Personnel	37.5	43.0	47.0	15%
	Operation and Maintenance	25.0	24.0	24.0	-4%
	Military Construction	—	—	—	
	Procurement	—	—	—	
Total	Personnel	8,874.4	9,172.1	9,101.8	3%
	Operation and Maintenance	6,694.8	6,789.2	6,786.1	1%
	Military Construction	583.8	604.5	586.5	4%
	Procurement	2,533.3	3,510.2	3,865.8	

Note: 1. Marine Corps Reserve figures included in Naval Reserve Military Construction.


Sources: FY 1988, Budget of the United States Government.

FY 1989 and FY 1990, Budget of the United States Government.



# Force Structure 2

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*"One of the key ingredients in our preparedness, the Total Force Policy, has placed increasing reliance on our reserve components, and has transformed the Guard and Reserve into one of the world's most powerful military forces."*

*Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., USN  
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff*



## General

The mission of the reserve components is to provide trained, well-equipped units and individuals for active duty in time of war, national emergency, or at such other times as the national security requires. War-fighting contingency plans and some peacetime operations require participation by the reserve components.

In addition to this federal mission, the National Guard has a state mission to provide an organized, trained, and equipped force to protect life and property, and to preserve peace, order, and public safety under state authority. The dual state-federal status of the National Guard is derived from the militia clause in the U.S. Constitution.


Army National Guard and Reserve units provide essential combat, tactical support, and general support units to both active and reserve component

forces. Naval Reserve units are an integral part of most mission areas of the Navy. They include carrier air wings, maritime patrol, surface combatants, and air and medical support. The Marine Corps Reserve includes a division, an air wing, and a force service support group which provide combat, combat support, and combat service support of the same type as the active component. Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units perform many combat and combat support missions including tactical fighter and reconnaissance, strategic and tactical airlift, aerial refueling, aeromedical evacuation, and aerospace rescue and recovery. The Coast Guard Reserve provides port security elements and augmentation of the Coast Guard.

Today, greater dependence than ever is being placed on National Guard and Reserve forces. The following sections and tables show that the reserve components are a significant part of the total force upon which our country relies for national security.

## Army

The Army relies on National Guard and Reserve units to fill out its wartime organization. Over one-half of the Army force structure is in the reserve components, including 42 percent of combat units, 58 percent of combat support units, and 70 percent of combat service support units. The Army National Guard has an assigned strength of 456,960, plus 10,126 personnel that are in Inactive National Guard (ING) status. The Army Reserve has an assigned strength of 319,244 in the Selected Reserve and an additional 274,558 members assigned to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).



The Army's CAPSTONE program aligns Army reserve component units with their wartime gaining commands. The program integrates active and reserve component units. The program also allows reserve component units to focus training on wartime tasks and on areas where they would deploy upon mobilization.

Army National Guard and Reserve units assigned to active divisions are called "roundout" units. The roundout program brings an understructured command in one component, up to its wartime configuration, by assigning a unit from another component. Under this program, 9 of the 18 active component divisions are structured with roundout brigades or battalions from the National Guard or Reserve. Reserve component roundout units are given the same equipment priorities as their parent active component units, based upon deployment priority. A few reserve component units are rounded out with active component units.

During FY 1989, the Army National Guard activated 73 units and deactivated 40. The Army Reserve activated 59 units and deactivated 19. Organizational changes and equipment modernization over the last five years have caused considerable turbulence in the Army's reserve components. The impact of this turbulence varies according to unit type. In many cases, it changes individual skill requirements within a unit. Such changes require careful management to ensure that adequate retraining opportunities are available, so that skill mismatch problems are minimized.

Over the next several years, the Army intends to modernize its aviation fleet.



The Army Aviation Modernization Plan looks forward 30 years to provide the framework for modernizing total army aviation to meet changes in the threat, refinements in force design, and warfighting requirements. The modernization plan will reduce the number of aircraft in aviation units. This is a result of increased capabilities of advanced technology that allow Army Aviation to achieve more warfighting capability with fewer aircraft. As a result of budget cuts, seven attack helicopter battalions have been eliminated from the Total Army. Plans for activation or conversion of three Army National Guard and two Army Reserve attack helicopter battalions have been cancelled.

In some Army National Guard and Army Reserve units, older aircraft are being removed as part of this modernization program before replacement aircraft are available. This results in decreased reserve component training and combat capabilities. The Board believes that reductions should only take place as replacement aircraft are provided to reserve component units. Retaining the older equipment maintains valuable training resources and at least some combat capability.



The Army's position is that "The removal and retirement of the older, less capable, and less supportable aircraft from the US Army rotary wing fleet allows for the procurement of the modern systems. Some units will be required to "downsize" early to their newer and smaller objective designs, before they receive modern systems. There will be some degradation of near-term capability that will increase the risk associated with our ability to support the warfighting requirements in the unified and specified commands. This short term risk is acceptable, as it facilitates providing adequate resources for the future US Army Aviation force structure."

The Board recommends that the services be cautious in removing aging, yet capable, equipment from units scheduled for equipment modernization until the new equipment is actually on hand.

At the direction of Congress, the Army is examining proposals that would affect the command and control of the Army Reserve, including concepts for a major organizational change. The Secretary of the Army is required to submit a recommendation to Congress by March 15, 1990.

In 1986, significant growth was programmed for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve during FY 1990-1994. This planned growth was reflected in the Program Objective Memorandum. Subsequent analysis concluded that the programed growth could not be resourced with either equipment or personnel.

In 1988, Total Army Analysis (TAA) 96/97 reduced Army reserve component force structure allowances to more closely match programmed end strength. Actions to accomplish overstructure reduction were: eliminate errors in the force accounting system, deactivate obsolete units, take advantage of equipment force modernization savings, delay unit activations/conversions, reduce Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) organizations to better align with the active component, and reorganize some functional areas Army-wide.

In March 1989, the Army Vice Chief of Staff approved the proposed force structure reductions which will align Army National Guard and Army Reserve force structure allowance with programmed end strength by FY 1995.

Army National Guard and Army Reserve contributions to the Total Army are reflected in Table 5.

**Table 5**  
**ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE**  
**CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL ARMY**


Unit Types	Army National Guard Percent of Army	Army Reserve Percent of Army	Combined Percent of Army
Heavy Helicopter Units	100	0	100
Infantry Scout Groups	100	0	100
TOW Light Anti-tank Infantry Battalions	100	0	100
Training Divisions and Brigades	0	100	100
Pathfinder Detachments	50	50	100
Railroad Units	0	100	100
Judge Advocate General Units	2	98	100
Civil Affairs Units	0	97	97
Psychological Operations Units	0	87	87
Public Affairs Units	58	29	87
Heavy Equipment Maintenance Companies	76	10	86
Separate Brigades	73	7	80
Engineer Battalions (Combat)	52	25	77
Hospital Units	8	69	77
Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Companies	18	59	77
Engineer Bridge Companies (Non-Divisional)	43	31	74
Corps Support Groups, Headquarters	15	58	73
Chemical Smoke Generator Units	6	66	72
Supply and Service Companies	31	40	71
Engineer Battalions (Combat Heavy)	30	37	67
Truck Companies	37	30	67
Theater Defense Brigades	50	17	67
Military Police Companies (Non-Divisional)	44	21	65
Conventional Ammunition Companies	18	43	61
Field Artillery Battalions	52	9	61
Military Intelligence Units	4	54	58
Signal Battalions (Corps Area)	43	14	57
Infantry Battalions	50	5	55
Special Forces Groups	25	25	50
Mechanized Infantry Battalions	47	2	49
Armored Battalions	43	2	45
Area Support Groups, Headquarters	30	15	45
Watercraft Companies	14	29	43
Armored Cavalry Regiments	40	0	40
Combat Divisions	36	0	36


Note: Percentages determined by counting like-type units.

Sources: Army National Guard.

Army Reserve.

Data as of September 30, 1989.





## Navy

The Naval Reserve has 151,505 personnel in the Selected Reserve and 86,556 personnel in the IRR. The Selected Reserve is organized into three types of units for alignment with gaining commands.

- **Commissioned Units (6 percent):** Reserve combat units, with organic equipment, such as aircraft squadrons, NRF ships, or construction battalions. These units are tasked to deliver a complete operational entity to the operating force, are commanded by either active or reserve component officers, and manned primarily by Selected Reserve personnel.
- **Reinforcing Units (34 percent):** Units which augment active component commissioned units and operating staffs with trained personnel. Such units are tailored to augment designated ships, aircraft squadrons, craft, special warfare commands, and

marine expeditionary forces. Their function is to allow peak operations for an indefinite period of time.

- **Sustaining Units (60 percent):** Units which augment fleet and force support activities with trained personnel. They provide a surge capability, and sustain the high level of activity required to support deployed forces. Such units provide augmentation to security groups; intelligence, communications, and meteorological activities; intermediate maintenance units; and staff, naval station, and headquarters organizations.

Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships are under the operational control of the Commanders-in-Chief, Atlantic or Pacific Fleet. The Naval Reserve trains on NRF ships and craft and provides a significant portion of their mobilization manpower. Naval Reserve Force ships are manned (at reduced strength from normal peacetime levels) by active component personnel, Training and



Administration of the Reserve (TAR) program personnel, and drilling Selected Reservists.

The NRF has 24 frigates and three amphibious ships, as well as 18 minesweepers and three salvage ships.

Two of the Navy's 15 carrier air wings are in the Naval Reserve. Current plans are to place, over the next several years, one out of every 10 ships, and nearly one-fourth of the Navy's frigates, in the NRF. One-half of Naval maritime patrol squadrons are in the Reserve.


Changes to the Naval Surface Reserve during FY 1989 include the activation of 112 units and the deactivation of 76 units. The activations include 17 Physician Reservists in Medical Universities and Schools (PRIMUS) "units." They consist of medical

personnel who are programmed to fill fleet hospital and other medical billets upon mobilization. The first eight of 15 planned Naval Reserve fleet hospitals were commissioned during FY 1989.

One Knox-class frigate and one guided-missile frigate were added to the NRF in FY 1989. A Craft of Opportunity (COOP) unit and three Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare (MIUW) units were commissioned, increasing the total MIUW units in the NRF to 26. One NRF ship, the USS EDSON, was decommissioned.

FY 1989 force structure changes to Naval Reserve aviation units were limited to decommissioning one aerial refueling squadron and establishing a new airborne mine countermeasures squadron.





The modernization of both Naval Reserve carrier air wings should be completed by FY 1992. They are receiving new equipment simultaneously with the active component and will soon be fully supportable aboard the Navy's most modern aircraft carriers. Current plans are to reduce the number of aircraft in all 13 Naval Reserve air patrol squadrons by 33 percent and reduce

aircrews by 20 percent.

The Naval Reserve will receive HH-60H helicopters over the next two years. They will replace HH-1K helicopters and combine the strike rescue and special support missions of these older aircraft.

Contributions by the Naval Reserve to the Total Navy are displayed in Table 6.

**Table 6**  
**NAVAL RESERVE**  
**CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL NAVY**

<u>Unit Types</u>	<u>Naval Reserve Percent of Navy</u>
Combat Search and Rescue Squadrons	100
Fighter/Composite (Adversary/Service) Squadrons (U.S. Based)	100
Logistic Airlift Squadrons (U.S. Based)	100
Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Units	100
Naval Embarked Advisory Teams	100
Strike Rescue/Special Warfare Support Helicopter Squadrons	100
Naval Control of Shipping (Military Personnel)	99
Cargo Handling Battalions	93
Military Sealift Command (Military Personnel)	85
Ocean Minesweepers	85
Mobile Construction Battalions	68
Fleet Hospitals	50
Intelligence Program Personnel	48
Airborne Mine Countermeasures Squadrons	40
Maritime Air Patrol Squadrons	35
LAMPS MK-I Anti-Submarine Warfare Squadrons	33
Frigates (FFG-7s/FF-1052s)	24
Carrier Air Wings	14
Amphibious Warfare Ships	3

Note: Percentages determined by counting like-type units or personnel.

Source: Naval Reserve.

Data as of September 30, 1989.

## Marine Corps

The Marine Corps Reserve has 43,576 personnel in the Selected Reserve and 36,552 in the IRR. Mobilization missions for the Marine Corps Reserve are:

- Selectively augment the active component to field three Marine expeditionary forces at full wartime strength.
- Selectively reinforce active component Marine expeditionary forces with selected Marine Corps Reserve units.
- Provide the capability to field a Marine expeditionary brigade (with reduced aviation and limited combat service support capability) to reinforce an active component Marine expeditionary force.
- If augmentation/reinforcement is not

ordered, provide the capability to field a division, wing, and force service support group.

- If augmentation/reinforcement is ordered, provide a nucleus to reconstitute a division, wing, and force service support group.





In FY 1989, the Marine Corps transferred three bulk fuel companies and two bridge platoons from the active component to the reserve component. One light antiaircraft missile battery is scheduled to be activated in FY 1992.

Sixteen Reserve rifle companies are

designated to augment 16 active infantry battalions in time of war. This provides the required wartime structure in the event of mobilization.

Contributions by the Marine Corps Reserve to the Total Marine Corps are displayed in Table 7.

**Table 7**  
**MARINE CORPS RESERVE**  
**CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL MARINE CORPS**

<u>Unit Types<sup>1</sup></u>	<u>Marine Corps Reserve Percent of Marine Corps</u>
Civil Affairs Groups	100
Bulk Fuel Companies	62
Force Reconnaissance Companies	50
Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies	50
Tank Battalions	40
Beach and Port Operations Companies	40
Heavy Artillery Batteries	33
Infantry Battalions	27
Light Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalions	25
Low Altitude Air Defense	25
<u>Aircraft Types<sup>2</sup></u>	
Adversary Aircraft	100
Observation Aircraft	33
Aerial Refueling Aircraft	29
Light Attack Aircraft	28
Fighter Aircraft	20
Electronic Warfare Aircraft	18
Helicopters	18

Notes: 1. Percentages determined by counting like-type units.

2. Percentages determined by counting primary authorized aircraft.

Source: Marine Corps Reserve.

Data as of September 30, 1989.

## Air Force

There are 116,061 Air National Guard and 83,214 Air Force Reserve personnel in the Selected Reserve. There are 53,117 Air Force Reservists in the IRR.

Most Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units are aligned with wartime gaining commands and train with them regularly. This facilitates integration into the active force upon mobilization. Several reserve component programs augment the active component in peacetime. In addition to flying and maintaining reserve component aircraft, thousands of Air Force Reserve personnel fly and maintain active component aircraft in the Air Force Reserve Associate Program.

Due to severe fiscal constraints in FY 1989 and FY 1990, the Air Force announced force structure reductions in nine Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units. The Air Force also announced a plan to remove a wing-equivalent of tactical fighters from the Guard and Reserve by 1991, as the active Air Force is reduced by two wing-equivalents. These reductions would primarily be accomplished by reducing fighter units from 24 to 18 aircraft as they convert to more modern aircraft, and by reducing tactical airlift units from 16 to 12 or from 12 to 8 aircraft. In both the FY 1989 and FY 1990 Appropriations Conference Reports, Congress directed and funded restoration of all of the Guard and Reserve force structure.

Some Guard and Reserve units changed missions in FY 1989 and others transitioned to modern aircraft

with increased capabilities. The Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve undertook a new joint Air Force and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air base satellite communications mission. The program utilizes NATO air base satellite communications equipment to provide survivable and reliable voice and teletype communications, primarily for command and control and secondarily for logistics.

During FY 1989, the Air National Guard converted four operations groups and one training squadron to more modern aircraft. One unit changed missions from tactical reconnaissance to airlift. Also, activation of a C-5 unit at Stewart AFB, New York was completed.





The Air Force Reserve continued to upgrade its tactical fighter force in FY 1989 with the conversion of two F-4 units to F-16A/B aircraft. The Air Force also announced that the last two Air Force Reserve F-4 units would modernize to the F-16A/B by FY 1991. Due to a Congressional addition of eight C-130H aircraft in FY 1988, the only C-130As remaining in the Air Force Reserve are the AC-130A gunships at Duke Field, Florida. H-model gunships will replace these A-models as AC-130Us are procured for the active component. Upgrade is important, since these aging AC-130As are rapidly becoming unsupportable for this increasingly important special operations mission. The congressionally-directed addition of six C-130H aircraft in FY 1989 will allow the Air Force Reserve to convert six of eight C-130B aircraft at

Youngstown, Ohio, sooner than expected. The Air Force Reserve increased its total strategic airlift capability in FY 1989 by completing conversion of the second C-130 unit from C-130s to C-5s. These two units at Kelly AFB, Texas and Westover AFB, Massachusetts, operating 32 C-5s, provide an economical, peacetime operating tempo, while providing needed wartime surge capability.

The Air Force has significantly modernized the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. State-of-the-art equipment has been provided or is scheduled for delivery to most flying units.

Contributions by the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve to the Total Air Force are displayed in Table 8.



**Table 8**  
**AIR NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR FORCE RESERVE**  
**CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL AIR FORCE**

<u>Unit Types</u>	<u>Air National Guard</u>	<u>Air Force Reserve</u>	<u>Combined</u>
<u>Flying Units</u>	<u>Percent of</u>	<u>Percent of</u>	<u>Percent of</u>
<u>Aircraft</u> <sup>1</sup>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Air Force</u>
Aerial Spraying	0	100	100
Strategic Interceptor Force (U.S. Based)	92	0	92
Air Rescue/Recovery	24	39	63
Tactical Airlift	35	24	59
Tactical Air Support	55	0	55
Tactical Reconnaissance	46	0	46
Tactical Fighters	25	8	33
Special Operations	11	18	29
Weather Reconnaissance	0	27	27
Aerial Refueling/Strategic Tankers	19	4	23
Support Aircraft	18	0	18
Strategic Airlift	6	11	17
<u>Aircrews</u> <sup>2</sup>			
Aeromedical Evacuation	25	67	92
Strategic Airlift (Associate)	0	50	50
Tanker/Cargo (Associate)	0	38	38
Aeromedical Airlift (Associate)	0	30	30
<u>Non-Flying Units</u> <sup>2</sup>			
Aerial Port	14	57	71
Engineering Installation	69	0	69
Combat Communications	66	0	66
Combat Logistics Support Squadrons	0	59	59
Tactical Control	54	0	54
Civil Engineering	30	17	47
Air Force Bands	38	5	43
Strategic Airlift Maintenance (Associate)	0	40	40
Reconnaissance (Technical)	39	0	39
Aircraft Control & Warning	25	0	25
Medical Personnel <sup>3</sup>	12	9	21
Weather	14	1	15
Communications Flights	2	0	2
Electronic Security	1	0	1


Notes: 1. Percentages determined by counting primary authorized aircraft.

2. Percentage determined by counting authorized personnel.

3. Excludes aeromedical evacuation personnel.

Sources: Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve.

Data as of September 30, 1989.



## Coast Guard

There are 12,058 personnel in the Coast Guard Selected Reserve and 5,199 in the IRR. Except for three deployable port security units (351 total personnel), the Coast Guard Reserve augments active component units upon mobilization. Reservists also support Coast Guard peacetime operations.

The Coast Guard Reserve's Ten-Year Plan provides for considerable growth. However, implementation is contingent on the budget process. If the plan is consistently supported and funded, 50 port security units will be activated in the next five years. Each unit is comprised of approximately 30 individuals. No units are planned for deactivation.

Contributions by the Coast Guard Reserve to the Total Coast Guard are displayed in Table 9.

**Table 9**  
**COAST GUARD RESERVE**  
**CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL COAST GUARD**

<u>Unit Types<sup>1</sup></u>	<u>Coast Guard Reserve Percent of Coast Guard</u>
Deployable Port Security	100
Marine Safety Office	43
Operational Shore Facilities	31
Repair/Supply/Research	25
Command & Control	23
Vessels	19
Training Commands	14
Air Stations	3

Note: Percentages determined by counting mobilization billets.

Source: Coast Guard Reserve.



## Special Operations Forces

Special Operations Forces (SOF) fulfill a vital role in protecting our national security interests. Their capabilities can be used in peacetime and at all levels of conflict, independently, or in concert with other forces. SOF include special forces, rangers, special operations aviation, psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs (CA) as Army components. Naval components include SEAL and small boat units while Air Force representation includes both rotary and fixed wing aircraft. Challenges posed by low intensity conflict require increased attention to reserve component SOF.

SOF missions include:

- Direct Action
- Unconventional Warfare
- Foreign Internal Defense
- Special Reconnaissance
- Theater Search and Rescue
- Psychological Operations
- Civil Affairs

Collateral activities include:

- Security Assistance
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Counterterrorism
- Antiterrorism
- Counternarcotics
- Search and Rescue
- Special Activities


Other activities include:

- Deception Operations
- Demonstrations
- Show of Force

Army National Guard and Army Reserve SOF units comprise four of the

eight special forces groups in the Army. One special operations aviation battalion is in the Army National Guard. Three of the four psychological operations groups are in the Army Reserve. There are three civil affairs commands, five civil affairs brigades, four civil affairs groups, and 24 civil affairs companies in the Army Reserve. This represents 97 percent of the Army's civil affairs forces.

Extensive use of PSYOP and CA units are highlighted by the significance of these forces on the modern battlefield. These units have profited greatly as a result of SOF revitalization. Examples are the Department of Defense PSYOP Master Plan, PSYOP and CA close association with SOF and their assignment to USSOCOM. The CA Master Plan should be finalized shortly and is hoped that it will do as much for CA as the PSYOP Master Plan has done for PSYOP. Another benefit of SOF association is that the organizing, equipping and deploying of PSYOP and CA personnel has been proven to work



well under the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Conversely, the ability of USSOCOM to perform its statutory mandate is directly influenced by how assigned PSYOP and CA forces are organized with the component commands. PSYOP and CA units are undergoing a modernization and reorganization that is designed to provide better support to theater requirements. Plans include the activation of 26 new PSYOP and 13 new CA units by the end of the 1990's.

Operational control of all CONUS-based SOF units is exercised by USSOCOM. On December 1, 1989, United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) was activated as a major Army command (MACOM). The USASOC mission and major responsibilities is to act as component headquarters for USSOCOM, provide command and control for active and reserve Army SOF, organize, train, and equip Army SOF, and to prepare subordinate units for deployment and employment. In October 1990, a reserve component major subordinate command to USASOC will be activated.



This will formalize the peacetime chain of command for Army Reserve SOF units.

Army National Guard SOF units remain under state control until mobilized or called to Federal service. The Chief, National Guard Bureau and Commander, USASOC have signed a memorandum of agreement addressing command and control issues. Under the agreement, USASOC oversees and evaluates Army National Guard training and readiness.

After mobilization, operational command for all Army reserve component units is through USASOC to USSOCOM. Upon deployment, operational command is passed from the Commander-in-Chief, USSOCOM to the theater Commander-in-Chief. Administrative command continues to be exercised through the service components of the respective theater commanders.

The Naval Reserve has four commissioned special boat units (SBU). They comprise 67 percent of all SBUs in the Navy. In addition, there are a number of reserve detachments which augment various active component SOF units and staffs.

Operational control of Naval Reserve special operation units is through Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command, to the Commander-in-Chief, USSOCOM. Administrative control is through Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command, to Chief of Naval Operations. Post mobilization command relationships would remain the same until deployment. Upon deployment, command passes to theater commanders.



There is one special operations unit in the Air National Guard. It is under state command for contingencies not requiring mobilization. During peacetime, the Military Airlift Command establishes training and evaluation standards for the unit. Upon mobilization, command passes to the Military Airlift Command, with operational control by USSOCOM, until the unit is deployed to another unified command.


The Air Force Reserve SOF consists

of one AC-130 special operations group, which is 50 percent of the Air Force's gunship capability, and one helicopter (HH-3) special operations squadron, which is 100 percent of the Air Force HH-3 SOF capability.

The Marine Corps Reserve and the Coast Guard Reserve do not have special operations units.

Contributions of the Selected Reserve to Special Operations Forces are displayed in Table 10.

**Table 10**  
**SELECTED RESERVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO**  
**SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES**



Note 1: Percentages determined by counting primary authorized aircraft.

Source: The services.

Data as of September 30, 1989.



## **Resolutions of the Reserve Forces Policy Board**

### **Force Structure Reductions**

During its December 1988 quarterly meeting, the Board adopted the following resolution:

"... the Total Force Policy established in the early 1970's places increased responsibilities on the reserve components of U.S. forces. Reserve component units perform important missions and support functions on a daily basis. Their priority for manning, training, and equipment modernization is not based on their peacetime status as forces "in reserve", but on the basis of their direct integration into the nation's operational plans and missions."

National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, January 1987

"The Total Force Policy has been a fundamental element of national

security since 1973. An objective of that policy is a balanced mix of Active and Reserve forces that fully utilizes all available assets while ensuring maximum military capability is achieved at the minimum realistic cost. The National Guard and Reserves have become full partners with the active components for the purpose of deterring war, providing defense, and, if necessary, waging war. The reserve components have achieved unprecedented levels of capability and readiness as the result of the Total Force Policy.

"The Reserve Forces Policy Board (Board) is concerned by emerging trends that may jeopardize the capabilities and readiness that have been so painstakingly developed and sustained in the reserve components. Examples exist in all Services. These circumstances arise largely because of externally imposed fiscal constraints and budgetary limitations that deprive the Department of Defense of required resources. Examples of these trends are especially apparent in the aviation programs of the Services.

"In the Army a critical need exists to modernize aircraft. Because of limited resources, the Army is being forced to reduce near term capabilities to fund research, development, and future acquisition of a new more capable helicopter. Soon, over 2,000 aircraft will have to be eliminated from the Army inventory. The Army plans to reduce the Army's active component and its reserve components. This means the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve will lose aircraft; units will be downsized with reductions in the number of pilots, maintenance personnel and facilities. The net effect in the reserve components would be a reduction from existing mission capabilities and readiness. It is uncertain whether withdrawn aircraft, even though serviceable, would even be stored for near term contingencies before the new aircraft are available.

"Air Force fiscal constraints are forcing a reduction in tactical fighter structure and aircraft in the active force and the reserve components. The planned Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve portion of that reduction is tactical fighter aircraft and personnel that equate to a tactical fighter wing. The net effect is a major loss of current capabilities in the Air Force's reserve components.

"The foregoing examples of service plans would adversely impact the capabilities and readiness of our reserve components—capabilities that would be absolutely necessary if the reserve components were called upon to go to war.

"The military capability of the National Guard and Reserve represent

the most cost effective combat capability available within the Total Force. Reduction of that capability increases the risk to national security. Long-range plans and programs to restore that capability in the future is not an acceptable substitute.

"As a consequence, the Board recommends caution and deliberation before the Services implement reductions in reserve component capabilities. Alternatives should be fully and thoroughly considered.

"The Board further recommends that if budget constraints cause the Services to make force structure reductions in the active forces, there should be a thorough analysis on the feasibility and cost effectiveness of transferring that capability to the reserve components."

### **Reserve Component Budget Reductions**

During its December 1989 quarterly meeting, the Reserve Forces Policy Board was briefed by the Services on programs and budgets. The Board





received indications that the Services are considering reserve component (RC) force structure reductions due to budgetary constraints. The Board adopted the following resolution:

“The Board believes that automatic RC reductions on some percentage basis when the active component is reduced is not prudent without careful analysis to provide an objective rationale. The Board recommends that careful analysis be conducted before approving such reductions. This analysis will ensure full consideration of RC cost effectiveness and force capability requirements resulting from the projected threat.”

### **Summary and Recommendations**

Today, more than ever, greater dependence is being placed on the reserve components. Most warfighting contingency plans and some peacetime operations require participation by the reserve components.

Significant force structure modernization has been made in the reserve components. This entails some unit activations and reorganizations.

Although the Total Force ultimately benefits, short-term turbulence impacts individual skill qualification, recruiting, retention, facilities, and training. The result may be a temporary reduction in readiness. However, decreased readiness status does not necessarily mean reduced unit capability.

The Board believes automatic reserve component force structure reductions on some percentage basis when the active component is reduced is not prudent without careful analysis to provide an objective rationale. A careful analysis should be conducted before approving such reductions to ensure full consideration of reserve component cost effectiveness and force capability requirements resulting from the projected threat.

The Board recommends that:

- The services be cautious in removing aging, yet capable, equipment from units scheduled for equipment modernization until the new equipment is actually on hand.
- If budget constraints cause the services to make force structure reductions in the active forces, a thorough analysis should be conducted on the feasibility and cost effectiveness of transferring that capability to the reserve components.
- Careful analysis should be conducted before approving reserve component budget reductions, to ensure full consideration of reserve component cost effectiveness and force capability requirements resulting from the projected threat. (M)



# Personnel 3

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*"Just as our Armed Forces have a duty to the nation, I believe the Nation has a duty to our people in uniform—to those who have served, to those who serve now, and those who will serve in the future."*

*General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA  
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff*



## General

The United States relies on an all-volunteer armed force. Accordingly, programs are required to attract and retain quality individuals in the National Guard and Reserve. Congress has approved and funded needed recruiting and retention incentives to assist in personnel management. With a declining recruit population, budgetary constraints, and ever-increasing competition from the private sector, bonuses and incentives are a major factor in recruiting and retaining quality reserve component personnel. The Department of Defense (DoD) offers a variety of incentive programs which should be continued and enhanced if the reserve components are to meet their manpower requirements. The only incentive available to the Coast Guard Reserve is the Montgomery G.I. Bill.



## Personnel Strengths

Tables 11-14 reflect the personnel strength of the Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve at the end of FY 1989.







**Table 11**  
**SELECTED RESERVE PERSONNEL STRENGTH**  
**(Numbers in Thousands)**

	FY 1989 <sup>2</sup> Wartime Requirement	FY 1988 Assigned	FY 1989 Assigned
Army National Guard	486,800	455,182	456,960
Army Reserve	338,900	312,825	319,244
Naval Reserve	160,200	149,457	151,505
Marine Corps Reserve	47,700	43,556	43,576
Air National Guard	118,200	115,221	116,061
Air Force Reserve	88,500	82,116	83,214
DoD Total	1,240,300	1,158,357	1,170,560
Coast Guard Reserve	27,500	11,986	12,058
Total	1,267,800	1,170,343	1,182,618

Notes: 1. Selected Reserve consists of unit, IMA, AGR, TAR and Statutory Tour personnel.

2. Numbers rounded to nearest hundreds.

Sources: DoD Comptroller.

The Coast Guard.

Data as of September 30, 1989.

**Table 12**  
**INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE AND**  
**INACTIVE NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL STRENGTH**

Army National Guard	10,126
Army Reserve	274,588
Naval Reserve	86,556
Marine Corps Reserve	36,552
Air National Guard	0
Air Force Reserve	53,117
DoD Total	460,939
Coast Guard Reserve	5,199
Total	466,138

Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.

The Coast Guard.

Data as of September 30, 1989.



**Table 13**  
**STANDBY RESERVE PERSONNEL STRENGTH**

Army National Guard	0
Army Reserve	632
Naval Reserve	9,979
Marine Corps Reserve	1,401
Air National Guard	0
Air Force Reserve	<u>17,299</u>
DoD Total	29,311
Coast Guard Reserve	<u>562</u>
Total	29,873

Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.  
The Coast Guard.

Data as of September 30, 1989.

**Table 14**  
**MILITARY RETIREE PERSONNEL STRENGTH**

Army	588,300
Navy	474,734
Marine Corps	91,743
Air Force	<u>586,366</u>
DoD Total	1,741,143
Coast Guard	<u>31,000</u>
Total	1,772,143

Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.  
The Coast Guard.

Data as of September 30, 1989.

All of the reserve components were successful in attaining their Selected Reserve recruiting goals in FY 1989. However, budgeted strength can be significantly less than wartime requirements. Current funding levels prevent the reserve components from filling to wartime requirements, and in some cases to authorized peacetime levels.

The Army National Guard attributes its success in part to a one percent reduction in enlisted losses. Losses decreased to 17.7 percent of the total enlisted force.

The Army Reserve implemented a successful direct assignment program to assist in meeting its FY 1989 strength objectives. The Army Reserve Personnel Center solicited selected Individual Ready Reserve members for possible assignment to a troop program unit or to Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) positions. Only those who possessed the required grade and skill were contacted. As a result, 4,823 IRR soldiers were assigned to Army Reserve troop program units and 3,469 were assigned to IMA positions.

Although the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve were able to attain their Selected Reserve budgeted strength, neither component's Force Structure Allowance (FSA) was fully funded. In the case of the Army Reserve, for example, only 92 percent of its troop program unit (TPU) positions were budgeted for fill in FY 1989. In FY 1990, funds are not available to fill 5,472 authorized officer and 9,049 enlisted positions in the Army Reserve, regardless of the ability to recruit them. While the budgeted shortage appears relatively small on a

percentage basis, it is not evenly distributed by grade, skill, or geographical area. Consequently, the shortage of drill pay funding has a significant detrimental effect on Army Reserve readiness. Any future budget reductions affecting drill pay would exacerbate this situation.

The Naval Reserve ended the year with a shortage of about 900 Selected Reservists. However, the Naval Reserve started FY 1989 with a deficit of 2,900 because recruiting was intentionally slowed in FY 1988 to conserve drill pay. A FY 1989 recruiting initiative was the establishment of the Naval Reserve Recruiting Command which consolidated all Selected Reserve recruiting under one chain of command. This permitted much more efficient use of recruiters and resources. More flexible drill options, and broader





commander involvement in retention programs. Officer shortages remain in the critical medical specialties. Sufficient funds are budgeted in FY 1990 to fill the remaining vacancies. Recruiting efforts are being directed to fill specialty shortages.

The budget remains the principal barrier to correcting Coast Guard personnel shortages. The overall wartime requirement for the Coast Guard Selected Reserve is 27,500. The Coast Guard Ten-Year Plan called for a strength of 12,750 for FY 1989. However, funds were appropriated for only 12,100 Selected Reservists. The result was that less than one-half of Coast Guard Selected Reserve mobilization strength was attained. The other reserve components are funded at 90 percent or more of their requirements. Continued inadequate funding of the Coast Guard Reserve will result in the inability of the Coast Guard to perform its wartime missions and limit its effectiveness in drug interdiction. Further delay in implementation of the Ten-Year Plan will make it even more difficult to catch up in later years.

The Board recommends that the Coast Guard Reserve Ten-Year Plan be authorized and funded. The Board also recommends that continued emphasis be given to reducing critical skill shortages in each of the reserve components.

## Recruiting Results

Tables 15 and 16 show the number of accessions for each reserve component during FY 1989. Table 16 also compares enlisted recruiting objectives and actual accessions.



use of authorized absences for drilling personnel with short-term hardships or physical problems, allowed personnel who previously would have been transferred to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) to remain in the Selected Reserve. Funding is available in FY 1990 to fill most Naval Reserve positions, if personnel can be recruited.

The Air National Guard exceeded its FY 1989 overall Selected Reserve budgeted end strength goals by four percent. Excess accessions were in the enlisted specialties. The Air National Guard attributes its success to effective recruiting, command emphasis on retaining quality people, and effective force management. Officer shortages remain in the critical specialties. Sufficient funds are budgeted in FY 1990 to fill these vacancies.

The Air Force Reserve exceeded its overall FY 1989 end strength goal by five percent. Excess accessions were in the enlisted specialties. The Air Force Reserve attributes its success to effective recruiting, challenging training opportunities for members, and unit

**Table 15**  
**PERSONNEL ACCESSIONS**

	Officer		Enlisted		Total Accessions
	Prior Service	Non-Prior Service	Prior Service	Non-Prior Service	
Army National Guard	5,685	307	35,341	35,791	77,124
Army Reserve	11,219	275	46,207	29,239	86,940
Naval Reserve	4,152	1,241	23,384	7,849	36,626
Marine Corps Reserve	999	0	4,559	7,487	13,045
Air National Guard	1,042	99	7,356	4,293	12,790
Air Force Reserve	1,886	205	8,805	2,844	13,740
DoD Total	24,983	2,127	125,652	87,503	240,265
Coast Guard Reserve	42	0	357	650	1,049
Total	25,025	2,127	126,009	88,153	241,314

Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.


The reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1989





**Table 16**  
**ENLISTED RECRUITING GOALS vs ACCESSIONS**



Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.  
The Coast Guard.  
Data as of September 30, 1989.

## Personnel Shortages

Personnel shortages adversely affect the readiness of a unit. Each of the reserve components are experiencing shortages of 10 percent or more in various officer, warrant officer, and enlisted skills. The Board is concerned that upon mobilization some units may be faced with a reduced capability because of personnel shortages. Shortages of medical personnel are discussed in the medical chapter.

The Army National Guard lists 39 officer, 30 warrant officer, and 82 enlisted Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) that are more than 10 percent short of wartime requirements. The Army Reserve lists 55 officer, 24 warrant officer, and 48 enlisted MOSs that are more than 10 percent short of wartime requirements.

The Army is examining these specialties to develop exportable training packages and segmented active

duty training. Additionally, some cross-leveling, reclassification, and refresher training of personnel will have to occur upon mobilization to bring deployable units to full strength with qualified personnel.

The Naval Reserve lists 23 officer, 20 warrant officer, and 33 enlisted fields that are more than 10 percent short of wartime requirements. However, enlisted shortages in non-technical ratings do not significantly impact readiness, since many are filled under valid substitution criteria by personnel with other ratings.

An increase in the number of billets in the Naval Reserve warrant and limited duty officer programs is planned over the next several years. Additionally, recent improvements in enlisted advancement opportunities are permitting more junior, technically-proficient petty officers to become eligible to apply for these programs. Bonus programs are being used to attract both enlisted veterans

and new accessions into ratings with shortages.

The Marine Corps Reserve identified 12 officer, 5 warrant officer, and 12 enlisted skill areas that have significant shortages against wartime requirements.

The Air National Guard lists four critical enlisted personnel shortages. They are emphasized in recruiting and retraining action, and have been given primary consideration for incentive bonus programs.

Only one percent of the Air Force Reserve's unit enlisted critical skill authorizations remain vacant. This includes medical positions and reflects a significant improvement over the past few years.


The Coast Guard Reserve has six officer and 16 enlisted career fields with critical shortages against wartime requirements. Many of these same skills are undermanned in the active component. The impact of these



shortages is exacerbated by the difficulty of maintaining skill qualification levels when a unit converts from one type of equipment to another. Intensified recruiting and training efforts will be undertaken to resolve these shortages.

### **Overstrength Manning**

All of the reserve components have policies that allow overstrength assignment (overmanning) of personnel against authorized positions. Overmanning is an important management tool for the reserve components. While service policies vary, they appear to be justified and are monitored to prevent abuses. Normally, overmanning does not result in an overstrength condition overall, but only in certain areas where the number of available personnel exceed unit vacancies. However, overmanning can also result when expected growth or turnover does not occur, or during unit conversions which cause changes in skill requirements.



Overmanning is generally restricted to junior officer and enlisted grades. Exceptions are made in certain professional fields, such as chaplain, legal, and medical. Some components restrict overmanning to certain time limits. Personnel are normally not promotable while in an overstrength status. This serves as an incentive to voluntarily retrain into a needed career field, or to travel a greater distance to a unit with a suitable vacancy.

It should be noted that funding constraints and officer strength restrictions can make overmanning undesirable. In a resource-constrained environment, overstrength units can degrade the combat readiness of units which are not authorized to be overstrength by preventing adequate personnel fill. In addition, an overstrength situation can reduce morale in a unit by restricting or totally eliminating promotion opportunities.


In those instances where overmanning can be effectively utilized, it provides commanders a degree of flexibility to maintain sufficient strength to ensure that a full complement of trained personnel are available in the event of mobilization.

The Board recommends that overstrength policies be continued within authorized manpower ceilings.

### **Personnel Attrition**

Attrition from the Selected Reserve results in a loss of trained personnel. Replacement training is time consuming and expensive. Commanders and supervisors must work to overcome those factors within their control to reduce the loss of trained personnel.





The reserve components indicate that their most common reasons for attrition include family and job conflicts, lack of meaningful training, lack of communication up and down the chain of command, slow pay, and a lack of advancement opportunities.

There are indications that retention is improving. This can be attributed to improvements in training, pay systems, benefits, incentives, advancement opportunities, and reenlistment bonuses.

- Actions being taken by the Army National Guard to reduce attrition include expanded leadership training, improved sponsorship programs, establishment of realistic attrition reduction goals, greater emphasis on awards and recognition, increased efforts to care for soldiers, and increased family-oriented activities.
- Actions being taken by the Army Reserve include a revised promotion policy, employing consolidated promotion boards, which allow soldiers to compete for promotion within geographic areas rather than just in their unit; adoption of a new pay system; broad dissemination of the results of the 1989 Survey of Army Reserve Troop Program Unit Soldiers to commanders and senior NCOs, to make them more aware of the causes of attrition; and the revision of resident and portable training packages by the Army Reserve Readiness Training Center.
- The Naval Reserve is conducting an in-depth review of causes of attrition which is expected to be completed in FY 1990.
- Actions being taken by the Marine Corps Reserve include establishment



of Full-Time Support career planner positions and monitoring of manpower plans to ensure that the qualifications of recruits match position requirements.

- The Air National Guard is aggressively promoting incentive programs and increasing advertising in an effort to improve retention.
- The Air Force Reserve has categorized some types of losses as "manageable" and established loss-rate goals. Beginning in FY 1989, a report was provided to commanders to focus their attention on manageable reenlistment and retention problems within their units. Manageable retention has improved from 82 percent in FY 1987 to 88 percent in FY 1989. The Air Force Reserve considers 90 percent to be a realistic retention goal.
- The Coast Guard has produced and distributed a motivational retention/benefit pamphlet designed to reduce attrition.

The Board recommends that retention continue to be given a high priority as a means of increasing readiness and reducing recruiting and training costs.

### **Enlisted Tenure Programs**

Tenure programs are designed to eliminate grade stagnation, improve upward mobility, and provide commanders an opportunity to maximize personnel talent and experience through a progressive assignment policy. They are also intended to encourage younger members to stay in Selected Reserve units by providing promotion opportunities.

The Board has reviewed the enlisted tenure programs of each of the reserve components. These programs have caused fully-qualified personnel to be discharged, transferred to the IRR, or retired. However, the purpose of these programs is to enable unit commanders to retain younger members and improve morale.

The Army National Guard program considers all enlisted personnel who are qualified for retirement at two-year intervals. Only the best qualified are retained. Grade is not a consideration. The non-retention of Army National Guard soldiers creates vacancies in all enlisted grades.

The Army Reserve program also seeks to ensure that only the best qualified soldiers are retained in the Selected Reserve beyond 20 years of service. Military personnel records are reviewed at designated periods. Soldiers qualified for retirement are removed from the Selected Reserve based on maximum years of service by grade.

In 1988, the Naval Reserve expanded its High-Year Tenure Program. This program limits Selected Reserve service based on length of service by grade, as in the active component. It has been effective in reducing grade stagnation. Further improvements are anticipated as the program is fully implemented.

The Marine Corps Reserve limits the tenure of enlisted personnel by age and years of service. The maximum age is 60. Waivers can only be granted by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Reenlistment waivers may be granted based on the needs of the Marine Corps.

Air National Guard policy is that enlisted members are separated no later than age 60. Management of the force is enhanced by the Selective Retention of Air National Guard Officer and Enlisted Personnel Program. This program is designed to avoid the loss of combat readiness by regularly assessing the potential of each retirement-eligible member. A Selective Retention Review Board is appointed by each state Adjutant General. That board recommends to retain or not retain, but the ultimate decision is made by the state Adjutant General.

The Air National Guard Selective Retention Program requires commanders to project the potential of each retirement-eligible member and the member's contributions to the unit mission. The judicious use of the selective retention process minimizes grade stagnation and increases promotion opportunities.

The Air Force Reserve will begin a High-Year Tenure Program in FY 1992. This program will limit participation in

the Selected Reserve to a maximum of 33 years of service or age 60, whichever occurs first. Eligible members can compete for a one-time, three-year extension in their 32nd year of service. Extensions will be based on the needs of the Air Force Reserve and are expected to be few in number. The first group will be retired, reassigned to inactive status, or discharged beginning in January 1992. This program is





expected to reduce grade stagnation in both senior and junior enlisted grades. This should improve grade ratios, and ensure greater promotion opportunities for enlisted personnel. Retention of members serving in critical skills should also improve. It is anticipated that this will help improve overall retention.

The Coast Guard Reserve separation policy states that "... unless retired with pay or transferred to the retired Reserve, an enlisted member shall be discharged upon reaching age 60 unless retained to age 62 to complete 20 years of satisfactory federal service." This enables the Coast Guard Reserve to maintain an effective force and to enhance promotion opportunities.

The Board recommends that enlisted tenure programs be continued, but utilized to improve overall retention.

### **Montgomery G.I. Bill**

The Montgomery G.I. Bill (MGIB) is a highly-effective recruiting and retention incentive. For the National Guard and Reserve, it is a non-contributory, general entitlement program. Members must have a high school diploma or equivalent, and are required to enlist or agree to serve in the Selected Reserve for a period of six years. Participants who remain members of the Selected Reserve have up to 10 years (after becoming eligible for the MGIB) to use the entitlement.

MGIB benefits are payable for up to 36 months of education at the rates of \$140, \$105, \$70, and \$35 per month for full-time, three-quarter, half-time, and less than half-time study respectively. The maximum total benefit is \$5,040. Study must be in a VA-approved program of education. A recent change recommended by the Board, and enacted by Congress, authorizes payments on a percentage scale for vocational-technical training beginning October, 1990. To be eligible, members must agree to serve in the Selected Reserve for six years after October 1, 1990.

There are currently 395,000 reserve component officer and enlisted personnel eligible for the MGIB program. Of that number, approximately 157,000 (40 percent) have applied for benefits. The number of applicants continues to increase. A breakout of qualified and enrolled personnel by component is provided in Table 17.

**Table 17**  
**MONTGOMERY G.I. BILL USAGE**

	<u>Eligibles</u>	<u>Applicants</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Army National Guard	179,001	61,722	34%
Army Reserve	72,023	38,152	53%
Naval Reserve	37,786	16,332	43%
Marine Corps Reserve	19,284	10,645	55%
Air National Guard	48,707	18,513	38%
Air Force Reserve	34,484	10,282	30%
DoD Total	391,285	155,646	40%
Coast Guard Reserve	4,041	1,250	31%
Total	395,326	156,896	40%

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.

The Coast Guard.


Data as of September 30, 1989.

### **Reserve Pay**

Prompt and accurate receipt of pay is the expectation and entitlement of every member of the reserve components. Anything less adversely affects retention and reduces readiness. The services should be able to meet this challenge with the computer technology now available.

In the Army National Guard, the average time elapsed from drill attendance to receipt of drill pay is 30 days. A change to the pay system is being considered. If adopted, elapsed time for receipt of drill pay would be reduced to approximately two weeks. The Army National Guard plans to implement a new pay system in 1991. It will allow payments within five workdays following drill attendance. The system will also provide all data elements required upon mobilization. This system will be used by both the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.





In the Army Reserve, the average time elapsed for receipt of drill pay is 30 days. Significant progress has been made in improving timeliness and accuracy of Army Reserve drill pay over the past 18 months. This progress is attributable to the Pay Attention Project initiated by the Chief, Army Reserve in 1987 and the systems enhancements and automated interfaces established by the Army Finance and Accounting Center.

A future objective is to realign the Army Reserve pay input network to operate within command channels. The purpose of this is to increase command emphasis on the importance of timely drill attendance input. According to the 1989 Survey of U.S. Army Reserve Troop Program Unit Soldiers, "having pay problems" was one of the top reasons junior enlisted soldiers gave as reasons for leaving the Army Reserve.

The Naval Reserve reports that when drill information is properly recorded, personnel normally receive their drill pay within 30 days. A number of initiatives are in progress or planned to improve timeliness of pay:

- The Navy Finance Center (NFC) now issues drill pay checks twice a month, instead of once a month.
- The Naval Reserve Personnel Center (NRPC) now provides additional customer service hours on Saturdays.
- NFC provides a toll-free number for members to call to resolve pay problems.
- Improved interface between NFC and NRPC by more frequent update of computer tapes.
- Implementation of the Reserve Standard Training Administration and Readiness Support (RSTARS) system.

The direct deposit pay method will become mandatory for all Naval Reserve accessions commencing in January 1990. Additionally, direct deposit will become mandatory when a member's status changes, such as at reenlistment. Direct deposit provides quicker payment to the reservist, and a more efficient process for the services.

The key to reducing drill pay delays is the prompt, accurate reporting of drill attendance and personnel data. RSTARS will electronically report this data from the field to NRPC. More importantly, built-in system safeguards will prevent reporting of erroneous data. RSTARS should be fully operational early in FY 1990. Lack of prompt, accurate pay has been a significant morale problem for Naval Reservists. Eliminating pay problems should enhance retention.

The Marine Corps Reserve reports the average time from drill attendance to receipt of drill pay is 21-30 days. The

Marine Corps is currently conducting a survey on pay to determine possible improvements.

In the Air National Guard, drill pay is usually received in seven to 10 days. No new programs are planned.

In the Air Force Reserve, the average time elapsed from drill attendance to receipt of drill pay is five working days or less. The average time has been reduced from 30 days or more in the last few years. This was accomplished by increasing the number of available pay run days from one per month to six-to-eight per month.

Coast Guard Reservists are paid approximately one month after submission of drill attendance data.

The Board recommends that efforts be continued to pay reserve component personnel within 10 days of drill attendance.

### **Sixth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation**

The Sixth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (6th QRMC) was organized to "... conduct a complete review of the principles and concepts of the compensation system for members of the uniformed services and to report... options and recommendations for improving the current compensation system." If adopted, many of the recommendations will benefit members of the reserve components, and correct inequities in current laws and policies.

The Board expressed concern to the Secretary of Defense about two recommendations made by the 6th QRMC.

First, the Board was unable to support the extensive changes in reserve component retirement recommended by the 6th QRMC because:

- The Board believes that the current retirement system in the reserve components is cost-effective and has been instrumental in providing a high quality force.
- Recent surveys of the reserve components indicate the current system is effective, is generally supported by the members of the reserve components, and needs no changes.
- The Board does not believe that promotion stagnation or an aging force is a problem in the reserve components, yet the alternative system appears to be developed on the basis of such allegations.
- The Board believes the reserve components have sufficient flexibility to achieve and maintain



desired force profiles, yet the claim is made that the alternate retirement system would provide flexibility.

- The Board believes that the cost analysis of the alternate system inadequately considered the costs of recruiting and training replacements for early retirees.

Second, the Board is opposed to the proposal of the 6th QRMC to eliminate the 15 retirement points that reserve component members currently receive for membership. The elimination of the 15 membership points represents an unjustified reduction in reserve component retirement compensation for a substantial number of reserve component members. The Board agrees with the proposal to increase the maximum retirement points for inactive duty training (IDT) to 75 per year.

The 6th QRMC Report was submitted to OMB on August 3, 1989, with the two-tier retirement proposal. The Board recommends that the current retirement system in the reserve components be continued.

The Board recommends that the 6th QRMC proposal to eliminate the 15 retirement points for membership not be enacted. The Board also recommends that the maximum retirement points for IDT be increased to 75 per year as recommended by the 6th QRMC.

### **Full-Time Support**

Full-Time Support (FTS) personnel are assigned to reserve component units to provide assistance in all areas relating to readiness, including administration, logistics, personnel management, recruiting, retention, and training. These functions are essential if reserve component units are to meet readiness requirements and commitments to the Total Force. The FTS program has made an important contribution to the capabilities, readiness, and training of the National Guard and Reserve. Sufficient numbers of FTS personnel are critical to the readiness of the reserve components.

Full-Time Support requirements were funded at over 90 percent during FY 1989 in all reserve components except the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. Their requirements were funded at 75 percent and 63 percent respectively.







**Table 18**  
**FULL-TIME SUPPORT PERSONNEL STRENGTH**

	Army National Guard	Army Reserve	Naval Reserve	Marine Corps Reserve	Air National Guard	Air Force Reserve	DoD Total	Coast Guard Reserve	Total
<b>AGR/TAR Personnel<sup>1,2</sup></b>									
Required	41,218	26,288	22,505	2,133	7,948	772	92,916	0	92,916
Requested	26,199	13,344	21,991	1,945	7,948	672	72,099	0	72,099
Assigned	25,893	13,344	21,987	1,948	8,019	635	71,826	0	71,826
<b>Military Technicians<sup>2</sup></b>									
Required	31,529	9,881	0	0	26,100	10,061	77,571	0	77,571
Requested	28,120	8,429	0	0	23,644	10,061	70,254	0	70,254
Assigned	28,390	8,529	0	0	23,688	9,299	70,106	0	70,106
<b>Active Component</b>									
Required	243	4,634	7,006	4,996	612	605	18,096	850	18,946
Requested	243	4,634	7,006	4,996	612	605	18,096	599	18,695
Assigned	576	4,431	7,239	5,430	600	592	18,868	599	19,467
<b>Civil Service</b>									
Required	406	5,517	3,214	352	1,957	4,526	15,972	150	16,122
Requested	406	4,538	3,002	352	1,997	4,526	14,821	112	14,933
Assigned	424	4,697 <sup>3</sup>	2,895	333	1,963	4,856	15,168	112	15,280
<b>Total</b>									
Required	73,396	46,320	32,725	7,481	36,617	15,964	204,555	1,000	205,555
Requested	54,968	30,945	31,999	7,293	34,201	15,864	175,270	711	175,981
Assigned	55,483	31,001	32,121	7,711	34,270	15,382	175,968	711	176,679

Notes: 1. Includes AGR in the Army, officers and enlisted on Statutory Tours in the Air Force Reserve, TAR in the Naval Reserve and military FTS in the Marine Corps Reserve.

2. Air National Guard AGR and MT positions can be filled by either status personnel.

3. Includes civilians financed by Military Construction Appropriations.

Sources: Offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.

DoD Comptroller.

The reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1989.

Sufficient Full-Time Support personnel are needed to perform many of the peacetime administrative functions now being performed by drilling members of the National Guard and Reserve. This would allow drilling members of the reserve components to devote more time to training. Time constraints are the most significant training detractor in the reserve components.

It is imperative that qualified FTS personnel be allocated in sufficient

numbers to fill positions at all levels. It is especially critical that FTS positions in Selected Reserve units and organizations be fully resourced to avoid unfilled positions as personnel are transferred from one position to another. Without adequate funding of FTS personnel, new force structure or maintenance of new equipment must be supported at the expense of existing missions.

Additional FTS personnel authorizations are needed to fill

unresourced requirements and to support new missions and force structure. More personnel, and in some instances higher grades and ranks, are needed. Senior leaders in the reserve components are concerned about inadequate funding of FTS requirements and the management of current FTS resources.

The categories of FTS personnel are briefly described below. Complete definitions are in Department of Defense Directive 1205.18.

- **Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) Personnel:** National Guard or Reserve members on active duty for 180 days or more who provide full-time support to the reserve components and are paid from the Reserve Personnel Appropriations of the military departments concerned. This classification includes Naval Reserve Training and Administration of the Reserve (TAR) personnel and statutory tour personnel.
- **Military Technicians (MT):** Civilian personnel who occupy technician positions. They are required to be members of the Selected Reserve in

the component which they support and simultaneously maintain civil service status.


- **Active Component (AC) Personnel:** Military personnel on active duty who directly support the reserve components. They are paid from active component appropriations. This classification includes all Coast Guard military personnel assigned to Full-Time Support billets.
- **Civil Service (CS) Personnel:** Federal (Title 5) and state civil service personnel, other than military technicians, who provide full-time support to the reserve components but do not occupy technician positions. They are not required to be members of the Selected Reserve.

The numbers vary in each category for each component. Differences are based on many service-unique factors which have been carefully analyzed to provide the best program to support readiness.

Tables 18 and 19 provide a breakout, by reserve component and category, of Full-Time Support personnel.



**Table 19**  
**PERCENTAGE OF FULL-TIME SUPPORT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED**



Note: Percentage based upon personnel assigned as a percent of required strength.

Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.  
 The reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1989.

The Board supports the FTS program and reaffirms its 1987 recommendation that "opposes any proposal that would mandate the replacement of AGR personnel with those from the active component or reduce the current compensation or benefits provided to AGR members. The AGR force is a dedicated, professional force which

makes a vital contribution to overall reserve component readiness by assisting drilling reserve component members to achieve and maintain their readiness requirements." The Board also recommends that Full-Time Support programs be adequately funded and managed.

## **Warrant Officer Management**

House Resolution 2979, Warrant Officer Management Act (WOMA), is pending in the Congress. WOMA pertains mostly to the management of active component warrant officers. However, the Act provides that each service secretary is authorized to implement WOMA provisions for reserve component warrant officers. WOMA also contains provisions for establishment of the grade of Chief Warrant Officer Five, which is applicable to both active and reserve components.

The Army National Guard and Army Reserve are implementing the Total Warrant Officer System-Reserve Components (TWOS-RC), which establishes the first Army personnel management system for reserve component warrant officers. TWOS-RC includes assignment, promotion, and training criteria, along with a rank-coding designation for all warrant officer positions. WOMA provides legislative authority for implementation of portions of TWOS-RC, and provides legislative authority for implementation of a best-qualified promotion system for reserve component warrant officers.



The Marine Corps is also rank-coding warrant officer positions, which will affect warrant officers in the Marine Corps Reserve.

## **Women in the Reserve Components**

Statutes and service combat exclusion policies define those combat-related career fields to which women cannot be assigned. Otherwise, men and women possessing similar skills and qualifications are assigned on an equitable basis. Women are fully integrated into those career fields available to them.

Department of Defense combat exclusion policies do not apply to the Coast Guard. Coast Guard policy is that all female members be accorded the same career opportunities and responsibilities as male members, limited only by a unit's ability to provide separate berthing and hygiene facilities. The Commandant of the Coast Guard has further stated that it would not be in the best interest of the units concerned, or the Coast Guard in general, to remove female crew members during mobilization.

Tables 20 and 21 provide data on women officers and enlisted personnel in the reserve components for FY 1989.

The Board recommends that career advancement opportunities for women in the reserve components be expanded.


The Army National Guard and Army Reserve have programs designed to ensure that family members are informed about current unit activities, training cycles, and mobilization issues.

This helps make families aware of the existence and nature of their benefits, both in peacetime and upon mobilization. Commanders are authorized to conduct family orientation training for up to eight hours each year.




**Table 20**  
**WOMEN IN THE SELECTED RESERVE**

	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Percent of Selected Reserve</u>
Army National Guard		
Officer	3,529	7%
Enlisted	26,468	7%
Army Reserve		
Officer	11,603	19%
Enlisted	50,817	20%
Naval Reserve		
Officer	3,484	12%
Enlisted	18,186	15%
Marine Corps Reserve		
Officer	162	5%
Enlisted	1,584	4%
Air National Guard		
Officer	1,319	9%
Enlisted	13,461	13%
Air Force Reserve		
Officer	3,305	19%
Enlisted	12,238	19%
DoD Total		
Officer	23,402	13%
Enlisted	122,754	12%
Coast Guard Reserve		
Officer	110	7%
Enlisted	1,245	12%
Total		
Officer	23,512	13%
Enlisted	123,999	12%
Total Women	147,511	12%
Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. The Coast Guard. Data as of September 30, 1989.		



**Table 21**  
**PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN IN THE SELECTED RESERVE**



Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.  
The Coast Guard.

Data as of September 30, 1989.

### **Family Member Mobilization Support**

Each of the reserve components recognizes the importance of family support of National Guard and Reserve members. Family attitudes have a major impact on retention of trained personnel. Further, members will be more effective upon mobilization if they are confident that their families will be cared for. Family members should be informed of their options and responsibilities. The reserve components are doing this in a variety of ways.

The National Guard Bureau established its Family Program in 1986. The Family Program includes a requirement that each State headquarters ensure that unit commanders assist in educating and preparing families for mobilization. Additionally, each State Family Program incorporates family briefings and processing during mobilization exercises, prepares mobilization assistance handbooks and briefings, provides annual unit commander briefings to families, and provides family sponsorship for new members.

The Naval Reserve Force Guide to Mobilization of the Selected Reserve, with addendum, provides individuals and family members a comprehensive planning guide and mobilization reference.

The Marine Corps Reserve does not have an official program to provide mobilization information to families. However, individual units have family programs and local publications which deal with this subject.

In April 1988, Air Force Reserve units were furnished a videotaped premobilization briefing for reservists and their families. The tape provides information on matters that should be accomplished by the member prior to mobilization. The video is available for viewing at the member's unit or home. A premobilization handbook is being published for use in conjunction with the video. The handbook will contain information on Air Force personnel programs and services to include personal affairs, financial information, benefits and entitlements, use of military facilities, preparation of wills, and many other subjects. A copy will be provided to each member during FY 1990.

The Coast Guard Reserve requires an annual two to four-hour training period for all Selected Reserve members. The training includes legal rights, financial planning, and family planning for mobilization. Annual active duty for training includes premobilization legal counseling, and the preparation of wills and powers of attorney.

The Board recommends that the services continue to support family programs.

## **Single Parents and Military Couples**

The Board reviewed the policies of the reserve components concerning enlistment and reenlistment of single parents (single member with dependent(s) in the household) and military couples (military member married to military member) to determine what, if any, impact such personnel would have upon mobilization readiness.

Service policies stipulate that prior service single parents may join a reserve component as long as they are otherwise qualified for enlistment, were single parents upon separation from active duty, and dependent care responsibilities were not a factor in release from active duty. As a general rule, a non-prior service single parent cannot join a reserve component.

Military couples present a somewhat different set of circumstances. Those with no dependents do not present a problem. Those with dependents must generally follow the same rules as a single parent. Once a military couple is in the reserve components and subsequently acquires minor dependents, they may continue to





participate if their parental obligations do not conflict with their military duties. They may be required, however, to have a family care plan that addresses care of minor dependents upon mobilization. Officer applicants must meet the same general rules. In some components, officer applicants may request a waiver.

The reserve components believe that this issue would not impact mobilization. However, some of the reserve components do not track this information, information is incomplete, or systems are still being developed to gather the information.

The Board recommends that systems be implemented to gather information to better analyze the impact of single parents and military couples on reserve

component mobilization readiness.

### **Individual Mobilization Augmentees**

The Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Program provides trained individuals to augment, upon mobilization, active component organizations which have wartime requirements above their peacetime strength authorizations. IMAs are Selected Reservists assigned to active component organizations, the Selective Service System, or the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The National Guard does not have an IMA program.

Table 22 shows the number of IMAs in the reserve components at the end of FY 1989.

**Table 22**  
**INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES**

	<u>Required</u>	<u>Budgeted</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Assigned Percent of Required</u>
Army Reserve	19,166	14,655	14,708	77%
Naval Reserve	847	847	31	4% <sup>1</sup>
Marine Corps Reserve	2,722	2,722	1,299	48%
Air Force Reserve	<u>18,369</u>	<u>13,230</u>	<u>12,985</u>	71%
DoD Total	40,288	30,638	29,043	72%
Coast Guard Reserve	<u>43</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>20</u>	47%
Total	40,331	30,661	29,043	72%

Note: Remainder of budgeted IMA positions are filled with drilling reservists.

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.  
The reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1989.



Department of Defense policy, as stated in DoD Directive 1235.11, requires all IMAs to perform 12 to 14 days of annual training (AT) in their wartime assignment status each year; Inactive duty training (IDT) is optional. This policy notwithstanding, not all IMA positions in all services are fully funded. The Army Reserve, for example, could fund only about 60 percent of its IMAs to attend annual training. Some components require IMAs to perform up to 48 drills. The IMA Program has a direct, positive impact on active component mobilization readiness. Subject to the availability of funds, IMAs are eligible for additional professional development and educational opportunities.

Although underfunded for identified IMA requirements, the Army Reserve has made an effort to maintain a constant fill rate on funded IMA authorizations. Vacancies are primarily the result of personnel turbulence within the IMA force.

The Naval Reserve has a small IMA program. The 31 Naval Reserve IMAs are currently assigned to the Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Selective Service System, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Navy medical department.

The Marine Corps Reserve has capped the funded manning level for IMAs at 1,300. All positions are filled. Consideration is being given to increasing the manning level by approximately 100 billets. The program has been successfully implemented up to budgeted strength levels, but remains limited due to restrictive funding.

The Air Force Reserve IMA program is a vital part of the Air Force Total

Force. Although the program is currently manned at over 98 percent of funded authorizations, there are still critical enlisted skill vacancies in security police, intelligence, and medical career areas; and officer vacancies in the medical, intelligence, and disaster preparedness fields. These shortages generally reflect those that exist in the active component. IMA program managers and Air Force Reserve recruiters have specifically targeted these specialties for intensive recruiting.

The Coast Guard Reserve has only a limited number of IMA billets. There are three billets in the Department of Defense, 15 officer billets provided under a reimbursable agreement with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and three reimbursable billets in the Selective Service System. There are no enlisted IMA billets.

The Board recommends that Service IMA program authorizations be filled and adequately funded.





### Individual Ready Reserve Screen


The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) consists of trained individuals who, in most cases, have previously served in an active component or the Selected Reserve. IRR members have some period of contractual commitment remaining, or have voluntarily extended their military affiliation. They may voluntarily participate in annual training, inactive duty training for retirement points, and be considered for promotion.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Reserve Affairs initiated mandatory annual screening in 1987 to provide the services updated information about their IRR members. Data on IRR members has been significantly improved through screening programs. Personnel data is updated and briefings are provided concerning their military status, rights, and responsibilities. Additionally, on-site screening provides realistic training to the organizations and personnel involved in the mobilization process.

Table 23 shows, by service, the percentage of the IRR screened in FY 1989.

**Table 23**  
**INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE SCREENING RESULTS**  
**FY 1989**



Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.

Data as of September 30, 1989.

Due to funding limitations, the Army Reserve screened only 23 percent of its IRR in FY 1989—10 percent fewer than FY 1988. Based on experience gained from previous screenings, field grade officers and members within one year of their mandatory removal date or expiration of term of service were not screened. As a cost-saving measure, some IRR members were screened while they participated in active duty for training. Effective screening can decrease the workload upon mobilization, and has proven to be an effective vehicle to inform IRR members about opportunities in the Selected Reserve. Since the Army Reserve initiated the IRR screen, nearly 9,000 participants have joined either active or reserve units.

The Naval Reserve screened 27,280 of 87,281 members (32 percent) of its IRR in FY 1989. This represented 73 percent of the targeted population of 38,485 which met eligibility criteria for screening. Full funding for IRR screening was provided. Screening has had a positive impact on the mobilization readiness of the Naval Reserve IRR.

The Marine Corps Reserve screened 16,577 of 36,551 (45 percent) of its IRR in FY 1989. Based on the results of the IRR screen, the Marine Corps Reserve estimates that 92 percent of its IRR population can be contacted in the event of mobilization.

The Air Force Reserve screened 16,274, or 31 percent, of its IRR in FY 1989. As a one-time test, the Air Force screened 3,285 selected members with critical wartime shortage specialties. This was done in conjunction with a field test exercise of the Air Force "Push-Pull" Mobilization Plan. By

testing the mobilization plan, the Air Force is better able to assess the preparedness, availability, and readiness of IRR members to fill wartime shortages in the event of a national emergency. In addition, 19,654 members, not included in the overall percentage, were screened by mail.

The Coast Guard was not resourced to conduct an annual IRR screen. It does, however, conduct a random-sample, telephone survey every two years. The Coast Guard Reserve does not consider its IRR a viable early-response asset.

The IRR screen has proven its value both in managing IRR personnel and for filling positions in the Selected Reserve. The Board recommends continued support be provided for the IRR Screen.

### **Armed Forces Commissary Privilege card**

In its FY 1987 Report, the Board recommended that a standard identification card be adopted for commissary access by reserve component members. The new cards were scheduled to be issued prior to the end of 1989 and completed on January 1, 1990. Personnel in garrison units will be issued the card at their unit. IMAs will receive the card at their personnel center.





### **National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve**

The Veterans' Reemployment Rights Law (Public Law 93-508, December 3, 1974, as amended by Public Law 94-286, May 14, 1976), gives reserve component members the right to take time off from their civilian jobs to participate in military training. This legislation, and the activities of the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (NCESGR), are important to all reserve component members.

The NCESGR ombudsman provides advice and counsel concerning employer obligations. The Board asked the NCESGR ombudsman to comment on problems, if any, concerning lack of support from employers, particularly public service employers, whose employees work weekend shifts. His comments follow.

"Public and private sector jobs entailing weekend work continue to present problems for some Guardsmen and Reservists.

However, during a six-month period, less than five percent (117 out of 2,378) of the contacts received by NCESGR's national ombudsman involved questions or problems concerning weekend employment in public service jobs. Among federal, state and local government agencies, these were primarily in the areas of law enforcement, fire, medical, transportation and public utility services. Conflicts appear to result from manpower and funding constraints or supervisors not being aware of or ignoring employer policies and reservist job rights mandated by federal and local laws.

"Problems involving guardsmen/reservists employed by the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) accounted for an additional two and one-half percent (60 of 2,378) of the NCESGR contacts. Many USPS supervisors and workers are not aware of the Postmaster General's Statement of Support of the Guard and Reserve signed on August 12, 1988. Other factors contributing to job-reserve duty problems include misunderstanding of USPS military leave policy, staffing shortages, constraints on overtime, and the perception that the agency's workload takes precedence over peacetime military duty."

"While such data identify trends that help direct NCESGR's retention efforts, NCESGR is not capable of assessing the overall impact on retention. Data maintained by the ombudsman and the U.S. Department of Labor provide insight on certain cases where job-

reserve conflicts resolved in favor of reservists have ensured their continued Guard/Reserve affiliation."

"Mission One" is a new NCESGR program to place a trained volunteer at every National Guard and Reserve training site—over 5,000 throughout the nation. Its purpose is to provide every reserve component commander and member with immediate counsel should an employment conflict occur. These activities greatly increase national awareness and expand NCESGR's ability to provide timely, accurate resolution of employment conflicts.

The Board commends NCESGR for its outstanding support to members of the reserve components.

### **Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act**

The Board is required by 10 USC 113(c)(3) to review Reserve Officer Personnel Act (ROPA) policies pertaining to appointment, retention, promotion, and retirement of officers in the reserve components. The passage of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) in 1980 for active component personnel was to be followed by a Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) for the reserve components. A replacement for ROPA, ROPMA was first submitted to Congress on May 8, 1987. On May 3, 1989, Congressman G. V. (Sonny) Montgomery reintroduced the legislation for consideration by the 101st Congress.

When enacted, ROPMA would:


- provide common statutes regarding the appointment, promotion,

separation, and retirement of reserve component officers in all reserve components;

- establish a viable, uniform, and improved officer personnel management system for reserve component officers not on the active duty list;
- provide the flexibility to be responsive to changing officer requirements; and
- provide a balance between management objectives and equitable treatment of individual career expectations, including an attractive career progression for reserve component officers.

The Board recommends that DoD technical corrections be incorporated and that the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act be passed by the 101st Congress.





### **General and Flag Officer Accountability**

Reserve component general and flag officers on active duty in connection with the administration and management of the reserve components are counted against active component grade ceilings. Some examples are: Chief, National Guard Bureau; Chief, Army Reserve; Chief, Air Force Reserve; Directors, Army and Air National Guard; Program Manager, Reserve Component Automation System; Military Executive, Reserve Forces Policy Board; and Director, Naval Reserve, when that position is filled by a member of the Selected Reserve.

Since 1982, the Board has recommended that legislation be enacted to exclude positions filled by National Guard or Reserve general/flag officers on active duty from active component grade ceiling accountability. The Board reaffirms this position.

### **Resolutions of the Reserve Forces Policy Board**

During its December 1988 meeting, the Board adopted the following resolutions:

### **Montgomery G.I. Bill**

"Reserve Component member participation in the Montgomery G.I. Bill has shown steady growth since its inception in July 1985. The six-year commitment required of Montgomery G.I. Bill participants provides for personnel stability which enhances mobilization readiness. Recent amendments to the Montgomery G.I. Bill will further enhance recruiting and retention in the Reserve Components."

"The Bill currently provides benefits only for those attending college. The Board believes that amending the law further to provide benefits for those attending trade or vocational schools would further enhance recruiting and retention in the Reserve Components. The Board supports such an amendment."

Congress has enacted this change. It will become effective October, 1990.

### **Social Security Offset to the Survivor Benefit Plan**

"Current law (P.L. 96-402) unfairly provides for reductions of the Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) annuity to surviving spouses of reservists."

"When P.L. 96-402 was enacted in 1985, it eliminated the little-understood Social Security offset to SBP survivors annuity under previous law. Reserve component retirees were basically exempted from a Social Security offset if they paid maximum Social Security taxes based on their civilian employment."

"Thus, P.L. 96-402, with its automatic reduction of the survivor

annuity, from 55% to 35% at age 62, discriminates against the Reserve retiree whose survivors had previously been protected from an unjustified Social Security offset."

"The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support legislation to remedy this unfair result to the surviving spouses of eligible members of the reserve components."

### **Reserve Retired Pay Cap**

"Some Federal employees who are retired members of the reserve components are unfairly discriminated against at age 60 when they are eligible for reserve retired pay."

"This occurs because the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-454, October 13, 1978) reduces their retired pay by the amount that the combined rates of their federal civilian salary and reserve military retired pay exceeds Level V of the Executive Schedule."

"Reservists eligible for retired pay at age 60 who are employed other than by the federal government (civilian sector, self employed, or state and local governments) receive their full retirement pay."

"The Board recommends that the Secretary of Defense support legislation to remedy this inequity and unfair discrimination against federal employees who have earned their full reserve retirement."

### **Summary and Recommendations**

The loss of trained personnel from

the Selected Reserve requires greater attention, even though a large percentage of these losses go into the IRR, on active duty, or to other reserve components. Training of replacements is costly and time-consuming. Reserve component leaders at all levels should continue to give retention of trained personnel a high priority. Improved timeliness of drill pay should improve retention. Incentive programs, targeted recruiting, consideration of family and job concerns, and more effective use of training time should also assist in maintaining personnel strengths.

The Board recommends that:

- Congress authorize and fund, according to the Coast Guard Reserve Ten-Year Plan, programmed annual increases for the Coast Guard Reserve.
- continued emphasis be given to reducing critical skill shortages in each of the reserve components.
- overstrength (overmanning) policies be continued within authorized manpower ceilings.
- retention continue to be given a high priority as a means of increasing readiness and reducing training costs.
- enlisted tenure programs be continued, but utilized to improve overall retention.






- career advancement opportunities for women in the reserve components be expanded.
- the services continue to support family programs.
- systems be implemented to gather information to better analyze the impact of single parents and military couples on reserve component mobilization readiness.
- Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) program authorizations be filled and adequately funded.
- support be continued for the Individual Ready Reserve screen.
- the Department of Defense technical corrections be incorporated and that Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act be passed by the 101st Congress.
- legislation be enacted to exclude certain positions filled by National Guard or Reserve general/flag officers on active duty from active component grade ceiling accountability.
- the Secretary of Defense support legislation to remedy the unfair reduction in survivor benefits to surviving spouses of eligible members of the reserve components caused by the Social Security Offset.
- the Secretary of Defense support legislation to remedy the inequity and unfair discrimination against federal employees who have earned their full reserve retirement (caused by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978). (M)
- efforts be continued to pay reserve component personnel within 10 days of drill attendance.
- the current retirement system in the reserve components be continued.
- the 6th QRMC proposal to eliminate the 15 retirement points for membership not be enacted.
- the maximum retirement points for inactive duty training (IDT) be increased to 75 per year.
- any proposal that would mandate the replacement of Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel with those from the active component or reduce the current compensation or benefits provided to AGR members be opposed.
- Full-Time Support programs be adequately funded and managed.





# Training and Mobilization

# 4



*"The importance of training cannot be overstated. In all of the Army's successes over the past decade . . . training has been the key ingredient."*

*General Carl E. Vuono, USA  
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army*

## General

If the United States were to become involved in a large scale conflict, about 30 percent of total mobilizable personnel would come from the Ready Reserve. Therefore, the most important peacetime mission of the reserve components is training to be ready to fight in contingency operations or in the event of mobilization. This capability deters an adversary and maintains peace. Training and mobilization readiness of the reserve components continues to improve. Today's National Guard and Reserve are highly trained and capable of mobilizing and accomplishing their missions.



## Training Initiatives

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the services initiated several new programs to improve reserve component training during FY 1989.

Currently, dependable training data is limited. A lack of data may result in lost

training opportunities and inefficient use of training time and funds. To address this situation, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (in conjunction with the Training and Performance Data Center, the National Guard Bureau, and the Florida National Guard) is developing an integrated data base to link training needs to training opportunities. Named the Reserve Component Nested Model (RCNM), it will provide a single source of information about unit training options to include exercises, ranges, and training areas available for reserve component training. Additionally, it will be able to match individual training options such as military schools and civilian technical schools, colleges, and universities to satisfy reserve component training needs. After the prototype has been validated, the system will include training data of all services.

The RCNM will be designed and developed into two modules. The Unit Training Module (UTM) will focus on unit-related training options and be able to automatically match options to specific training needs. The Occupation Training Module (OTM) will perform a similar function for reserve component individuals. The UTM will be able to sort units as to type, mission, occupation, equipment, and location.

In May 1989, the Army put into effect the Reserve Component Training Development Action Plan (RC TDAP). This plan incorporates the 1988 recommendations of the Reserve Component Training Strategy Task Force and other training programs. It is the Army's master plan for improving reserve component training. The RC TDAP will have an impact on all aspects of Army reserve component training. It



includes initiatives to improve overall training within a unit by emphasizing soldier education, leadership development, modern training technologies, and programs to reduce administrative tasks. It is a comprehensive and dynamic plan designed to be continuously updated by adding new issues and retiring resolved issues. If adequately resourced, the RC TDAP should greatly improve reserve component training and mobilization readiness.

To reduce administrative workload and increase training time, the Army fielded the Center Level Administration System (CLAS). CLAS is a software package operating on existing computers at reserve component unit level which automates many administrative actions, thereby providing more time for commanders and staffs to concentrate on training. Another software package, Readiness Group Automation System, was fielded. It automates statistical analyses within Readiness Groups, thereby allowing active component advisors to target training needs for supported reserve component units.

An Army equipment maintenance center test program has been established in the Federal Republic of Germany. The center is staffed by active component and Active Guard/Reserve personnel. They support National Guard and Reserve heavy equipment maintenance companies which deploy from the United States to work in the center for three-week annual training periods. Five Army National Guard units and one Army Reserve heavy equipment maintenance unit rotated through the center in FY 1989. This program provides units with excellent overseas training while also



reducing maintenance backlogs. The program allows reserve component units to train and repair military equipment at the General Support (GS) level. Equipment readiness should increase by the amount of serviceable equipment that these units are putting back into service. If the test is successful, rotation of reserve component units through the center will become permanent. This concept could be extended to other missions, both overseas and in the United States.

To eliminate duplication and conflicting guidance, the Army published joint FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2, which provides a single source for Army reserve component training guidance. One significant aspect of Regulation 350-2 is that it gives reserve component units priority use of training facilities on weekends and for annual training. This helps to ensure that reserve component units will be able to conduct quality training when they are most available to train.

The Naval Reserve initiated a program to modularize surface fleet training courses to better fit reservists' schedules and to more effectively utilize training resources. Although not new this year,



the Navy has continued to implement its Reserve Readiness Center program. Eight reserve centers have been designated as Readiness Centers and are being manned. Another six are expected to be designated in the first quarter of FY 1990. Readiness Center implementation has reduced administrative burdens on commanders. Reports have been consolidated and reduced. Administrative efficiencies have resulted in improved training.

To reduce lost training time, the Marine Corps Reserve initiated no-notice Commanding General's inspections during FY 1989. Prior to this initiative, units spent valuable time that could have been used for training preparing for inspections. The Marine Corps Reserve continues to increase its participation in active component training and exercises. This enhances active and reserve teamwork and facilitates unit integration upon mobilization.

The Air National Guard expanded the use of wartime-tasked theater training through two initiatives—Creek Corsair and Creek Thunderbolt. Creek Corsair is a six-week rotational deployment of A-7 aircraft to Germany, which leaves the aircraft in place and rotates

personnel at two-week intervals. Creek Thunderbolt is similar, but employs A-10 aircraft and four-week rotation intervals. The programs provide theater advanced training for aircrews, beyond the levels received during normal three-year unit deployments and at a fraction of the cost. Readiness of theater-tasked units is considerably improved when individual National Guardsmen can train in the operational environment in which they may have to fight.

The Air Force Reserve established a Training Development Center (TDC) at Robins Air Force Base, Georgia. The TDC is responsible for the development and maintenance of training courses to meet training requirements that are unique to the Air Force Reserve. It is also responsible for evaluation, application, and implementation of new training technologies. The Air Force Reserve has continued to implement interactive video disk technology in the areas of combat arms training and aerospace ground equipment.

During FY 1989, the Coast Guard Reserve implemented performance-based training in its resident courses. Under this program, only essential knowledge is taught through classroom instruction. More time is then available for students to actually practice skills under close supervision. The result is more effective utilization of available training time.

### **Training Simulators and Devices**

The use of training simulators and devices can be a very cost-effective means of increasing combat readiness in the reserve components. One of the greatest problems facing the reserve components is time available to train.

Greater availability and utilization of simulators would help to alleviate this problem. Through the use of simulators, reserve component members can get realistic training at training centers during IDT periods and other available training times. The use of simulators provides reserve component personnel with more effective and stimulating training. This improves retention, which in turn reduces training requirements and expenses. Scheduling is facilitated, training time during IDT is more effectively utilized, and time is not lost traveling to and from remote training ranges and facilities. Travel expenses as well as expenses associated with building and maintaining training ranges and facilities are reduced.

The use of simulators also reduces the operational demand on actual aircraft and combat weapons and vehicles. Therefore, there is less expense involved in maintaining and replacing worn-out parts and systems remain available for longer periods of time to meet actual operational needs. Simulator training also minimizes the possibility of mishaps that cause the loss of expensive weapons systems and trained personnel. In many cases, the use of simulators is the only effective means of practicing emergency procedures that may very well save an actual aircraft and crew. Training simulators and devices are also needed for combat support and combat service support applications.

The use of training simulators and devices at armories and reserve centers allows personnel to concentrate on individual skill training during IDT. More time can then be devoted to unit training requirements during AT. Training with simulators and devices also reduces the impact of increasingly

stringent environmental concerns in the United States. Environmental concerns are the greatest obstacle to expanding existing and constructing new training areas and ranges.

Despite all of the advantages associated with utilizing training devices and simulators, the reserve components are not receiving sufficient funding to meet their requirements. The Army, Navy, and Air Force reserve components all report significant shortages of aircraft simulators. Training devices and simulators provide savings in overall equipment procurement costs, operating costs, repair and replacement costs, travel costs, and costs associated with lost training time and lower retention rates. A value cannot be placed on lives saved. The use of training simulators and devices is a very cost-effective means of achieving and maintaining desired readiness levels in the reserve components. Equipment allocation policies should give high priority to reserve component requirements for training simulators and devices.

The Board recommends increased funding for reserve component training simulators and devices.





### **Civilian Contract Training**

All of the reserve components, except the Coast Guard Reserve, utilize civilian contract training. They find that such training is less expensive, of high quality, and effective in improving certain military occupational specialty qualifications.

The Army, Marine, and Navy reserve components use contract training for various specialties. The Army and Navy emphasize medical specialist training. The Air National Guard utilizes civilian flight training companies to train pilots. The Air Force Reserve uses contract training to support a noncommissioned officer leadership development program. Participants attend college-level courses on management, time management, and leadership.

Military occupational specialty mismatch, shortages of medical professionals, and limited time available to train are all significant reserve component readiness inhibitors. High quality and relatively inexpensive civilian contract training provides flexible and effective means of addressing these problems.

The Board recommends increased utilization of civilian contract training.

### **Ammunition and Ordnance— Training Allowances**

Training with live ammunition and ordnance improves readiness by increasing skill levels. It also improves retention through realistic, motivating training. Nothing can replace the realism of actually firing live rounds downrange. Therefore, it is important to ensure that sufficient live ammunition is available for training reserve component personnel.

The Army National Guard had some minor shortages in training munitions in FY 1989. The Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard Reserves reported no shortages that impacted training. However, the Air Force Reserve indicates that the supply of training munitions has been reduced to the absolute minimum required to maintain readiness of tactical aircrews.

The Naval Reserve experienced ordnance and ordnance-related shortages of sonobuoys, MK 46 exercise torpedoes, air-to-air targets, MK 76 practice bomb lugs, 2.75" rockets and

5.0" rockets. Most of these shortages also existed in FY 1988.

The Marine Corps Reserve experienced both aviation and ground ordnance shortages. Aviation ordnance, and ordnance-related shortages existed in the areas of MK 82 and 83 bombs, MK 76 practice bombs, chaff, 2.75" white phosphorus rocket warheads, aerial targets, LAU-7s, and GPU-2A gun pods. These shortages were common to both the active and reserve components. The training impact of the shortages is compounded by the fact that Receipt, Segregation, Storage, and Issue (RSSI) funds have been reduced to a level which may further degrade future reserve training exercises. RSSI funds provide for movement of ordnance which is critical to such exercises. Any reduction in RSSI funds has a greater impact on the reserve components due to priorities, and the geographical dispersion of reserve training areas. On the ground side, the Marine Corps Reserve experienced shortages of smoke grenades and various types of 40mm, 60mm, 81mm, and .50 caliber rounds.

Due to time constraints of reserve component members, and limited availability of live-fire ranges, the opportunity for reserve component members to train with live ordnance is often restricted. Every effort should be made to take full advantage of such training opportunities, including ensuring that ordnance is available when reserve component members and ranges are available. Missing such opportunities degrades readiness.

The Board recommends that sufficient levels of ordnance and ammunition be provided to assure that

effective training can be conducted to maintain appropriate readiness levels.

### **Training With Gaining Commands**

Frequent training with wartime gaining commands, whether overseas or in the United States, enhances a unit's ability to mobilize, deploy, and perform wartime missions. In many cases, equipment and expert instruction is most readily available at the gaining command. The gaining command becomes involved in training the reserve component unit and ensures that training is directed toward the mobilization mission. Readiness is enhanced when reserve component members train in the environment where they are expected to fight. The Army maintains that overseas deployment training with wartime gaining commands is one of the best programs for improving wartime capabilities of reserve component units.



The Army's CAPSTONE program aligns active and reserve component elements to meet wartime operational requirements. In effect, it integrates the Total army—active and reserve components. Reserve component units respond to missions from the active component unit they support or to which they are aligned. It allows the units to plan and train in peacetime for their wartime missions. In FY 1989, 45 percent (2028 units) of Army National Guard and Reserve units trained with wartime gaining commands during annual training. Of these, 939 deployed overseas for training. Twenty percent (874 units) of Army reserve component units trained with gaining CAPSTONE commands during inactive duty training.



An Army program that supports CAPSTONE training is the Directed Training Associations (DTA) program. Under this program, reserve component units are aligned with like-type active component units for peacetime training and support. Where possible, these alignments are within the CAPSTONE trace. However, where geographical distances make this impractical, the



alignments are made between similar organizations. CAPSTONE, supported by the DTA program and overseas deployment training, is critical to the Army's wartime mobilization and deployment capability.

The "round out" program is another Army affiliation program to improve the mobilization and deployment readiness of Selected Reserve units and provide added combat power earlier in the execution of contingency plans. As part of this program, reserve component combat battalions and brigades have been selected to "round out" active component divisions that are understructured due to resource constraints. Round out units are given the same resourcing priority as the parent unit, are scheduled to deploy with the parent unit (or as soon as possible thereafter), and enter into close planning and training associations with the parent unit to improve readiness.

The Naval Reserve also maintains that training with gaining commands is a crucial element of force readiness. Mobilization billet training can best be conducted at gaining commands. During FY 1989, approximately 53 percent of the Navy's surface Selected Reserve training was conducted at wartime gaining commands. Naval aviation Selected Reserve flying units conducted about 30 percent of their active duty training and five percent of their inactive duty training at gaining commands. For non-flying units, about 60 percent of active duty and 10 percent of inactive duty training was with gaining commands.

The Marine Corps Reserve has established the Designated Augmentation Unit program through which 16 Reserve infantry companies are assigned to augment active




component battalions in wartime. Fourteen of these companies trained with their gaining battalions in FY 1989. Marine Corps Reserve training with active units increased from 13 percent in FY 1988 to 23 percent in FY 1989.

Air National Guard fighter, reconnaissance, tactical airlift, and air refueling units (with conventional tasking) generally deploy overseas to wartime theaters once every three years for a two-week period. Air refueling units also deploy annually for one to two weeks to augment U.S. Air Force Europe, and Pacific Air Force air refueling requirements. However, due to funding constraints, unit deployments normally involve only about 25 percent of assigned personnel. Overall, less than two percent of Air National Guard training time is with wartime gaining commands.

Given the current parameters of funding, personnel availability, and inspection cycles, a three-year deployment cycle seems appropriate for meeting Air National Guard unit readiness requirements. The readiness of theater-tasked units is considerably improved when they can train in the environment where they may someday have to fight. Unfortunately, shortages in funding for exercise participation will cause the unit deployment cycle to slip from three to 3.5 years beginning in FY 1990. As a result, combat capability may decrease.

The Air Force Reserve schedules each of its combat units for an overseas deployment every third year and actively pursues joint training exercise opportunities and other gaining command training. Approximately 10-15 percent of tactical airlift forces



train with Military Airlift Command (MAC) gaining commands. The nature of strategic airlift requires that Air Force Reserve units operate within the MAC system much more frequently. Therefore, 80-85 percent of their unit strategic airlift is conducted with MAC gaining commands.

The entire Coast Guard Reserve training program is designed to augment active commands in peacetime. Approximately 30 percent of Selected Reserve personnel regularly train with their gaining commands. Most of the remaining force trains with active units that provide training experiences similar to those of gaining commands. Most Coast Guard Reservists are very familiar with the geographic area, missions, and command structure of the units they augment. This greatly enhances mobilization capability.

### **Aviation Training**

All reserve components reported sufficient flight hours to accomplish at least minimum levels of proficiency training in FY 1989. However, any reductions in present levels would adversely impact readiness and safety.



Both the Army Reserve and the Coast Guard Reserve reported aircraft shortages. However, through efficient aircraft maintenance and intense flight crew scheduling, they were able to support flight-hour requirements. The Army Reserve has begun a new program to sustain the skills of aviators assigned to the IRR. Now in a test mode, this program will provide two weeks of sustainment training at either Army schools or a local aviation flight facility. The Navy did not have sufficient A-6E aircraft available for all pilots to meet minimum requirements. This was due to wing-related problems that should be resolved during FY 1990.

The Army National Guard was the only reserve component that did not have sufficient additional flight training periods budgeted for flight crews in FY 1989. Aircrew proficiency was maintained by using non-aviation training funds.

The Army Reserve indicated that sufficient ranges and training areas were available to maintain aircrew proficiency, although many units had to expend significant flight hours and

training time traveling to and from distant training areas. The Army National Guard noted the same problem and also indicated that flight training with night vision goggles was being adversely affected due to limited availability of adequate training areas.

Insufficient supersonic and low altitude training airspace, and inadequate air-to-ground gunnery ranges continue to hinder aircrew training efforts of the Air Force Reserve components. Environmental concerns are the main issue in acquiring new and updating existing training areas. This has been exacerbated by the imminent closure of the air-to-ground range at Jefferson Proving Grounds, Indiana. This range provides the only easily accessible range for most of the fighter units in the upper Midwest. Training of 11 Air National Guard and two Air Force Reserve units will be adversely affected—particularly in the area of night weapons training. As a result, the Air National Guard may be required to develop another range at an alternate site, or fund additional unit deployments to accomplish night weapons training.

During FY 1989, increased taskings of Air National Guard aircrews was their most challenging problem. Increased demands on Guard aircrews are causing family and employer conflicts that lead to retention problems. A reduction in non-mission essential tasking would help to alleviate this problem.

A major problem encountered by the Coast Guard Reserve was the lack of qualified active duty maintenance support crews to help keep aircraft in an operational status at the three air stations utilized by reserve aircrews. This is especially important since, due to aircraft shortages, the Coast Guard

Reserve must fly all of its aircraft beyond programmed hours to support flight-hour requirements.

Both the Naval Air Reserve and the Air National Guard note that they are receiving additional missions and taskings. They emphasize that, in order to maintain readiness, such additions must be fully funded and resourced with equipment and Full-Time Support personnel. When properly resourced, reserve component aviation is a cost-effective, vital part of the total force, both for accomplishing operational missions and in the event of mobilization. Reserve component aviation programs allow the services to retain their highly trained, valuable flight personnel who choose to leave active duty.

### Air Liaison Officers

The Army National Guard and Army Reserve have many maneuver units for which the Air Force cannot provide sufficient Air Liaison Officers (ALO) and Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP).

The Tactical Air Command, Forces Command, and the National Guard Bureau have agreed that the Air Force active component will provide ALOs and TACPs to Army active component combat maneuver units and that the Air National Guard will support the Army's reserve components.


Currently, the Air National Guard has 40 ALOs who are aligned by name to early-deploying Army reserve component maneuver battalions. The Air National Guard plans to train an additional 11 ALOs, who will be with early-deploying Army reserve component maneuver brigades. In both cases, the ALO's primary responsibility

is training with their aligned maneuver unit. There is also a two-year Air National Guard test program to evaluate non-rated ALOs. If successful, this program will provide an additional training resource.

Air National Guard close air support units are converting to more modern equipment, and negotiations are ongoing to ensure adequate range and airspace support. ALOs and TACPs are integral parts of the system, and train with their aligned units during drill weekends and major training exercises. Command post and live exercises lend credibility to tactics and procedures, while deployments to various locations around the world give the units experience in working in varied environments. More sophisticated ranges and equipment provide real-time and realistic feedback during simulated and live-weapon delivery passes. Electronic emitters and threat radars support numerous exercises, providing combat realism. Consequently, training is more effective than ever before. Each mission is designed with specific learning/training objectives, and all associated ground support is directed toward accomplishing those objectives.

The Air Force has a dedicated close air support force to support the Army in time of war. Once mobilized, Army National Guard and Army Reserve units will be supported by the active Air Force. Those units which do not have an aligned ALO will be assigned one. ALOs will undergo qualification/requalification training as the Army units undergo their mobilization training. When the Army unit deploys, the aligned ALO will move with them.

Communication in the close air support environment is crucial. Various





law, as amended, now authorizes indirect military involvement such as equipment loan, personnel support, training, and sharing information. Indirect support must be incidental to the military mission, or provide substantially equivalent military training. Further, it cannot degrade combat readiness nor the capacity of the Department of Defense to fulfill its defense mission. The law does not limit the National Guard in state status (on state active duty or under Title 32 USC) from performing law enforcement functions authorized by the states concerned, nor the Coast Guard Reserve which is under the Department of Transportation. The extent of drug interdiction activity varies considerably between the reserve components.

The National Guard has supported federal law enforcement agencies in drug interdiction efforts and domestic marijuana eradication since 1983. In state duty status, some states have used National Guard units in support of marijuana eradication and drug interdiction since 1977. Domestic marijuana eradication has been the primary mission. Other support includes use of observation aircraft and crews to observe and report suspected marijuana fields and drop points for other drugs, use of utility helicopters to transport both law enforcement agents and contraband, loan of specialized equipment, radar support, and aerial imagery.

The 1989 National Defense Authorization and Appropriations Acts provided funding of not less than \$40 million and not more than \$60 million for enhanced National Guard support for drug interdiction and enforcement operations. The Secretary of Defense provided funds to the governors of states who submitted plans specifying



communications systems are under scrutiny for application to this environment. Everything from field phones, to the most sophisticated satellite communications are under consideration. While secure FM radios are a possibility, and are under consideration, they are by no means the only alternative. The goal is to enhance close air support communications capability.

The Board recommends continued emphasis on resolving Air Force Air Liaison Officer shortages and close air support communications requirements for the Army's reserve components.

### **Drug Interdiction—Impact on Training**

The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, and subsequent legislation, directly affects the extent to which military forces (including reserve components) can participate in law enforcement activities. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of federal military forces to perform internal police functions. The Act does not pertain to the Army and Air National Guard when they are in state status.

Public Law 97-86, passed in 1982, amended the Posse Comitatus Act. The

how the National Guard was proposed to be used. Such operations were required to be in addition to normally scheduled weekend drill and annual training periods.

Plans from each state were developed in coordination with city, county, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. Plans were submitted to the National Guard Bureau (NGB) for review and recommendations for funding. Following review by NGB, plans were forwarded through the appropriate military secretaries to the Secretary of Defense for approval. The Secretary of Defense referred the plans to the Attorney General for consultation as to adequacy, and then made funding decisions.

Priorities were developed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in coordination with federal law enforcement agencies and the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Final funding decisions were based on these priorities and recommendations by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Guard Bureau, and the appropriate military service. Funding of governors' plans was contingent on compliance with law and limited to the amount authorized and appropriated by Congress.

The operational limits of the plans require National Guard members to perform their duty under command and control of state authorities, either in a state active duty status or in U.S. Code Title 32 duty status. Guard personnel are not to become involved in the seizure of evidence or arrest of individuals involved in illegal drug activities. They should not be in the chain of custody of evidence or contraband, or process illegal drugs

seized during an operation. Whenever possible, National Guard personnel perform jobs that are related to their military specialties.

In 1988, National Guard military police were used in a pilot program to assist U.S. Customs agents in searching commercial cargo entering various land and sea border entry points. This very successful program was expanded in 1989 to nearly every major seaport and many major airports throughout the United States, increasing the U.S. Customs Service capability to inspect cargo by 23 percent. Other examples of missions for state interdiction and eradication efforts are helicopter transport of law enforcement personnel and confiscated illegal drugs, special operations forces identification of ground and air traffic, loan of equipment, training of law enforcement agencies, aircraft photo reconnaissance, and monitoring air traffic with organic radar. The support operations planned and conducted in 1989 will be continued and expanded in 1990. Seventy million dollars has been appropriated by the Congress to support these operations in FY 1990, and an additional \$40 million has been appropriated to procure mission-related equipment.

Based on year-end reports from the States and reinforced by numerous DoD staff visits, there is overwhelming evidence that, if anything, individual and unit readiness is improved by the additional mission of the National Guard supporting law enforcement agencies. The primary reasons for this are:

- All operations in support of law enforcement agencies are conducted in addition to regularly scheduled weekend drills and annual training.





- As much as possible, the jobs performed by National Guard members in support of these agencies are identical or closely akin to their military jobs.
- By conducting operations and using and maintaining equipment on a daily basis as compared to monthly training, individuals and units learn to operate in a better coordinated, better planned manner.
- Performing a "real-time" mission that has significant benefits to society has created an enthusiastic volunteer environment that enhances individual pride and unit esprit de corps.

In FY 1989, The Naval Air Reserve flew 124 surveillance sorties and 1,036 flight hours in support of drug interdiction. Naval Reserve ships steamed a total of 459 days. In addition, Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare units provided 36 days of surveillance support for various federal agencies. No funds were diverted from other missions and there was no adverse impact on readiness.

The Marine Corps Reserve provided training and equipment support to law enforcement agencies, including the U.S. Border Patrol Agency and the U.S. Customs Service.

The Air Force Reserve supported drug interdiction on request with aerial surveillance, air transportation, equipment loans, aircraft maintenance and storage, all within the limits of existing law and without interference with their primary training mission.

The Coast Guard Reserve's primary means of training is to augment active

duty commands with reserve personnel. Since the Coast Guard is a major drug interdiction agency, reservists are very much involved in this effort. They contribute directly by performing such duties as port security, surface interdiction, investigations, boardings, and surveillance. Coast Guard Reservists contribute indirectly by temporarily replacing active duty personnel who can then conduct drug enforcement activities. In either case, personnel are receiving valuable training in their mobilization billets and mobilization readiness is increased.

The Board recommends maximum support of drug interdiction efforts, consistent with training and readiness requirements.

### **Overseas Training**

Overseas training provides some of the most effective training available for the reserve components. Preparing for and executing an overseas training mission is very similar to actual mobilization and deployment. Such training becomes even more effective when conducted with gaining commands. Overseas deployments build morale and increase retention in the reserve components. Civic action and technical assistance to friendly nations, in conjunction with overseas deployment, supports foreign policy and increases United States stature abroad. Additionally, overseas training demonstrates, to allies and potential adversaries, the ability of the United States to execute its forward defense strategy.


Table 24 shows the number of units and personnel which participated in overseas training during FY 1989. The table is followed by a list of countries in which reservists trained.

**Table 24**  
**OVERSEAS TRAINING**

	<u>FY 1988</u>		<u>FY 1989</u>	
	<u>Cells/ Units</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Cells/ Units</u>	<u>Personnel</u>
Army National Guard	1,091	29,310	563	22,277
Army Reserve	1,447	19,175	1,341	18,401
Naval Reserve	246	5,467	408	12,495
Marine Corps Reserve	28	1,591	30	1,867
Air National Guard	218	10,674	252	14,815
Air Force Reserve	506	15,796	519	16,441
DoD Total	3,536	82,013	3,113	86,296

Source: The reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1989.



Antigua	Djibouti	Honduras	Norway	Sudan
Antilles	Dominica	Hong Kong	Okinawa	Sweden
Argentina	Dominican	Iceland	Oman	Thailand
Australia	Republic	India	Panama	Tonga
Azores	Ecuador	Indonesia	Pakistan	Turkey
Bahamas	Egypt	Israel	Papau,	Union of
Bahrain	England	Italy	New Guinea	Soviet
Bangladesh	Fiji	Jamaica	Paraguay	Socialist
Barbados	Finland	Japan	Peru	Republics
Belgium	France	Jordan	Philippines	United Arab
Belize	Germany,	Kenya	Portugal	Emirates
Bermuda	Federal	Kiribati	Puerto Rico	Uruguay
Bolivia	Republic	Kuwait	Saint Christopher	Vanuatu
Botswana	Greece	Liberia	Saint Vincent	Venezuela
Brazil	Greenland	Luxembourg	Scotland	Virgin Islands
Canada	Grenada	Malaysia	Saudi Arabia	Wake Island
Colombia	Guam	Marshall Islands	Sicily	Wales
Chile	Guantanamo	Mexico	Singapore	Western Somoa
Costa Rica	Bay, Cuba	Morocco	Soloman Islands	Yugoslavia
Denmark	Guatemala	Netherlands	Somolia	Zaire
Diego Garcia	Guyana	Nigeria	Spain	

Reserve component overseas training and participation in actual missions provides realistic training, contributes to deterrence, and enhances readiness. This training will become even more important should additional missions be transferred to the reserve components and the United States forces overseas be reduced. Deterrence and combat readiness would then be even more dependent on the ability to rapidly deploy reserve component units overseas in the event of a major conflict.

The Board recommends that overseas training of reserve component units and individuals be sustained.

### **Training Detractors**

It is important to identify and eliminate anything that detracts from the very limited time reserve component members have available for training. The reserve components identified major training detractors, for both Inactive Duty Training (IDT) drills and for Annual Training (AT) periods, that existed during FY 1989.

The Department of the Army goal is that a minimum of 80 percent of a reserve component member's time be spent on mobilization-oriented training. An informal poll revealed that the time now spent on such training ranges from 10-90 percent, depending on the unit. The Army has identified the major training detractor for both IDT and AT to be a chain of command that is insensitive to the negative impacts caused by requirements it imposes on subordinate units. This situation tends to reward administrative prowess rather than effective training. In many cases, unit commanders are more comfortable concentrating on administration and other detractors because results are measurable. Also, some commanders may lack the experience to plan and conduct meaningful training.

Each level down the chain of command perceives that the Department of the Army mandates a multitude of requirements. What actually happens is that each level amplifies and expands implied tasks. Efforts are underway to correct this situation by reducing perceived administrative requirements. A data base has been created, and is being refined, which delineates all of the regulatory requirements that directly impact company and battalion level units. Simply listing the requirements has led to eliminating, consolidating, and clarifying many of them.

Other IDT detractors for the Army reserve components are:

- Lack or shortage of equipment at home station.
- Limited or no access to local training areas.
- Multiple inspections.
- Mandatory briefings and classes.





- Preparation of needless or duplicative reports and training records.

Other AT detractors for the Army reserve components are:

- Lack or shortage of training ammunition.
- Insufficient training areas.
- Disruption of unit cohesion due to junior leaders having to attend professional development training rather than unit AT.
- Insufficient numbers of training devices and simulators.
- Insufficient numbers of active component advisors to ensure the highest quality training in the limited time available.

The Naval Reserve estimates that the amount of time used effectively for training ranges from 55-75 percent, depending on the activity. The remaining time is spent on administrative matters. Percentages are estimates based on unit inspections. Commander, Naval Reserve Force is pursuing a number of actions to reduce the administrative burden on reserve unit commanders. A Selected Reserve unit administrative visit program was initiated in FY 1989 to review management practices at Naval facilities.

Other IDT detractors for the Naval Reserve are:

- Operating requirements that conflict with scheduled training.
- Lack of training devices and simulators at home station.
- Personnel changes which requires constant retraining.
- Lack of training program management at the unit level.
- Insufficient training with gaining



commands due to geographic dispersion or deployment schedules.

- Lack of government transportation for reservists who reside a considerable distance from IDT sites.

Other AT detractors for the Naval Reserve are:

- Operating requirements that conflict with scheduled training.
- Lack of training devices and simulators at home station.
- Lack of a centralized school reservation system available for use at the unit level.

The Marine Corps Reserve identifies no significant training detractors during AT. It is estimated that 75 percent of IDT time is dedicated to actual training. IDT detractors for the Marine Corps Reserve are:

- Routine administrative paperwork.
- Training not related to individual skills.
- Issuance and retrieval of controlled items, such as individual weapons.

The Air National Guard identifies no significant training detractors during AT. It estimates that 80-85 percent of IDT time is dedicated to actual training. IDT detractors for the Air National Guard are:

- Administrative requirements at the unit level.
- Ancillary training requirements.

The Air Force Reserve reports no major training detractors. It estimates that about 12 percent of IDT and AT time is spent on administrative functions. Continuing efforts to reduce this percentage are being pursued.

The Coast Guard Reserve estimates that 74 percent of IDT time is spent on actual training. There are no significant AT detractors. IDT detractors for the Coast Guard Reserve are:

- Administrative paperwork.
- Access to suitable training opportunities and equipment for units that are not located near active Coast Guard facilities.



The Board recommends that administrative reporting requirements be consolidated at the highest level practical, to relieve subordinate units of unnecessary administrative burdens.

The Board recommends that active component training and support facilities be made available when the reserve components need them, and that additional training facilities and



ranges be provided close to drill sites to reduce nonproductive travel time.

## **Operating Tempos**

Except for the Army Reserve, the reserve components report that FY 1989 training funds provided sufficient land miles per vehicle, flying hours per aircraft, and steaming days per ship to meet operationing tempo (OPTEMPO) requirements. The Army Reserve was funded at 75 percent of its requirements.

The Army National Guard anticipates continued funding to meet OPTEMPO requirements of 259 miles and 8.9 flying hours per month. Significant reductions in required training time would cause skill degradation and reduced readiness.

The Army Reserve OPTEMPO requirement was initially funded at 50 percent, but increased to 75 percent by a reprogramming action. At 100 percent funding, the Army Reserve OPTEMPO is 200 miles and eight flying hours per month. Army Reserve OPTEMPO is fully funded for FY 1990/91.

Naval Reserve Force ships are funded at the requested level of 21 steaming days per quarter for FY 1990. Sufficient flying hours are also provided for air crews to maintain required proficiency. The Marine Corps Reserve is adequately funded to maintain the necessary OPTEMPO in FY 1990.

The Air Force Reserve has programmed an overall reduction in the number of flying hours for FY 1990. A \$3.2 million reduction is planned, which translates into 2,807 C-130 flying hours. Flying hours for combat aircrews remains approximately the same; flying

hours for other aircrews were reduced by 33 percent.

The Coast Guard Reserve is concerned that reductions in training funds may exacerbate the personnel shortfall. Failure to provide adequate training funds would minimize the benefit of increases in Coast Guard Reserve personnel strength.

### **Training the Individual Ready Reserve**

The services have differing philosophies and policies for training Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) members. This is driven by differing projected mobilization manpower requirements. Funding levels mentioned in this section do not include costs associated with screening the IRR.

The IRR is the Army's primary source of pretrained individual manpower for mobilization. Based on training guidance, the Army Reserve Personnel Center estimates that about 27,000 IRR members should undergo skill retention training each fiscal year. There were insufficient funds available to meet this goal in FY 1989. It is projected that there will also be insufficient funds for FY 1990.

In FY 1989, approximately 12,000 Army IRR members participated in skill retention or professional development education training. Another 4,000 soldiers performed active duty tours for special work. The total cost for both types of active duty was about \$36 million. Funding for both types of active duty in FY 1990 is projected at about \$32 million. A shortage of \$21 million exists in meeting the goal of skill retention training for 27,000 IRR members. The lack of training funds

reduces the readiness of the IRR. Fewer personnel will be trained and ready in the event of mobilization.

Although on a smaller scale, funding constraints are also adversely impacting the skill proficiency and readiness of the Navy's IRR. During FY 1989, less than one percent of the total Navy IRR population received proficiency training. Highest priority was given to critical medical specialties and others identified to fill Selected Reserve shortfalls. Funding was available only to train 73 percent of these highest priority members. FY 1990 funding for Naval Reserve IRR training has been cut by 53 percent (from \$767,000 to \$361,000)—\$406,000 below the FY 1989 level. This will further reduce the number of trained individuals available upon mobilization.



The Marine Corps Reserve Counterpart Training Program (RCT) is the primary means for skill retention training for Marine Corps members of the IRR. RCT provides Marines with refresher training, normally of two weeks duration, in a variety of military occupational specialties. Training is limited by available funding and the voluntary nature of IRR participation. In FY 1989, it cost about \$2.5 million to send over 1,440 IRR Marines to RCT. Approximately 700 IRR Marines received other types of active duty tours. The Marine Corps Reserve plans on training the same number of IRR members during FY 1990. Funding for FY 1990 is considered sufficient to support this level of training.

The Air Force is in the process of determining the degree of skill degradation that IRR members with critical specialties experience after leaving active duty. Once this is determined, specialty-related training courses can be developed to better prepare IRR members for mobilization.

Due to budget constraints, the Coast Guard does not fund training of IRR members. The result is a negative impact on mobilization readiness due to skill degradation of the IRR.



The Board recommends that greater resources be provided for management and training of the IRR.

### **Mobilization Preparedness**


Given the current world situation, which will likely result in fewer forward-deployed forces and smaller forces overall, the ability to effectively mobilize reserve component forces will become an even more important deterrent to aggression. Some recent developments in mobilization preparedness include the following.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recently sponsored a three-week, worldwide command post mobilization exercise entitled PROUD EAGLE 90. Participants included civilian and military elements of the Department of Defense as well as numerous other Federal departments and agencies. No reserve component personnel were actually mobilized.

The exercise simulated world events that required senior decision-makers to consider and implement a Presidential Selected Reserve callup, followed by partial mobilization, and subsequent full mobilization. For the first time in this type of exercise, de-escalation options were also considered upon the lessening of tensions. Virtually all mobilization categories, including a comprehensive test of the Presidential 200,000 callup, were tested.

PROUD EAGLE 90 showed that the ability to effectively mobilize reserve component forces has greatly improved in recent years. Lessons learned will further enhance the ability to mobilize reserve component forces.

During FY 1989, the Army implemented a new reserve component



mobilization evaluation program. The program features three types of exercises designed to improve specific areas of Army mobilization capability.

- **OPTIMAL FOCUS** exercises test the ability of Selected Reserve units and individuals to mobilize. The annual tests involve 10 percent of those Selected Reserve units subject to the Presidential 200,000 callup, to support operational missions. Units involved must demonstrate their ability to effectively mobilize on extremely short notice. They are evaluated on their ability to organize and prepare to deploy an advance party, conduct unit briefings, prepare post-mobilization training plans, coordinate facilities transfer, process personnel, and to inventory and embark equipment. The first test of over 9,000 soldiers in 54 Army National Guard and Reserve units was very successful.
- **CALL FORWARD** exercises will be conducted annually, commencing in 1990, to test the ability of mobilization stations to handle the surge in personnel and equipment during mobilization. They also train personnel in mobilization procedures

by actually moving units to mobilization sites during their two-week annual training periods.

- **Command post exercises**, involving all Army mobilization stations, will be conducted biannually starting in 1992. The exercises will allow site commanders and staffs to resolve problems associated with key mobilization issues.

### **Strategic Airlift and Sealift**

Strategic transportation of reserve component forces to a theater of operations is a continuing concern of the Board. Current airlift and sealift capabilities are inadequate to meet either active or reserve component deployment requirements. Sufficient airlift is necessary to quickly deploy reserve component forces in the early stages of any major conflict. Strategic sealift is critical to accomplish the surge of unit equipment into a combat theater.

The Board recommends that increased attention be given to airlift and sealift requirements, particularly as they impact the reserve components.



## **Resolution of the Reserve Forces Policy Board**

### **Presidential 200,000 Call Up Authority**

The Board adopted the following resolution relating to 10 USC 673b at its March 1989 Quarterly Meeting.

"The Reserve Forces Policy Board (Board) was briefed on the history and dynamics of use of the Reserve Components prior to and subsequent to adoption of the Total Force Policy. With the advent of the Total Force Policy and better preparation of the Reserve Components for mobilization, Section 673b was added to Title 10 United States Code to allow for Presidential authority to call to active

duty members of the Selected Reserve, without their consent, to augment the active forces for any operational mission.

"The Navy expressed concern about its ability to obtain access to resources that exist in the Reserve Component when needed for operational missions that would overextend active duty resources and manpower. The Navy believes that with the increased missions which have been assigned to the Reserve Components and increasing security challenges across the spectrum of conflict, real possibility exists that active component resources may require more augmentation to meet national commitments than can be accomplished by utilizing only Reserve Component volunteerism of personnel, or access to Reserve military equipment.

"The Board last discussed Section 673b at the December 1987 Quarterly Meeting. The Board reaffirms its position adopted in December 1987, as follows:

'The Total Force Policy of the United States is fundamental to national security. This policy places a heavy reliance on the Reserve Components which must plan and train in peacetime for rapid mobilization to support national strategies. The unprecedented progress of the reserve components in this decade toward achieving readiness goals and improved capabilities is demonstrated routinely in operational missions. The Total Force Policy is effective and successful. The Board believes that the public, employers, Congress, and members of the reserve components should understand that while the use

of volunteers from the Selected Reserve is consistent with the Total Force Policy, the use of the Presidential call up authority of 10 USC 673b may be appropriate and required under certain circumstances.”

### **Summary and Recommendations**


The reserve components' most important peacetime mission is training to be ready to fight in the event of mobilization. Training and mobilization readiness of the reserve components continues to improve.

Innovative training programs are being developed and implemented within the reserve components to enhance training in individual and unit skills. Some of these programs are using very cost-effective training devices and simulators or other highly technical systems. Regional training programs are being established to train National Guardsmen and Reservists on the most modern equipment.

Overseas training of reserve component personnel is important to achieving mobilization readiness. This training is often conducted under realistic and environmental conditions not available in the United States. Mobilization, deployment, and redeployment plans can be exercised and gaining command relationships strengthened.


The major training detractors for the reserve components are the limited time available to train to established standards and excessive administrative requirements. The reduction of administrative burdens would increase time available to train for unit missions.

Varying mobilization and callup categories provide latitude to the President or Congress to meet contingencies. The services use several types and levels of exercises to evaluate mobilization preparedness. The Department of Defense and the services are striving continually to improve the mobilization capabilities of all reserve components.



The Board recommends that:

- increased funding be provided for reserve component training simulators and devices.
- utilization of civilian contract training be increased.
- sufficient levels of ordnance and ammunition be provided to assure that effective training can be conducted to maintain appropriate readiness levels.
- continued emphasis be given to resolving Air Force Air Liaison Officer shortages and close air support communications requirements for the Army's reserve components.
- the reserve components provide maximum support of drug interdiction efforts, consistent with training and readiness requirements.
- overseas training of reserve component units and individuals be sustained.
- administrative reporting requirements be consolidated at the highest level practical, to relieve subordinate units of unnecessary administrative burdens.
- active component training and support facilities be made available when the reserve components need them.
- additional training facilities and ranges be provided close to drill sites to reduce nonproductive travel time.
- greater resources be provided for management and training of the Individual Ready Reserve.
- increased attention be given to strategic airlift and sealift requirements, particularly as they impact the reserve components. (M)








# Equipment 5

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*"Perhaps credibility is the best reason for modernizing . . . We lose credibility with our soldiers whose lives depend on the quality of the equipment we give them."*

*General John A. Wickham, Jr.  
Former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army*



## General

Modern equipment has significantly increased the readiness of National Guard and Reserve units. Although excellent progress has been made in equipping reserve component units, significant equipment and spare parts shortages remain. Additionally, some equipment incompatibility continues to exist between the active and reserve components.

## Department of Defense Policy

Department of Defense (DoD) policy is to equip first those units that will fight first. This policy is intended to ensure that units employed first in time of a crisis will be adequately equipped. Under this policy, the reserve components have received substantial amounts of modern equipment in recent years. Some reserve component units that would not deploy early have only minimum essential equipment items which are needed for training. However, the First to Fight policy does


help to ensure that early deploying units are ready.

## Equipment Modernization

Equipment modernization can be accomplished either by upgrading equipment on-hand or by converting to newer models of equipment. Equipment modernization enhances the warfighting capability of affected units. Their equipment is more compatible with active units with which they may deploy.

Budget reductions that slow equipment modernization programs will adversely affect the ability of the reserve components to meet readiness goals. Use of older equipment provides some capability for training and skill retention, but degrades warfighting capability and exacerbates compatibility problems with the active component.

Table 25 shows examples of reserve component equipment conversions that occurred in FY 1989.





**Table 25**  
**EQUIPMENT CONVERSIONS**

#### Army National Guard

- 2 battalions from M60A3 to M1 tanks
- 6 battalions from M60 or M48A5 to M60A3 tanks
- 1 battalion from AH-1 Cobra to AH-64 Apache helicopters
- 3 battalions from UH-1 Huey to UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters
- 1 signal battalion received modern radios

#### Naval Reserve

- 1 squadron from EA-6A to EA-6B aircraft
- 1 squadron from A-7E to A-6E aircraft
- 1 squadron from P-3B to P-3C Update III aircraft
- 1 squadron from P-3B to P-3C aircraft
- 2 squadrons from HH-1K to HH-60H helicopters
- 1 squadron from SH-3D to SH-3H helicopters
- AN/SQQ-89 ASW combat system installed on ships

#### Air National Guard

- 1 group from F-4D to F-16A/B aircraft
- 2 groups from C-130B to C-130E and C-130H aircraft
- Modified 6 AN/TGC-26 tactical communications equipment centers

Source: The services.

Data as of September 30, 1989.

#### Army Reserve

- All remaining battalions from M48A5 to M60A3 tanks
- 2 assault battalions from UH-1 Huey to UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters
- 3 battalions received AH-1S helicopters
- 2 Special Forces Groups received burst communications equipment

#### Marine Corps Reserve

- 1 squadron from F-21 to F-5E/F aircraft
- 1 squadron from F-4 to F/A-18 aircraft
- 1 squadron from A-4F to A-4M aircraft
- Completed conversion to 155mm Howitzer

#### Air Force Reserve

- 1 wing from F-4D to F-16A/B aircraft
- 1 wing from C-130A to C-130H aircraft
- 1 group from F-4D to F-16A/B aircraft
- 1 group from F4-D to F-4E aircraft

Some equipment is distributed to the reserve components directly from manufacturers as part of current-year purchases. This equipment is managed by the responsible service. Other equipment is purchased with National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations which are dedicated by Congress for use by the reserve components. Some of these items are specified by Congress. The remaining dedicated procurement appropriations are listed as "miscellaneous." In January

1989, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs provided Congress a list of proposed acquisitions to be made from miscellaneous appropriations.

#### **Recent Equipment Purchases and Transfers**

Table 26 shows examples of recent reserve component equipment acquisitions. Some items were purchased new, others were transferred from the active component.



**Table 26**  
**RECENT EQUIPMENT PURCHASES AND TRANSFERS**

Army National Guard

M113A3 armored personnel carriers  
M901A1 improved TOW vehicles  
M1 tanks  
Bradley fighting vehicles

Naval Reserve

Communications equipment  
TACAN receivers  
3 HH-60H helicopters  
Installation of FFISTS & CDS  
Civil engineering equipment  
AN/SQR-17A acoustic processors  
P-3C aircraft

Air National Guard

F-16A/B aircraft  
OA-10A aircraft  
HC-130 aircraft  
C-130 aircraft  
C-26 aircraft  
MH-60G helicopters

Army Reserve

M113A3 armored personnel carriers  
M60A3 tanks  
5-Ton trucks  
Night vision goggles

Marine Corps Reserve

F/A-18 aircraft  
KC-130T aircraft  
F-5E/F aircraft  
A-4M aircraft  
Heavy engineering equipment  
Training systems

Air Force Reserve

C-130H aircraft  
Refueling vehicles  
ECM pods

Coast Guard Reserve

Small boats

Source: The services.

Data as of September 30, 1989.

**Equipment On-Hand**

Table 27 shows the dollar value of equipment on-hand and shortages of major items, spare parts, and other equipment items in the reserve components at the end of FY 1989, and makes comparisons to FY 1988. The Naval Reserve, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve all had 100 percent of required major equipment items on-hand. Of DoD components, the Army Reserve had the lowest percentage of equipment on-hand. The Coast Guard Reserve had

only six percent of required major equipment items on-hand.

Spare Parts requirements and authorized levels increased 84 percent for the Naval Reserve and 85 percent for the Air National Guard compared to FY 1988. This may be due to conversions to modern aircraft. During the transition period, spare parts are required to support both new and old weapon systems. Despite of this, on-hand status improved for the Air National Guard.

**Table 27**  
**VALUES OF MAJOR EQUIPMENT ITEMS, SPARE PARTS, AND OTHER ITEMS**  
**FY 1988-89**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

		Guard	Army Reserve	Naval <sup>1</sup> Reserve	Marine Corps Reserve	Air Force Guard	Air Force Reserve	Coast Guard Reserve
<b>MAJOR EQUIPMENT ITEMS</b>								
Wartime Reqmt	FY 1989	32,705	9,554	6,157	3,670	20,159	9,075	179
Wartime Reqmt	FY 1988	32,230	7,508	5,982	3,225	19,468	8,744	179
Difference		475	2,046	175	445	691	331	0
Authorized	FY 1989	32,683	7,940	6,157	3,670	20,159	9,075	0
Authorized	FY 1988	32,206	6,801	5,982	3,225	19,468	8,744	0
Difference		477	1,139	175	445	691	331	0
On-Hand	FY 1989	25,845	5,549	6,157	3,391	20,159	9,075	10
On-Hand	FY 1988	24,945	4,379	5,982	3,045	19,468	8,744	9
Difference		900	1,170	175	346	691	331	1
% OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 1989	79%	58%	100%	92%	100%	100%	6%
% OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 1988	77%	58%	100%	94%	100%	100%	5%
Percent Change		2%	0%	0%	-2%	0%	0%	1%
Dollar Shortfall								
OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 1989	6,860	4,005	0	279	0	0	169
<b>SPARE PARTS</b>								
Wartime Reqmt	FY 1989	312	27	270	219	2,382	215	0
Wartime Reqmt	FY 1988	336	25	147	185	1,287	269	0
Difference		(24)	2	123	34	1,095	(54)	0
Authorized	FY 1988	312	27	270	219	2,382	215	0
Authorized	FY 1988	336	25	147	185	1,287	269	0
Difference		(24)	2	123	34	1,095	(54)	0
On-Hand	FY 1989	216	14	68	76	2,012	203	0
On-Hand	FY 1988	221	16	58	91	924	251	0
Difference		(5)	(2)	10	(15)	1,088	(48)	0
% OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 1989	69%	52%	25%	35%	84%	94%	0%
% OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 1988	66%	64%	39%	49%	72%	93%	0%
Percent Change		3%	-12%	-14%	-14%	13%	1%	0%
Dollar Shortfall								
OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 1989	96	13	202	143	370	12	0
<b>OTHER EQUIPMENT ITEMS</b>								
Wartime Reqmt	FY 1989	1,470	518	1,101	127	3,110	704	66
Wartime Reqmt	FY 1988	1,442	563	966	113	4,312	713	66
Difference		28	(45)	135	14	(1,202)	(9)	0
Authorized	FY 1989	1,511	518	1,073	127	3,110	703	0
Authorized	FY 1988	1,482	563	937	113	4,312	712	0
Difference		29	(45)	136	14	(1,202)	(9)	0
On-Hand	FY 1989	1,082	421	522	125	2,322	411	1
On-Hand	FY 1988	1,061	407	673	112	2,892	340	1
Difference		21	14	(121)	13	(570)	71	0
Dollar Shortfall								
OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 1989	388	97	549	2	788	293	65

Note: 1. Figures do not include value of ships (\$6.2 billion).

Source: The reserve components.


Data as of September 30, 1989.





Table 28 shows the percent of total equipment on-hand versus wartime requirements for each of the reserve components as of the end of FY 1989. Data is drawn from Table 29. There is a disparity between reserve components in the percentages of the dollar value of equipment on-hand versus wartime requirements. The disparity is greatest for the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and the Coast Guard.

**Table 28**  
**EQUIPMENT ON-HAND**



Note 1: Does not include value of ships.


Source: The reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1989.

## Equipment Shortages

Although the reserve components have received large amounts of modern equipment in recent years, significant shortages remain. The result is reduced readiness and some loss of training opportunities.

Tables 29 and 30 show the values of equipment shortages, for each reserve component, at the end of FY 1989. The Army National Guard, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve reduced their equipment shortages by six percent, 35 percent, and 22 percent respectively. The status of equipment on-hand versus wartime requirements declined in the other reserve components.






**Table 29**  
**EQUIPMENT SHORTGAGES**  
**EQUIPMENT ON-HAND COMPARISONS**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

	Wartime Requirement	Authorized	On-Hand	On-Hand vs Wartime Requirement	Percent On-Hand vs Wartime Requirement	Percent On-Hand vs Authorized
<b>Army National Guard</b>						
FY 1989	34,487	34,506	27,143	7,344	79%	79%
FY 1988	34,008	34,024	26,227	7,781	77%	77%
Difference	479	482	916	(437)		
Percent Change	1%	1%	3%	-6%		
<b>Army Reserve</b>						
FY 1989	10,099	8,485	5,984	4,115	59%	71%
FY 1988	8,096	7,389	4,802	3,294	59%	65%
Difference	2,003	1,096	1,182	821		
Percent Change	25%	15%	25%	25%		
<b>Naval Reserve<sup>1</sup></b>						
FY 1989	7,528	7,500	6,777	751	90%	90%
FY 1988	7,095	7,066	6,726	369	95%	95%
Difference	433	434	51	382		
Percent Change	6%	6%	1%	104%		
<b>Marine Corps Reserve</b>						
FY 1989	4,016	4,016	3,592	424	89%	89%
FY 1988	3,523	3,523	3,248	275	92%	92%
Difference	493	493	344	149		
Percent Change	14%	14%	11%	54%		
<b>Air National Guard</b>						
FY 1989	25,651	25,651	24,493	1,158	95%	95%
FY 1988	25,067	25,067	23,284	1,783	93%	93%
Difference	584	584	1,209	(625)		
Percent Change	2%	2%	5%	-35%		
<b>Air Force Reserve</b>						
FY 1989	9,994	9,993	9,689	305	97%	97%
FY 1988	9,726	9,725	9,335	391	96%	96%
Difference	268	268	354	(86)		
Percent Change	3%	3%	4%	-22%		
<b>DoD Total</b>						
FY 1989	91,775	90,151	77,678	14,097	85%	86%
FY 1988	87,515	86,794	73,622	13,893	84%	85%
Difference	4,260	3,357	4,056	204		
Percent Change	5%	4%	6%	1%		
<b>Coast Guard Reserve</b>						
FY 1989	244	0	10	206	4%	0%
FY 1988	245	0	11	204	4%	0%
Difference	(1)	0	(1)	2		
Percent Change	-0%	0%	-9%	1%		
<b>Total</b>						
FY 1989	92,019	90,151	77,688	14,303	84%	86%
FY 1988	87,760	86,794	73,633	14,097	84%	85%
Difference	4,259	3,357	4,055	206		
Percent Change	5%	4%	6%	1%		

Note 1: Figures do not include value of ships (6.2 billion).  
Source: The reserve components.  
Data as of September 30, 1989.




**Table 30**  
**EQUIPMENT DOLLAR SHORTAGES**  
**(Dollars in Billions)**



Source: The reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1989.

Table 31 indicates the most critical major equipment shortages as identified by each reserve component.





**Table 31**  
**MAJOR EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES**

Army National Guard

5-ton trucks  
Tactical radios  
Maintenance and support equipment  
Helicopters  
Aviation night vision devices

Army Reserve

Communications/electronics equipment  
Test measurement & diagnostic equipment  
Material handling equipment  
Support equipment (e.g. tactical vehicles, generators, engineer light sets)

Naval Reserve

A-6E attack aircraft  
C-9, C-20, and C-130 aircraft  
Aircraft support equipment  
Aircraft spares  
Electronic warfare equipment  
Cargo handling equipment  
Construction battalion equipment

Source: The services.

Data as of September 30, 1989.

Marine Corps Reserve

Communications/electronics equipment  
Engineering equipment

Air National Guard

Medical war reserve material  
Aircraft defensive systems  
Missile launchers  
Test equipment  
Jet intermediate maintenance equipment

Air Force Reserve

Aircraft defensive systems  
Chemical defense equipment  
Trucks and tow vehicles

Coast Guard Reserve

Wheeled vehicles  
Small boats

Thirteen percent of Army National Guard units reported deficiencies in equipment — a seven percent improvement over the previous year. Budget reductions in FY 1989 delayed the acquisition of 760 squad automatic weapons and 291 field kitchens for the Army National Guard, and 15 Bradley fighting vehicles and 602 squad automatic weapons for the Army Reserve.

In the Army Reserve, 20 percent of the units reported degraded status due to equipment shortages. This is a two percent improvement over the prior year.

Reductions in the Naval Reserve budget delayed aircraft modifications

and the procurement of spares. Naval Reserve construction and cargo handling battalions also received less equipment than planned in FY 1989.

Ninety-eight percent of Marine Corps Reserve units reported sufficient equipment available to accomplish their wartime mission.

The Air National Guard has shortages of critical F-16 support equipment. Common ground equipment and other aircraft-peculiar and missile support equipment were also reduced due to budget considerations. Approximately five percent of Air National Guard units lack adequate equipment to meet their wartime tasking.

The Air Force Reserve experienced shortages in support equipment for aircraft recently transferred from the active component. There were also shortages of aircraft defensive systems and replacement aircraft. However, the shortages are Air Force wide.

The limited equipment requirements for the Coast Guard Reserve generally remain unfilled.

Equipment shortages adversely affect training and mobilization readiness of the reserve components. Effective training is the cornerstone to a ready force. It is vitally important that the reserve components be provided with sufficient training equipment of the type they would use in combat and that the remainder of their wartime equipment be available upon mobilization.

The Board recommends that the reserve components be funded to meet wartime equipment requirements.

### **National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations**

National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations (NGREA) are dedicated funds designated for the purchase of reserve component equipment. These funds are in addition to those requested in the President's budget. Some of the funds are designated by Congress for the purchase of specific items of equipment. The remainder may be used by reserve components for discretionary purchases of equipment to improve readiness. Dedicated NGREA complement service appropriations to improve training and readiness in the reserve components. These funds have been used to reduce critical equipment shortages.

Table 32 displays the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations from FY 1982 through FY 1990.


**Table 32**  
**NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE EQUIPMENT APPROPRIATIONS**  
**FY 1982-90**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

	Combined FY 1982-85	FY 1986	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1990	Total
Army National Guard	350	521	146	273	256	315	1,861
Army Reserve	165	365	90	85	30	89	824
Naval Reserve	86	70	61	66	145	118	546
Marine Corps Reserve	45	100	60	40	82	109	436
Air National Guard	60	250	50	341	400	239	1,340
Air Force Reserve	25	174	150	202	227	39	817
DoD Total	731	1,480	557	1,007	1,140	909	5,824

Note: These are appropriations dedicated by Congress in addition to the DoD budget request.

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.

Data as of December 15, 1989.





### Equipment Obsolescence

The Army National Guard continues to operate some types of gasoline-powered vehicles that the active component has replaced with diesel-fueled equipment. The fuel supply system is designed only for diesel fuel. Progress is being made in reducing this incompatibility. Additionally, Army National Guard tanks, armored personnel carriers, tactical radio systems, and individual weapons require modernization to assure compatibility with the active component. The Army National Guard is approaching commonality with the active component in aircraft.

Modern ambulances and armored personnel carriers are being provided to the Army Reserve to increase compatibility with the active component. Purchase of maintenance test sets for modern equipment will allow the Army Reserve to provide better training for maintenance personnel.

Commissioned units of the Naval Reserve are generally equipped to perform their mission. Augmentation

units require no equipment, since they share active component equipment. The horizontal integration policy for equipping the Navy helps to assure adequate equipment for the Naval Reserve, and to maintain compatibility with the active component. Training and maintenance occurs on the same types of equipment in both components.

Naval Reserve helicopters, attack aircraft, and antisubmarine patrol aircraft have been upgraded. However, fewer of the modern P-3C UPDATE III aircraft will be provided to the active component, thereby slowing the transfer of earlier models to the reserve component. Additionally, Naval Reserve airlift aircraft are reaching the end of their planned service life with no replacement in sight. Service life extensions may be required to allow some older reserve aircraft to continue flying to meet peacetime mission requirements. However, wartime mission capability would be degraded.

The Marine Corps Reserve receives equipment based on mobilization sequence. Specific training needs, or unique logistical support requirements, may occasionally shift priorities. Horizontal fielding of equipment in the Marine Corps assures that reserve units are adequately equipped. The Table of Equipment procurement plan for the reserve component is a mirror image of the active component. Although the Marine Corps Reserve operates older aircraft, compatibility problems are reduced by a plan to utilize contingency support packages of spare parts and support equipment necessary for deployment with the older aircraft.

Some high priority Air National Guard units have received modern tactical

digital radios, high frequency radios, satellite terminals, technical controls, tactical aids to navigation for aircraft, and telephone switches. These additions allow for proper training and improved readiness. However, about 50 percent of Air National Guard communications equipment is analog, while the active component has mostly digital equipment. Compatibility and support problems are significant.

Obsolete ground support equipment in the Air National Guard is a limiting factor in supporting unit requirements. Older equipment is labor intensive, unreliable, and lacks commonality with newer systems. The obsolescence of Air National Guard combat communications equipment also continues to be an area of concern. About 40 percent of the equipment is of 1950-60 vintage which results in interoperability problems between U.S. and allied forces. The goal is to upgrade all equipment from the existing analog to modern digital technology. About 70 percent of the Air Force's combat communications capability and 60 percent of the tactical control units are in the Air National Guard.

Air National Guard unit conversions to more modern aircraft have reduced the need for unique support equipment. Most major equipment items are available or on order for the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve.

### **Equipment Maintenance Backlogs**

Proper maintenance is vital to effective training and readiness. Some reserve component maintenance backlogs exist and efforts are underway to reduce them.

Funding levels have been adequate to sustain training operational tempo without degrading the Army National Guard's equipment readiness posture. The Army Reserve has reported no equipment maintenance backlogs for the past two fiscal years. However, budget reductions may cause a spare parts shortage. This could lead to a maintenance backlog.

The Naval Reserve developed maintenance backlogs in FY 1989 in the areas of airframes, engine rework, and some planned modifications. Further budget reductions could lead to an increase of the backlog. As a result, less equipment would be available for training and operations and readiness would decrease. Improvements in logistic procedures have been implemented to decrease response time required for spare parts acquisition.

The Marine Corps Reserve has no significant equipment maintenance backlog.





The Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve report no significant maintenance backlog at the unit level. This was accomplished through aggressive unit level management with depot team assistance. However, reduction in depot maintenance funding has caused an equipment maintenance backlog at that level. Both components have experienced a slowdown in return of equipment from depot level maintenance. As a result, some work has been shifted to the unit level. This results in deferment of unit level maintenance, which has created a minor backlog.

The Coast Guard Reserve has recently received some new equipment, but has no maintenance backlog.

### **Aircraft Defensive Systems**

The lack of adequate electronic warfare defensive equipment for reserve component aircraft is an important equipment issue. Survivability of aircraft in a high-threat, electronic environment is doubtful without such equipment. Little progress has been made to provide the reserve components with appropriate defensive equipment which is essential in an electronic warfare environment.

Required Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) for Army National Guard aircraft will cost approximately \$134 million over the next six years. Training on ASE is necessary to help insure aircraft survival and mission accomplishment in wartime.

The percentage of Army Reserve aircraft with adequate defensive systems continues to improve. All Army Reserve aircraft should have adequate defensive systems by the end of FY 1990.

The Naval Reserve estimates that \$175 million is required to provide defensive equipment for its aircraft. An estimated \$15 million is still required for electronic warfare equipment for the Marine Corps Reserve. Availability of defensive systems improved over 400 percent during FY 1989 in the Marine Corps Reserve.

The Air National Guard reports that a shortage of electronic warfare defensive equipment persists. Some defensive equipment has been provided for fighters. However, reconnaissance and airlift aircraft have not received defensive equipment. The equipment currently held is either outdated or obsolete and would provide doubtful protection in a modern electronic warfare environment.

Radar and missile warning receivers combined with appropriate countermeasure systems are required to provide adequate self-protection. ECM pods are needed for fighter aircraft as well. The cost to provide adequate electronic warfare defensive equipment to the Air National Guard is estimated to be \$2.1 billion.

The Air Force Reserve is testing and planning to install an ALQ-156-based defensive system on 25 of its C-130

aircraft in FY 1990 to obtain some immediate capability. The follow-on system will incorporate the AAR-47, which will cost an estimated \$16.1 million for 132 aircraft and is scheduled to begin installation in FY 1991. Completion of these installations during the 1990's will provide some protection for this segment of the Air Force Reserve's airlift capability. Training in the use and maintenance of the equipment is only beginning. Developing and installing similar capability for other Air Force Reserve aircraft is imperative.

The Coast Guard Reserve utilizes active component aircraft.

The Board recommends that reserve component aircraft be provided with modern defensive systems to allow aircrews to conduct effective training and to enhance survival in a high-threat electronic environment.

### **Automated Management Systems**


The Tactical Army Combat Service Support Computer System (TACCS) is being distributed to the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. It is supported by Standard Army Management Information Systems (STAMIS). Allocation is based on unit priority for mobilization. Logistics Applications of Automated Marking and Reading Symbols (LOGMARS) equipment is also being fielded to the Army's reserve components. Reserve component units of the Army received one-half of the TACCS issued in FY 1989. This greatly enhanced the logistical readiness of using units.

The Army has made significant progress in fielding the Reserve

Component Automation System (RCAS) and has fully funded the program through FY 1994. The RCAS entered the design phase with the Army's release of the Request for Proposals to industry early in FY 1990. The RCAS will provide an automation capability for more than 10,000 reserve component units at more than 5,000 armories and reserve centers worldwide. The System will provide an automated network for the mobilization chain of command. Fielding of the RCAS Critical Elements will begin in the fourth quarter of FY 1992.

The Naval Reserve has been provided with two logistic management software packages that are compatible with microcomputers currently available at reserve activities. Fund Administration and Standardized Document Automation (FASTDATA), and the Controlled Equipage Inventory System (CEIS) packages improve support for the Naval Reserve.

The FASTDATA system supports supply activities to assure accurate document preparation, standard record keeping, and automatic transaction processing and editing. Accounting data interfaces the reserve component system with the



Reserve Financial Information Processing Center, field activity comptrollers, and cost centers.

The CEIS supports comptrollers and storekeepers in management of minor and plant property, and in maintaining accurate inventory and history files.

The Reserve Unit Priority System (RUPS) equipment module developed for the Marine Corps Reserve, under the auspices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, provides the ability to manage equipment densities, requirements, and readiness. The RUPS equipment module has also been developed for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. It is currently

being installed within the Army Secretariat, Army Staff, the National Guard Bureau, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve and U.S. Army Forces Command.

Requisitioning of clothing for the Marine Corps Reserve is fully automated. Maintenance transactions are effectively documented with on-line input to the Marine Integrated Maintenance Management System (MIMMS). The Marine Corps Reserve utilizes basically the same systems as the active component. The addition of automated management systems has increased efficiency for the tracking and analysis of logistics and equipment readiness.







The Air National Guard is an active participant in the development and implementation of Air Force logistics systems. These and other logistics automation programs enhance Air National Guard mobilization readiness.

- Combat Ammunition System, which provides commanders with real-time status and accountability of munitions.
- Core Automated Maintenance System, which tracks workload and automates aircraft maintenance records.
- Weapon System Management Information System, which provides real-time status of unit logistics readiness.
- Combat Supply System, which automates supply support at deployed locations.
- Automated Sourcing System, which provides real-time visibility and sourcing of critical assets.

Automation in the Air Force Reserve continues to improve with conversion to the Core Automated Management System, which allows improved levels of automation in aircraft maintenance,

record keeping, and workload tracking. The Contingency Operation Mobility Planning and Execution System has been added for base level support. This provides on-line, management of mobility programs.

The Coast Guard Reserve reports only a limited requirement for logistics automation.

### **Summary and Recommendations**

Equipment modernization is critical for the reserve components to meet compatibility, commonality, and capability standards of the total force. Delays in modernization adversely impact unit training and readiness.

Budget constraints hamper improvements in the equipment on-hand status of reserve component units. Although many units are receiving new equipment for training, sufficient equipment is not being procured to fill wartime requirements. These requirements include major end items, other equipment, and spare parts.

Because much of the reserve component equipment is older than that in the active components, maintenance requirements are increased. Not only does this demand additional time and skill, but it also requires increasing numbers of spare parts. Inventory management is also time consuming. All of this reduces the time available for training on more modern equipment which is programmed into reserve component units.

Automated information systems to manage peacetime and mobilization activities are critically important to the reserve components. These systems will reduce time spent on administration and increase time available for

meaningful individual and unit training.

Reserve component equipment shortages vary greatly. Dedicated procurement appropriations have helped to reduce the equipment shortages which hamper unit readiness.

The Board recommends that:

- the reserve components be funded to meet their wartime equipment requirements.
- reserve component aircraft be provided with modern defensive systems to allow aircrews to conduct effective training and to enhance survival in a high-threat electronic environment. (M)





# Medical 6

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*"The links bonding the Naval Reserve with the Navy medical community have a long tradition—a tradition which exemplifies the best of medical care and the best of service to our nation."*


VADM James A. Zimble, MC, USN  
Surgeon General of the Navy

## General

The primary mission of the military medical departments is to ensure that military personnel are provided adequate medical care. The reserve components have a major responsibility in carrying out that mission. They provide more than two-thirds of the wartime medical personnel support and approximately three-fourths of the medical evacuation crews. This reliance on the reserve components has highlighted both the critical role of reserve component medical manpower and the personnel shortages that exist. Significant progress has been made in reducing Selected Reserve manpower shortages. However, shortages in critical skills and shortages against wartime requirements remain.



Recent policy changes have facilitated recruiting. Selected Reserve service for health care professionals has been enhanced, especially by the availability of flexible training options. Medical training opportunities have been made more accessible. Monetary incentives such as training stipends, loan repayment, and bonus programs have been initiated or expanded. Continuing health education opportunities are also being provided.



Congress has directed the Selective Service System to develop a standby program for the registration and classification of health care professionals. Such a program would only be implemented after the President declares a national emergency and after Congress passes legislation providing specific registration authority. The Selective Service System is developing an operational concept, functional description, and automated portions of the program. Testing will begin in FY 1991.

Wartime requirements for health care personnel are filled from the active component, the Selected Reserve, and Pretrained Individual Manpower (PIM), which consists of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), Standby Reserve, and military retirees. As the services look for ways to further reduce medical manpower shortages, all resources must be utilized.

## Medical Personnel

The FY 1990-94 Department of Defense Guidance directed the Services

“... to implement a health care reserve component recruiting and retention program which will, through steady annual staffing increases, eliminate the wartime shortfall of physicians with critical skills and of nurses by FY 1993. Thereafter maintain full manning levels for these wartime personnel requirements.”

Department of Defense -wide, there were Selected Reserve shortages of over 1,500 physicians, 2,800 nurses, and 5,900 enlisted health care personnel at the end of FY 1989. When yield rates are applied, this shortage increases to 1,900

physicians, 3,500 nurses, and 9,700 enlisted health care personnel. Yield rates were provided by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs to more accurately reflect the number of personnel expected to be available in the event of mobilization. The Department of Defense requires the military departments to use yield rates in their calculation of manpower availability.

Not only were there shortages in the total number of Selected Reserve health care personnel, but there were also shortages in critical medical specialties, such as anesthesiologists, general surgeons, orthopedic surgeons, thoracic surgeons, operating room nurses, nurse anesthetists, aidmen, and hospital corpsmen. Recruiting and retention of qualified personnel in these skill areas is essential if medical readiness is to be improved.

Wartime medical requirements are still being refined. In February 1989, The Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the comprehensive review of medical program goals and specific recommendations. These recommendations included goals for wartime physician requirements and 11 follow-on actions to further refine the established goals. In FY 1990, DoD expects to be able to identify the wartime requirements for all categories of health care personnel, as well as to allocate them between the active and reserve components.

Because wartime medical requirements were not available, this report does not fully address the extent to which the reserve components are presently capable of satisfying their wartime medical personnel requirements. However, as a secondary



means of assessing reserve manpower staffing, comparisons of Selected Reserve budgeted medical authorizations versus assigned physicians, nurses, and enlisted health care personnel are shown in Table 33. Enlisted fill rates do not consider skill qualification mismatches which are most often due to delays in fulfilling training requirements. Table 34 shows IRR medical strength in selected specialties which could be used to offset Selected Reserve shortages and to meet other mobilization requirements.

The Board recommends that greater emphasis be placed on filling enlisted health care positions with qualified personnel and that additional emphasis be placed on increasing the skill qualification rates of enlisted personnel.



**Table 33**  
**SELECTED RESERVE**  
**MEDICAL PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY SPECIALTY**

	<u>Army</u>			<u>Navy</u>		
	<u>Budgeted</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Available<sup>1</sup></u>	<u>Budgeted</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Available<sup>1</sup></u>
<u>Physicians</u>						
General Surgeon	1,307	508	483	146	131	124
Anesthesiologist	227	192	182	120	119	113
Orthopedic Surgeon	427	175	166	92	80	76
All Other	<u>3,358</u>	<u>3,098</u>	<u>2,943</u>	<u>1,392</u>	<u>1,534</u>	<u>1,457</u>
Total	5,319	3,973	3,774	1,750	1,864	1,771
<u>Nurses</u>						
Nurse Anesthetist	899	379	360	96	56	53
Operating Room Nurse	1,206	716	680	222	94	89
All Other	<u>7,555</u>	<u>6,644</u>	<u>6,312</u>	<u>2,008</u>	<u>1,755</u>	<u>1,667</u>
Total	9,660	7,739	7,352	2,326	1,905	1,810
<u>Enlisted<sup>2</sup></u>						
Enlisted LPN	8,267	5,245	4,983	0	0	0
All Other	<u>46,846</u>	<u>47,193</u>	<u>44,833</u>	<u>14,083</u>	<u>12,826</u>	<u>12,185</u>
Total	55,113	52,438	49,816	14,083	12,826	12,185
	<u>Air Force</u>			<u>DoD Total</u>		
	<u>Budgeted</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Available<sup>1</sup></u>	<u>Budgeted</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Available<sup>1</sup></u>
<u>Physicians</u>						
General Surgeon	93	88	84	1,546	727	691
Anesthesiologist	24	29	28	371	340	323
Orthopedic Surgeon	49	49	47	568	304	289
All Other	<u>1,341</u>	<u>1,133</u>	<u>1,076</u>	<u>6,091</u>	<u>5,765</u>	<u>5,477</u>
Total	1,507	1,299	1,234	8,576	7,136	6,779
<u>Nurses</u>						
Nurse Anesthetist	94	82	78	1,089	517	491
Operating Room Nurse	97	102	97	1,525	912	866
All Other	<u>3,129</u>	<u>2,798</u>	<u>2,658</u>	<u>12,692</u>	<u>11,197</u>	<u>10,637</u>
Total	3,320	2,982	2,833	15,306	12,626	11,995
<u>Enlisted<sup>2</sup></u>						
Enlisted LPN	0	0	0	8,267	5,245	4,983
All Other	<u>11,593</u>	<u>11,458</u>	<u>10,885</u>	<u>72,522</u>	<u>71,477</u>	<u>67,903</u>
Total	11,593	11,458	10,885	80,789	76,722	72,886

Notes: 1. Yield rates provided by OASD(HA) have been applied to the data to more accurately reflect the number of personnel expected to be available in the event of mobilization.

2. Not all enlisted are qualified in their assigned specialty.

Source: The reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1989.

**Table 34**  
**MEDICAL IRR/ING PERSONNEL STRENGTH IN SELECTED SPECIALTIES**

	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Available<sup>1</sup></u>
<u>General Surgeon</u>		
Army	232	209
Navy	57	46
Air Force	15	9
<u>Anesthesiologist</u>		
Army	95	86
Navy	54	43
Air Force	6	4
<u>Orthopedic Surgeon</u>		
Army	116	104
Navy	43	34
Air Force	6	4
<u>Nurse Anesthetist</u>		
Army	112	101
Navy	11	9
Air Force	15	9
<u>Operating Room Nurse</u>		
Army	225	202
Navy	20	16
Air Force	30	18

Note: 1. Yield rates were provided by OASD(HA) and applied to the assigned data to more accurately reflect the number of personnel who could be expected to be available in the event of mobilization.

Source: The reserve components.  
Data as of September 30, 1989.

### **Officer Drill Pay Accounts**

Improved recruiting incentives have helped to reduce medical personnel shortages. As recruiting success continues, there is a need for commensurate increases in officer drill

pay accounts—particularly in the Army's reserve components—to pay for the steadily increasing number of physicians and nurses. In past years, officer drill pay accounts were not fully funded, because of the large number of vacant medical positions. During FY





1989, internal budget adjustments, within the services, provided sufficient officer drill pay funding to support the expanded medical recruiting efforts. This capacity is limited.

The Board recommends that officer drill pay funding be increased, commensurate with programmed increases in medical personnel strength.

### **Recruiting and Retention Programs**

The Selected Reserve Scholarship Program for Reserve Service [Stipend Program], the Education Loan Repayment Program for Health Professionals who serve in the Selected Reserve [Loan Repayment Program], and the Selected Reserve Recruitment Bonus Test have been implemented by DoD to enhance medical recruiting and retention. It should be noted that health care professionals may not be eligible for the Stipend or Loan Repayment Programs if they are obligated to serve on active duty due to participation in another program.

The Stipend Program was promulgated in FY 1986 and expanded in FY 1988 to offer an additional option

for service in the Individual Ready Reserve. Under the Stipend Program, physicians and nurses may receive monthly stipend payments if they join one of the reserve components. Stipends vary from \$100 to \$706 per month, depending on the status of the recipient and service policy. A total of 753 participants were enrolled in this program as of the end of FY 1989. The Stipend Program is open to those currently serving in the reserve components, those who apply for appointment and are offered a commission as a Medical Corps or Nurse Corps officer, and to third and fourth year undergraduate students eligible for a commission upon completion of their baccalaureate programs. The reserve components regard this as an important and successful program for recruiting physicians and nurses training in critically-short wartime specialties.

The Loan Repayment Program was established in 1986, and expanded in FY 1988. It covers individuals who receive loans for their professional education under the Public Health Service Act or the Higher Education Act. A November, 1989 change expanded this program to include loans made, insured, or guaranteed through recognized financial or educational institutions, if the loan was used to finance education in a critically-short health profession. To qualify, a physician or nurse must be appointed to, or commissioned in, the Medical Corps or Nurse Corps on or after October 1, 1985, and before October 1, 1992. They must be in good professional standing and have a current license or certification. Participants must also be qualified and serving in a critically-short wartime specialty. Maximum reimbursement is \$3,000 for



each year of satisfactory service. Total program repayments may not exceed \$20,000. As of the end of FY 1989, 126 individuals were receiving benefits and approximately 200 others had declared their intent to apply. As an incentive, the Loan Repayment Program has been less effective than the Stipend Program. This may be due, in part, to eligibility restrictions, previous limitations on the types of loans, and the repayment amounts.

The Selected Reserve Recruitment Bonus test was started in August 1989 and is scheduled to end in September 1990. This program tests the effectiveness of recruiting bonuses for Selected Reserve physicians and nurses with critically short wartime specialties who live in specific shortage areas.

### **Policy Changes Affecting Recruiting And Retention**

Based on DoD guidelines, the services have initiated policy changes to help alleviate reserve component medical shortages.

- The Army deleted the requirement that associate degree and diploma nurses must have one year of full-time work experience following graduation to join Army reserve components. Additionally, the requirement for six months full-time employment during the year preceding application has been changed to allow part-time employment.
- Policy changes adopted by the Naval Reserve allow physicians to be assigned overstrength if all local unit positions are filled, providing additional unit assignment opportunities.

The Board believes an additional policy change is needed. A significant

disincentive for physician participation in the Selected Reserve is the inordinate amount of time spent giving physical examinations. This task, although necessary, is generally viewed as not professionally challenging. Service policies vary on the frequency of such examinations for their members. The current statutory requirement is that physicals must be given at least once every four years. A DoD legislative proposal to change the minimum to five years was forwarded to OMB on June 5, 1989. If the minimum requirement is changed, and the services followed the minimum where medically feasible, the requirement for reserve component health care professionals to give physical examinations would be reduced accordingly. Cost savings may also accrue.

The Board recommends that legislation be enacted to allow physical examinations of reserve component members once every five years.

### **Training Programs**

Continuing Health Education (CHE) programs are necessary to renew credentials and licenses, and provide refresher and proficiency training of military health care personnel. Surveys indicate that the opportunity to attend CHE is an important reason for joining and remaining in a National Guard or





Reserve unit. CHE is a valuable recruiting and retention tool which also enhances readiness. There are over 40,000 Army Reserve health care professionals eligible for CHE. However, in FY 1989, the Army Reserve had CHE funding for only about 2,500.

The Board recommends that Continuing Health Education programs be fully funded.

The National Army Medical Department Augmentation Detachment (NAAD) offers flexible training for Army Reserve physicians and nurses, in critical specialties, who are unable to train on a regular basis with local units due to geographic or time constraints. Physicians and nurses may be attached to the NAAD, and assigned to an understrength Army Reserve unit elsewhere in the country. They would mobilize with their assigned units. This allows recruiters to recruit on a nationwide basis, without concern for filling a local unit vacancy. At the end of FY 1989, 250 medical officers and 209 nurses were attached to the NAAD. An additional 335 applications were pending. The NAAD has demonstrated

the value of a flexible training option for health care professionals in the Selected Reserve. As knowledge of this program spreads, significant increases in participation are expected.

Three Naval Reserve programs have been particularly effective for medical recruiting and retention:

- The Reserve Flexibility program allows doctors and nurses to schedule flexible drill periods (up to 50 percent) to accommodate their busy schedules.
- Physician Reservists in Medical Universities and Schools (PRIMUS) permits doctors and nurses to fulfill their inactive duty for training obligation at host schools, military treatment facilities, or other appropriate sites. As of the end of FY 1989, 78 PRIMUS units had been formed, and 1,314 Naval Reserve health care personnel were participating.
- The Navy Expanded Drill Opportunity Clinical (NEDOC) was established in May 1989, as a pilot program for 100 participants, to provide flexible drill opportunities for Naval Reserve health care personnel. Physicians, oral surgeons, non-administrative Medical Service Corps providers, nurses, physician assistants, and hospital corpsmen may participate. NEDOC allows participants to drill at military treatment facilities.

The Combat Casualty Care Course (C4) is a joint-service program located at the Joint Medical Readiness Training Center, Camp Bullis, Texas. It is taught by the Military Medical Education Institute (MMEI). Participants receive

Advanced Trauma Life Support certification and recognition from the American College of Surgeons. The course prepares medical personnel to function during mid-to-high intensity conflict. It teaches skills required to provide medical care for casualties during the first 12 hours. The number of training spaces in the nine-day resident C4 course was increased from 100 to 220 during FY 1989. A total of 297 reserve component health care personnel had received resident C4 training by the end of FY 1989. Other combat casualty care training courses provided by the MMEI are: Advanced Burn, Cardiac, Pre-Hospital Trauma Life Support, Trauma Nurse Care, Deployment Medicine, Combat Casualty Management, and Combat Anesthesia.

The Mobile Medical Training Team (MMTT) is a joint-service program that provides training teams to reserve units at regional training sites throughout the country. MMTTs provide on-site courses to physicians and nurses including C4 training, Combat Anesthesia, Deployment Medicine, and the Combat Nurse Trauma Course. Courses are completed during inactive duty training or annual training.

Enlisted Sustainment Training is a joint-service initiative to determine the feasibility of joint training for reserve component medics and corpsmen. Under the auspices of the Reserve Components Medical Council (RCMC), the services developed a sustainment training initiative to train reserve component enlisted medical personnel. A Joint Working Group (JWG) was established, comprised of members from each of the services, with the Army as lead. A pilot program demonstrated that there were

economies of scale in performing joint service enlisted sustainment training on a shared basis.

The Army National Guard initiated a civilian education program to help reduce the critical shortage of nurse anesthetists. The program qualifies Nurse Corps officers as nurse anesthetists through training at accredited civilian institutions. Eight students were accepted in this program in FY 1989. An additional seven students are enrolled for FY 1990.

The first Regional Training Site-Medical (RTS-MED) was established at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, during FY 1989. This is one of seven (two Army National Guard and five Army Reserve) training sites being established to provide new equipment training and sustainment training on the Deployable Medical Systems. RTS-MED also provides training in the Army military occupation specialties of medical supply specialist and biomedical equipment inspector. Seventy-five personnel had been trained in the Biomedical Inspectors Course as of the end of FY 1989.



Specialized Training for Army Readiness (STAR), is a program designed to train qualified Army Reserve soldiers in critically-short medical technician skills. Participants in the STAR program complete basic training and attend a civilian school associate degree or technical diploma program, in an approved medical specialty. During this time, STAR participants also attend unit drills and annual training.

All STAR participants receive full tuition, books, and fees (up to a maximum of \$16,000) if they maintain satisfactory participation in an Army Reserve unit and meet academic requirements. Soldiers must serve one year in the Selected Reserve in the specialty in which they are trained for each full or partial year of education. STAR provides a cost-effective and attractive method of providing lengthy skill training for enlisted medical personnel. Fifty-six soldiers enlisted in the prototype program in FY 1989. The program will expand in FY 1990, to support 400 soldiers.



The Naval Reserve established a Same-Day Surgery Program at the Naval

Hospital in Oakland, California to meet the training needs of local Naval Reservists. Surgery is performed on Saturdays, either by Naval Reserve surgeons or hospital residents, under the supervision of qualified Naval Reserve surgeons. Naval Reservists staff the operating room, recovery room, and surgical ward. Advantages of this program are that otherwise idle facilities are utilized, meaningful training is available for Reservists on weekends, patients can have surgery performed on weekends, and another day can be added to the surgical schedule without having to increase working hours of the regular hospital staff.

The Naval Reserve initiated the Navy Enlisted Classification Attainment program for hospital corpsmen and dental technicians. This modular program enables personnel to obtain skill qualification in seven to nine months, instead of the three years required under previous programs.

The Navy distributed several new interactive video programs for training Naval Reserve medical personnel. In addition, commercial video programs are being distributed to supplement Navy programs.

In FY 1989, four Navy Fleet Hospital Operations Courses (FHOC) were provided to reservists during annual training. Training in conjunction with the FHOC includes environmental health; preventive medicine; and chemical, biological, and radiological defense. Over 2,300 members of the Naval Reserve were enrolled in this program at the end of FY 1989.

The Air National Guard trained 26 enlisted mental health specialists during FY 1989. These are part of 66 newly-



authorized positions in medical readiness squadrons. Training is provided by the Army's Academy of Health Sciences. Although additional positions were authorized in units, insufficient training funds were available.

The Air National Guard received the Survivable Collective Protection System-Medical in FY 1988. This is a large, airtight shelter capable of surviving sustained combat shocks. It has been placed at a permanent training site in Alpena, Michigan, to allow medical personnel to train in a simulated nuclear, biological, chemical environment. This facility is scheduled to open in FY 1990.

The Air Force Reserve initiated an Aeromedical Evacuation Readiness Orientation Course. Over 300 active and reserve component medical personnel were oriented to patient movement under tactical conditions. In addition, the Air Force Reserve is spearheading a proposal to change the Aeromedical Evacuation inspection criteria to emphasize wartime skills and functional expertise.

The Board recommends that joint service training be expanded for common medical skills.

### **Training Constraints**

The reserve components have identified several training constraints that have a negative impact on medical readiness and retention.

In the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, the limited number of quotas in the Biomedical Equipment Repairman Course has been a problem for the past three years, due primarily



to an equipment shortage. Although the Army National Guard has exceeded 100 percent strength in its authorized positions in this specialty, only 52 percent of the assigned personnel have been trained. Of the 70 training course spaces needed for FY 1990, only 22 are available.

Sufficient funds were not available for the Army Reserve enlisted civilian contract training. The cost of training a Licensed Practical Nurse in civilian schools can be as much as \$20,000. A partial solution to this problem would be for recruiters to give greater emphasis to recruiting individuals with civilian acquired skills.

The cumulative impact of these constraints is that qualification rates in some critical enlisted specialties continue to be far below the Army goal.

The Naval Reserve identified as training constraints limited access to active component schools and the restriction that prior service personnel are ineligible to participate in the Reserve Allied Medical Personnel



program. These factors have a negative effect on morale, retention, and promotions which ultimately impact upon medical readiness and mobilization.

The Board recommends that reserve component quotas for medical training courses be increased, commensurate with current shortages of qualified personnel and programmed increases in authorized medical strength.

### **Medical Exercises**

Over 10,700 health care personnel from 175 reserve component units participated in medical exercises during FY 1989, which included ORCHID SAGE and MEDEX 89.

- ORCHID SAGE was the largest reserve component joint medical readiness exercise ever conducted. Eighty-five active and reserve component units and over 6,000 personnel from the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and Air Force Reserve took part in the theater-level medical support exercise at Fort

Drum, New York. Units operated in a field environment for 11 consecutive days. Survival tasks and chemical contamination/decontamination procedures were emphasized. Over 4,000 simulated patients were treated. The Air Force Reserve provided a medical aeroevacuation staging facility and flew ten C-130 missions to practice patient regulating and evacuation. Four hospital units with Deployable Medical Systems Minimum Essential Equipment for Training sets participated. The equipment was transported and set up by the Army Reserve. Approximately 350 moulaged "patients" were transported by Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard C-130 aircraft to 40 civilian hospitals in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.

- MEDEX 89 involved nearly 3,000 active and reserve component medical personnel from 18 states and Puerto Rico. The five-day exercise tested medical capabilities under wartime conditions. Forty-four units operated combat support, evacuation, and mobile Army surgical hospitals. This exercise provided realistic training and a unique opportunity for medical personnel to operate as they would in wartime.

Thirty-one other medical units with 388 personnel participated in overseas medical support exercises in Bolivia, Costa Rica, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Korea, and Norway. Overseas training improves cooperation between the military and civilian communities, and enhances relations with host nations.

### Human Immunodeficiency Virus Screening

The services have all implemented policies on the identification, surveillance, and administration of Selected Reserve personnel infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). As of the end of FY 1989, approximately one million Selected Reservists had been screened for HIV. A total of about 1,000 (.1 percent) tested positive.


The Board reaffirms its recommendation that members of the Ready Reserve who are tested and determined to be HIV-positive, if not

discharged, be transferred to the Standby Reserve (Inactive Status List).

### Dental Panoramic Radiographs

One of the most important means to identify casualties is through the use of dental panoramic radiographs—a film record of teeth. DoD policy requires two radiograph copies for each service member. One is retained in the individual's dental record and the other is forwarded to the Central Panographic Storage Facility (CPSF) where films are stored and retrieved when required. Table 35 shows the percentage of dental panoramic radiographs on file for each component.

**Table 35**  
**PERCENTAGE OF DENTAL PANORAL RADIOGRAPHS ON FILE**



Source: The reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1989.





Department of Defense policy requires component personnel to have a dental panoramic radiograph on file prior to overseas deployment. With the large number of reserve component personnel still not having panoramic radiographs, mobilization readiness is impacted.

The Board recommends that annual goals be established for dental panoramic radiographs to ensure compliance with DoD policy.

### **Deployable Medical Systems**

Deployable Medical Systems (DEPMEDS) equipment consists of standardized modules such as operating rooms, laboratories, x-ray facilities and patient wards. DEPMEDS is to be used by all services. It can be configured to varying types and sizes of hospitals utilizing the latest medical technology and support equipment. It is transportable by existing military transportation systems.

The Army plans to provide 25 DEPMEDS sets to the Army National Guard and 94 DEPMEDS sets to the Army Reserve through FY 1996.

Excellent progress is being made on the DEPMEDS distribution plan. The reserve components had received 27 DEPMEDS sets by the end of FY 1989.

Seven DEPMEDS training sets are being provided to the five Army Reserve and two Army National Guard Regional Training Sites-Medical (RTS-MEDS). These sets are 400 bed evacuation hospital equivalents. As of the end of FY 1989, two DEPMEDS sets had been delivered to support the Army National Guard RTS-MEDS. During FY 1991-93, the five DEPMEDS sets to support the Army Reserve are scheduled for delivery.

Since the reserve components will not receive a complete DEPMEDS set until mobilized, both the Army National Guard and Army Reserve units scheduled to receive DEPMEDS are receiving DEPMEDS Minimum Essential Equipment for Training (MEET) sets. DEPMEDS (MEET) sets provide the unit the capability to train at home station at the individual and crew level.

As of the end of FY 1989, eight Army National Guard and 24 Army Reserve medical units received DEPMEDS New Equipment Training (NET) prior to receiving their DEPMEDS MEET set. The Training is keeping pace with the fielding of DEPMEDS equipment.

The Naval Reserve will not receive DEPMEDS equipment. However, the Naval Reserve will staff 14 DEPMEDS-equipped fleet hospitals with Selected Reservists and one with IRR members. The Navy is storing DEPMEDS equipment as prepositioned war stocks. Expansion of the Fleet Hospital Training Activity at Camp Pendleton, California, has enabled three of the eight



established reserve fleet hospitals to be trained. Training for the remaining units is scheduled to begin in FY 1990.

Training on DEPMEDS for both the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve is presently accomplished at Sheppard AFB, Texas. An Air National Guard medical training site at Alpena, Michigan, should be operational in FY 1990.

The opportunity to train on DEPMEDS equipment is having a positive impact on morale, retention, and readiness in the reserve components.

The Board recommends that DEPMEDS equipment be fielded to the reserve components as scheduled.

### **Other Medical Equipment**

The percentage of medical equipment on-hand in the reserve components is 81 percent for the Army National Guard, 51 percent for the Army Reserve, 56 percent for the Marine Corps Reserve, 76 percent for the Air National Guard, and 95 percent for the Air Force Reserve. Naval Reserve units utilize active component medical equipment.

There are continuing shortages of dental, x-ray, and laboratory equipment. Critical shortages of medical support equipment include 5-ton trucks, dolly sets, tentage, ambulances, radios, generators, and chemical masks and suits.

The Board recommends that reserve component medical personnel be provided sufficient medical equipment for training, especially equipment that is


critical to their wartime mission.

### **U.S. Public Health Service Agreement**

In addition to battlefield medical care, there is a requirement for medical care in the U.S. for patients who cannot be returned to duty within a reasonable period of time. In July 1988, the Department of Defense signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) concerning the mobilization and employment of U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) Commissioned Corps officers in DoD health care activities in time of war or during a national emergency. According to the agreement, these officers will serve as a "... readily available source of manpower to augment DoD continental United States health care activities and, on a limited basis, other activities during a national emergency." The original agreement was for a period of three years.

The Department of Defense signed an amendment to the Memorandum of Understanding in December, 1989 extending the agreement indefinitely.





### **Hospital Ships**

In August 1988, members of the Board visited the USNS COMFORT, one of the Navy's two hospital ships. The Board expressed concern at that time, and in the FY 1988 Annual Report, that the ship was manned only by active component personnel. The Board was concerned that there was no opportunity for reserve component personnel to train on the ship's modern medical equipment and facilities. Subsequently, the Navy reviewed this issue and determined that due to the ship's mobilization mission, which calls for its immediate deployment, it was considered inappropriate to identify Naval Reserve billets on the USNS COMFORT. The Navy's position is that mobilization does not allow time for Naval Reserve units to be mobilized and embarked prior to deployment. Opportunities will be provided, however, for Selected Reservists on temporary active duty to train onboard during peacetime missions. The Board

reaffirms its recommendation that Selected Reserve billets be identified and established for the Navy's two hospital ships.

### **Report on Reserve Component Medical Personnel**

At the request of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Board completed a study for the Secretary of Defense on reserve component medical personnel readiness. The study focused on reserve component medical personnel shortages that exist, DoD-wide, in physician and nurse surgical specialties, and the nurse requirement overall. The report, containing 28 recommendations, was submitted to the Secretary of Defense in October 1989. In his letter of transmittal, the Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board said that:

"Generally, the Board found that the current and proposed policies and programs of the Department of

Defense and the services, with respect to the Selected Reserve, are effective. Progress is being made toward the personnel goals for the health care professionals authorized for the Selected Reserve. Shortages in surgical specialties continue to require attention. Recruiting all the surgical specialists needed by the Selected Reserve will not be easy without additional legislation or additional resources.

"However, the wartime requirement for health care professionals exceeds the current authorized strength of the Active component and Selected Reserve. Other sources of medical personnel are the pretrained personnel in the Retired Reserve, Standby Reserve, and the Individual Ready Reserve. Currently there are insufficient numbers of personnel in those groups to fill wartime shortages. These categories of personnel merit increased attention and management. Another way to meet medical personnel wartime requirements might be to devise a system of registration and conscription through the Selective Service System."

### **Resolution of the Reserve Forces Policy Board**

The Board adopted the following resolution at its September 1989 quarterly meeting:

"House Resolution 3199 amends Title 10, United States Code, . . . to establish a program to provide post-secondary educational assistance to students in health professions who are eligible for educational assistance under the Reserve GI Bill program in

return for agreement for subsequent service with the Department of Veterans Affairs.

"The Reserve Forces Policy Board supports the provisions of H.R. 3199."

### **Summary and Recommendations**

More than two-thirds of the required wartime medical personnel will be provided by the reserve components. While Selected Reserve strength has improved dramatically over the past few years, critical shortages remain—particularly in medical specialties such as general surgeons, orthopedic surgeons, nurse anesthetists, and operating room nurses. Similar critical shortages continue to exist in Pretrained Individual Manpower.

Notable progress has been made in training and equipping of reserve component medical forces. Training programs are more accessible and flexible. Medical readiness exercises have substantially enhanced the training of reserve component personnel. As a result, medical readiness continues to improve.

Modern DEPMEDS equipment is being provided to the reserve components. However, the supply of other medical support equipment remains inadequate.

The Board also recommends that:

- officer drill pay funding be increased, commensurate with increases in medical personnel strength.





- greater emphasis be placed on filling enlisted health care positions with qualified personnel and that additional emphasis be placed on increasing the skill qualification rates of reserve component, enlisted personnel.
- joint service training be expanded for common medical skills.
- reserve component quotas for medical training courses be increased, commensurate with current shortages of qualified personnel and programmed increases in authorized medical strength.
- members of the Ready Reserve who are tested and determined to be Human Immunodeficiency Virus-positive, if not discharged, be transferred to the Standby Reserve (Inactive Status List).
- annual goals be established for dental panoramic radiographs to ensure compliance with Department of Defense policy.
- Deployable Medical Systems equipment be fielded to the reserve components as scheduled.
- reserve component medical personnel be provided sufficient medical equipment for training, especially equipment that is critical to their wartime mission.
- Selected Reserve billets be identified and established for the two Navy hospital ships. (M)



# Facilities

# 7



*"The physical condition of National Guard armories and Reserve centers sends a daily message to the general public about our reserve component readiness as well as our national resolve."*

*John B. Rosamond  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Reserve Affairs (Materiel and  
Facilities)*



## General

The reserve components manage 5,375 facilities in nearly 4,600 communities around the nation and in U.S. possessions overseas. These facilities are necessary for administration, training, and mobilization of the National Guard and Reserve. Some sites are used for storage or maintenance of equipment. Table 36 provides further details on reserve component facilities.

**Table 36**  
**RESERVE COMPONENT FACILITIES**

	<u>Total Facility Locations</u>	<u>Separate Communities</u>	<u>Number Buildings/ Structures</u>	<u>Number Jointly Used</u>
Army National Guard	3,221	2,600	21,970	401
Army Reserve	1,456	1,312	2,184	176
Naval Reserve	260	259	1,919	182
Marine Corps Reserve	193	182	116	139
Air National Guard	175	175	4,800	46
Air Force Reserve	<u>70</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>697</u>	<u>56</u>
DoD Total	5,375	4,598	31,686	1,000

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.

Data as of June 30, 1989.


One thousand of these facilities are shared by two or more reserve components. Many Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units share airfield space. The Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve share many facilities. The Coast Guard Reserve shares active component facilities. All new construction is evaluated for potential joint use. Joint use of facilities is economical and should be further exploited.

The Board recommends that joint use of facilities by all active and reserve components be increased.

It is vital that adequate facilities be provided. Readiness is directly affected by the adequacy of facilities. The military construction program has received strong support from Congress during the past two years, but there is still a large construction backlog as depicted in Table 37.



**Table 37**  
**CONSTRUCTION BACKLOG**



Source: The reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1989.





The Army Reserve has the largest shortage of owned facilities. Its operational needs are met through an extensive leasing program. Forty percent of its facilities are leased. Additionally, the Army Reserve's military construction appropriation is the smallest of the reserve components, when compared to the construction backlog.

To some extent, all components accommodate their construction backlog by crowding into existing or inadequate facilities. Additionally, the maintenance and repair backlog on existing facilities is severe and getting worse. Due to funding constraints, operational needs have taken precedence over proper care of facilities. Reserve components, particularly the Army's, have been unable to properly maintain existing facilities or meet replacement and environmental needs.

### Adequacy of Facilities

Adequate facilities are a cornerstone of effective military units. When

functional obsolescence, physical deterioration, or overcrowding become impediments to unit readiness, renovation or new construction is necessary. Those projects which have been identified by the reserve components, but which remain unfunded, make up the construction backlog. In addition to this backlog, each passing year takes its toll because of the aging of existing facilities.

The Department of Defense categorizes the facilities shortfall as "backlog", and the annual investment to retain the quality of the inventory as "renewal". Table 38 portrays the present situation for the reserve components in terms of an investment strategy. This strategy, formulated by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, would retire the \$7.5 billion backlog over the next 25 years. Construction funding is also needed to renew presently adequate, but aging facilities. Renewal costs are calculated at two percent of plant value, which provides for replacement or major overhaul of each facility every 50 years.

**Table 38**  
**RESERVE COMPONENT FACILITIES INVESTMENT STRATEGY**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

	Military Construction Backlog	Yearly Reduction	Plant Value	Yearly Renewal	Yearly Investment
Army National Guard	2,660	106	10,600	212	318
Army Reserve	1,906	76	3,600	72	148
Naval Reserve	1,046	42	2,600	52	94
Marine Corps Reserve	94	4	100	2	6
Air National Guard	1,082	43	10,200	204	247
Air Force Reserve	714	29	2,000	40	69
DoD Total	7,502	300	29,100	582	882

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.  
Data as of September 30, 1989.



Adding yearly reduction in construction backlog to yearly renewal, as shown in Table 38, indicates the annual amount needed to provide adequate reserve component facilities. An investment of \$882 million each year over the next 25 years is required to alleviate the backlog and provide funding for renewal.

### **Military Construction**

Military construction appropriations for the reserve components are necessary for new construction and

renovation of existing buildings. More and modern facilities are needed to accommodate new force structure and equipment being distributed to the National Guard and Reserve. Delays in providing adequate facilities affect modernization plans and unit morale. Retention, recruiting, and unit readiness are affected by the adequacy of reserve component facilities.

The number of major projects completed in FY 1988 and FY 1989 for each reserve component are shown in Table 39.


**Table 39**  
**MAJOR CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS COMPLETED**

	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>
Army National Guard	35	50
Army Reserve	21	16
Naval Reserve	10	12
Marine Corps Reserve	3	4
Air National Guard	59	10
Air Force Reserve	<u>29</u>	<u>4</u>
DoD Total Number of Projects Completed	157	96

Source: The reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1989.





The recent pace of construction has slowed the growth of the construction backlog. However, there still remains a construction backlog of approximately \$7.5 billion. Most of that backlog is in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. Much of the backlog developed over the last decade when new construction funding did not keep pace with force structure growth. Most of their backlog is for construction of new facilities to eliminate existing shortages, not for the rehabilitation of existing buildings.

Construction backlogs force the reserve components to lease facilities.

Leasing expenses must be paid from operations and maintenance accounts which tend to adversely affect the reserve components in two ways. First, fewer dollars are available for training and operations which directly affects readiness. Second, leases siphon off potential facility maintenance and repair dollars which, if spent on owned facilities, would reduce the maintenance backlog.

Table 40 summarizes military construction funding for FY 1988-90.

**Table 40**  
**MILITARY CONSTRUCTION FUNDING**  
**FY 1988-90**  
**(Dollars in Millions)**

	<u>FY 1988</u>	<u>FY 1989</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>
Army National Guard			
Military Construction Request	170	138	114
Military Construction Appropriation	184	229	205
Construction Backlog Cost <sup>1</sup>	2,500	2,660	2,714
Army Reserve			
Military Construction Request	95	80	77
Military Construction Appropriation	95	86	80
Construction Backlog Cost <sup>1</sup>	1,900	1,906	2,338
Naval Reserve			
Military Construction Request	74	48	40
Military Construction Appropriation	74	61	57
Construction Backlog Cost <sup>1</sup>	997	1,046	1,076
Marine Corps Reserve			
Military Construction Request <sup>2</sup>	—	—	11
Military Construction Appropriation <sup>2</sup>	—	—	—
Construction Backlog Cost <sup>1</sup>	84	94	99
Air National Guard			
Military Construction Request	161	148	165
Military Construction Appropriation	151	158	199
Construction Backlog Cost <sup>1</sup>	1,044	1,082	1,150
Air Force Reserve			
Military Construction Request	79	59	46
Military Construction Appropriation	79	71	46
Construction Backlog Cost <sup>1</sup>	714	714	722
DoD Total <sup>3</sup>			
Military Construction Request	579	473	453
Military Construction Appropriation	584	604	587
Construction Backlog Cost <sup>1</sup>	7,239	7,502	8,099

Notes: 1. Construction Backlog totals for the fiscal year are reduced by the amount of that fiscal year's construction request. Dollars in subsequent year programs have not been used to reduce the backlog total.

2. Marine Corps amounts included in Naval Reserve.

3. Coast Guard Reserve does not have Military Construction Funding.

Sources: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.  
The reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1989.



It appears that the recent trend of annual increases in new construction funding may decline. The projected funding levels for the next five years are significantly lower than the FY 1990 appropriation. These reductions do not appear to be based on reserve component requirements.

The Board recommends that future military construction appropriations for the National Guard and Reserve be maintained at the FY 1990 level in order to replace inadequate facilities and to reduce construction backlogs.



### **Maintenance and Repair**

In addition to providing funding for new construction, adequate funding must be provided for maintenance and repair of existing facilities. Funding for maintenance and repair comes from operations and maintenance appropriations, not military

construction appropriations. Therefore, maintenance and repair funding competes against operational, equipment maintenance, and training requirements. Service decisions typically give maintenance and repair a low priority in a fiscally constrained environment. As a result, the maintenance and repair backlog has grown.

Aging buildings cost more to operate and maintain. Construction of new facilities or major renovations funded from the construction appropriation can result in savings of maintenance and repair costs associated with older buildings.

Funding for property maintenance is not increasing. Obligatory expenses, such as pay raises and statutory and regulatory environmental compliance, erode the account, further decreasing the availability of funds for facility maintenance and repair. The longer maintenance is deferred, the more the repair eventually costs. The net effect is that the ability to fund necessary repairs is declining significantly.

The Department of Defense has made a commitment to lead the way in environmental compliance. Increased funding is required to bring reserve component facilities into compliance with environmental laws.


The Board recommends that adequate funding be provided for reserve component maintenance and repair projects.

Table #1 depicts reserve component Maintenance and Repair funding and the growth of the Backlog of Maintenance and Repair (BMAR).





**Table 41**  
**MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR FUNDING**



Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.  
Data as of September 30, 1989.

### Equipment Storage


Storage facilities for reserve component equipment are not adequate. New, often larger equipment has been provided to the National Guard and Reserve as a result of modernization and added missions. Construction of storage facilities has not kept pace with equipment procurement. As a result, inadequate storage facilities jeopardize the large capital investment in reserve component equipment.

The Army's reserve components have the most severe storage problems. Materiel subject to deterioration from

constant exposure to weather requires indoor, or at least, covered storage.

Storage facilities for the Marine Reserve and Naval Reserve generally meet present needs. However, the transfer of tanks, bridge units, and bulk fuel companies to the Marine Corps Reserve will tax available storage space.

The Air National Guard has received much needed electronic countermeasure equipment, yet storage and security facilities are not available. The Air Force Reserve's most critical storage problem is for personal combat equipment.



Units often store equipment by utilizing existing space which was originally allocated for training or maintenance, or by utilizing large equipment concentration sites which are often distant from the training site. This can result in a loss of valuable training time and reduce unit readiness.

The Board recommends that adequate equipment storage and maintenance facilities be provided.

### **Base Closures**

The reserve components are studying the effect of the Base Closure and Realignment Act. None of the planned closures involve major Army maneuver areas. Most do not involve crew-served weapon, live-fire ranges. Most closures are in urban areas where training constraints are already significant.

The Army National Guard and Army Reserve will suffer most from the closure of nearby range facilities. Some

loss of training time resulting from additional travel will occur.

The Naval Reserve and Coast Guard Reserve anticipate no effect on training and readiness. The Marine Corps Reserve anticipates that training will suffer in the short-term, but overall readiness will not be diminished.

The Air Force reserve components are concerned about the closure of Jefferson Proving Ground, Indiana. This is discussed further in the Aviation Training section of the Training chapter.

Some facilities located on bases designated for closure could be transferred to the reserve components to alleviate shortages.

All reserve components are responding to the Base Closure Commission's recommendation that the Secretary of Defense accelerate efforts to consolidate reserve facilities. The

best way to accomplish this is through joint reserve component facility boards which convene annually in each state. They review and evaluate all proposed reserve component construction in each state for its joint construction potential.

The Board recommends that active component facilities affected by base closure be considered for use by the reserve components.


### **Summary and Recommendations**

The investment in reserve component facilities must be protected. A facilities strategy that is founded on the principle of "taking care of what we own" is essential—even if it means transferring dollars from new construction to maintenance during the services' programming process and ensuring that maintenance dollars are used for repair

and maintenance during budget execution.

The Army Reserve presents a special challenge because nearly one-half of its facilities are leased. Additionally, its construction appropriation has been the smallest of the reserve components compared to its construction backlog. Increased annual construction appropriations are needed for the Army Reserve.


In the face of mounting pressure to cut the defense budget and adjust worldwide force structure, many uncertainties concerning units and equipment are bound to occur in the reserve components. Notwithstanding those uncertainties, the construction and maintenance of needed facilities must continue. Reserve component readiness is directly affected by the adequacy of facilities.





The Board recommends that:

- joint use of facilities by the active and reserve components of all services be increased.
- military construction appropriations for the National Guard and Reserve be maintained at the FY 1990 level to replace inadequate facilities and to reduce construction backlogs.
- adequate funding be provided for reserve component maintenance and repair projects and environmental compliance.
- adequate equipment storage and maintenance facilities be provided.
- active component facilities affected by base closure be considered for use by the reserve components. (M)







# Readiness 8

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*"The strategic stresses that have confronted the United States for the past half-century . . . may now be receding. However, new stresses and challenges are supplementing or replacing the older ones."*

*Michael P. W. Stone  
Secretary of the Army*

## General

During FY 1989, a number of sources were critical of reserve component readiness. Much of the criticism is unwarranted. The Board believes that, when all indicators are considered, although some problem areas persist, the reserve components are generally more ready, and in a better posture to mobilize and accomplish their wartime missions, than at any previous period reviewed by the Board.

## Measuring Reserve Component Readiness

Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1 (JCS-1) defines readiness as "the ability of military forces, units, weapon systems, or equipment to deliver the output for which they were designed."

There is no simple means for measuring readiness. An objective and uniform readiness measuring system for reporting reserve component unit readiness does not exist. As a result, many people resort to using the Status of Resources and Training System


(SORTS) as a complete measurement of readiness. This is not what the system was designed for and can be misleading. SORTS category levels alone do not indicate a unit's readiness. They only indicate a unit's resource and training status at a particular time, in the areas evaluated.

The SORTS report is only one of several indicators employed to determine reserve component unit readiness. The results of mobilization tests, combat readiness evaluations, operational readiness inspections, and other criteria must be examined to determine true combat readiness. Factors such as leadership, morale, cohesiveness, skill retention, and physical strength and stamina of individual members also affect a unit's combat readiness. Other factors must be considered when measuring readiness.

The readiness of a unit becomes less important if it cannot be effectively mobilized and deployed when and where required. Implementation of Department of Defense policy to resource first, those reserve component units that will fight first, directly affects readiness. Readiness is limited by assets on hand and time available to train

It is not expected that all reserve component units will be 100 percent proficient during peacetime. Units with older equipment, or skill mismatch problems due to lack of formal schooling, may not score well under SORTS, but still retain considerable combat capability. This is particularly true if personnel are highly experienced and proficient with the equipment they have.

Some units will not receive all of their equipment until mobilized and are



not considered ready until that time. Other units may not be ready due to a recent reorganization, or because they have received new equipment with which they have not had an opportunity to train. Many such reserve component units could rapidly increase their readiness, upon mobilization, with an intense period of accelerated training. This is provided for in mobilization planning.

There is no single number that can be pointed to as representing the readiness of a unit, or an entire reserve component. Evaluating readiness is a complex and dynamic process.

### **Factors Limiting Readiness**

The reserve components have made unprecedented progress in recent years toward achieving readiness goals and mobilization preparedness. Nevertheless, readiness limiting factors remain. The reserve components informed the Board of what they perceive to have been their most serious readiness limiting factors in FY 1989.

Tremendous strides have been made in the Army National Guard toward achieving readiness goals. Units have received more and newer equipment than ever before. Assigned strength is at a historical high, and meaningful, high-level training is being conducted. Overall, the readiness of the Army National Guard has never been better. Overall Army National Guard equipment on hand increased during FY 1989, however, certain shortages continue to adversely impact readiness.

The most significant were five ton-trucks, fuel tankers, semi-trailers, electrical generators, radios, and certain medical equipment. Most of the



shortages were Army-wide.

Another limiting factor for the Army National Guard was recruiting and retention of certain categories of medical professionals. These problems are detailed in the Equipment and Medical chapters of this report.

A significant personnel factor was sustaining skill qualification in certain technical skills that require long training periods. Training in these specialties can be very difficult for Army Guard members due to the length of courses in Army service schools, civilian job conflicts, and family responsibilities. Skill mismatch and training time problems are detailed in the personnel and training chapters of this report.

Army Reserve readiness is at its highest level ever. Personnel shortages are the most significant readiness limiting factor. Implementation of various personnel programs, discussed in the personnel and medical chapters of this report, should further improve unit strengths, training, and readiness of the Army Reserve.

The Army Reserve is comprised mostly of combat support and combat



service support units which require a variety of technical skills. Because of the active component force mix, there are relatively few properly-skilled prior service soldiers available to recruit. Recruiting is further compounded by shifting demographics. Many units are geographically located where recruiting was fruitful at one time, but is no longer due to population shifts. Units may need to be relocated to better recruiting areas.

Retention of skill-qualified soldiers is also a problem. This is compounded by shortages of equipment and inadequate training facilities which are detailed in the Equipment and Training chapters of this report.

New programs initiated for Naval Reserve reinforcing and sustaining units have resulted in marked improvement in overall readiness. The most critical factors limiting readiness of the Naval Surface Reserve commissioned units were equipment status and equipment on-hand. Personnel turbulence and personnel shortages in certain skills were the most significant limiting

factors for reinforcing and sustaining units. These limiting factors are detailed in the Equipment and Personnel chapters of this report.

A readiness limiting factor for the Naval Air Reserve is not having spare replacement aircraft to replace the primary assigned aircraft while they are undergoing periodic overhaul. This leaves units short of aircraft for training and mobilization purposes. Personnel shortages in certain skill areas were also a problem. The Naval Reserve Recruiting Command has been established to help alleviate personnel shortfalls.

Equipment shortages adversely affected readiness of some Naval Air Reserve units. Shortages of patrol squadron weapons system trainers and E-2 aircraft wing panels are two examples.

Personnel turbulence which results in increased training requirements also affected the Naval Air Reserve. The requirement for Reservists to attend lengthy formal schools for skill qualification was also a readiness inhibitor. Programs to segment formal school training and to substitute on the job training are being implemented to correct this problem.

The two most critical limiting factors to Marine Corps Reserve readiness are personnel and training. However, the ability of Reserve units to mobilize is not seriously degraded. Personnel deficiencies are often identified because a Marine does not hold the Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) required for the billet in which he is assigned. This does not necessarily mean that the Marine cannot perform at least some

tasks associated with the billet. It may just mean that a required formal school has not been attended.


As with the Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve MOS mismatch and shortages are often the result of Marines with the proper skills not living near the appropriate units. Recruiting focused on specific MOS requirements, vocational technical training, and on-the-job training are efforts being employed to alleviate this problem.

Efforts to alleviate training deficiencies include training with wartime gaining commands and emphasis on warrior skill training.

Readiness limiting factors for the Air National Guard were the grounding of the A-7 fleet due to wing cracks and a large number of units undergoing major equipment conversions. The first problem has been resolved. Some degraded readiness is inherent in the conversion process, but a more capable force will result in the long run.

Air Force Reserve units are capable of meeting all readiness and mobilization requirements. The most significant problem area noted was an Air Force-wide reduction of training munitions for the fighter force as a result of severe fiscal constraints. Munitions have been reallocated to help compensate, but a continued shortage of munitions will result in reduced readiness.

In FY 1987, the Coast Guard Reserve reported that it had insufficient resources to develop a Selected Reserve adequate to meet even 48 percent of its highest priority mobilization manpower requirements. The situation worsened in FY 1988. Due to budget cuts, resources were adequate to meet only 43 percent of requirements. This lack of support is particularly ironic and disturbing in this time of emphasis on the national drug control strategy. The Coast Guard is a prime player in the drug interdiction effort. Since the Coast Guard Reserve's training mission directly supports the active component, full funding of its requirements would



greatly enhance the anti drug effort, and ensure a ready force in the event of mobilization. This is a rare opportunity to accomplish two important goals at relatively small cost.



## Summary

There is no single objective and uniform system for measuring and reporting reserve component readiness. Many factors can impact a unit's readiness. They include individual skill qualification levels, shortages of full-time support personnel, personnel shortages, equipment shortages, personnel turnover, force structure changes, incompatible equipment, inadequate facilities, and a variety of training issues.

When all indicators are considered, the Board believes that, although there are problem areas, the reserve components are generally ready and in a better posture to mobilize and accomplish wartime missions than during any previous period reviewed by the Board.

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The Board concurs with the following statements:

*"I believe that we may fairly conclude that the growth in the importance of our Reserve forces since 1980, our increased reliance on those forces, and the improvement in the capability of those forces has been nothing short of dramatic. Americans have every right to be proud of our Reserve forces because they are, in fact, the best in the world. . . . Much, however, remains to be done. I solicit your continued, active support to ensure that we have the resources which are necessary to field Reserve forces that are well-trained, well-equipped, and ready."*

*Honorable Stephen M. Duncan  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Reserve Affairs*

*"For the first time in our peacetime history, we receive the resources to permit us to fulfill our wartime mission. For this we are grateful. Although there are many shortages that still plague us, the past several years have permitted us to improve our readiness to unprecedented levels. . . . I believe today's Guard is the best trained, best equipped, and most combat capable in our nation's history."*

*Herbert R. Temple, Jr.  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Chief, National Guard Bureau*

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*" . . . Today's Army Reserve is the best led, best equipped, and best trained in recent history. All of these improvements, taken together, mean that our Army Reserve today is a force to be reckoned with."*

*William F. Ward  
Major General, USA  
Chief, Army Reserve*

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*"The Naval Reserve has grown in size, scope and responsibility. But more importantly, we've grown in readiness. The Naval Reserve has earned the respect of the active force; we've become equal partners in the Total Force. Today, anywhere in the world that you see Navy personnel, you'll find Reservists working alongside their active duty counterparts, indistinguishable, equally trained, and performing with equal competence."*

*James E. Taylor  
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy  
Director of Naval Reserve*

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*"The combat readiness and warfighting capability of the Marine Corps Reserve is at an all time high. Your continuing support for our manpower, equipment, facilities and sustainment requirements has greatly enhanced our readiness and warfighting capabilities."*

*E. P. Looney, Jr.  
Major General, USMC  
Assistant Deputy Chief for  
Manpower and Reserve  
Affairs for Reserve Affairs*

*"Our Reserve units are combat ready. They can be mobilized in 24 hours and deployed within 72 hours. In Fiscal Year 1988 we made significant improvements to the quality of our training and today are at the highest level of readiness in our history."*

*Roger P. Scheer  
Major General, USAF  
Chief of Air Force Reserve*

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*"We have risen to the challenges placed upon our Reserve in the last year . . . and have emerged as a Reserve force not only able to meet our national security responsibilities, but able as well to provide well-trained personnel to augment the requirements of our active component in responding to natural disasters and domestic contingencies."*

*John N. Faigle  
Rear Admiral, USCG  
Chief, Office of Readiness  
and Reserve*







## Board Activities in FY 1989

# A



*"The Reserve Forces Policy Board stands ready to assist in developing and reviewing policies which will maintain and or enhance reserve component readiness."*

*Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr.  
Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board*

## General

Numerous activities were conducted during FY 1989 to enable the Board to fulfill its mission as "principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the reserve components." (10 USC 175(c)). Activities included quarterly board meetings; briefings; Congressional hearings; and meetings with defense policy makers, Congressional leaders, appointed officials and key staff members from executive departments and agencies, as well as from the private sector. In addition, the Board contributed reports and articles for various defense-related publications.

## Board Meetings

The Board met during FY 1989 on the following dates:

- December 5-7, 1988
- March 6-8, 1989
- June 12-14, 1989
- September 11-13, 1989

## Briefings Received by the Board

- Air Force Medical Readiness
- Air Force Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and Impact on the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve
- Air Force Reserve—Missions, Roles, Responsibilities and Key Issues
- Air National Guard—Missions, Roles, Responsibilities and Key Issues
- Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks
- Army Medical Readiness
- Army National Guard—Missions, Roles, Responsibilities, and Key Issues
- Army POM and Impact on the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve
- Army Reserve—Missions, Roles, Responsibilities, and Key Issues
- Changes in Joint Military Education
- Coast Guard Reserve—Missions, Roles, Responsibilities, and Key Issues
- Current DoD National Guard and Reserve Issues
- Command and Control of the Reserve Components
- DoD Guidance for Implementation of the President's National Drug Control Strategy
- Exercise TEAM SPIRIT §9
- Health Care Trends: Impact on Military Medicine
- Legislative Updates



- Marine Corps Reserve—Missions, Roles, Responsibilities, and Key Issues
- National Guard Bureau—Missions, Roles, Responsibilities, and Key Issues
- National Military Command Center
- Naval Air Reserve Resources
- Naval Reserve Force Ships
- Naval Reserve—Missions, Roles, Responsibilities, and Key Issues
- Navy Medical Readiness
- Navy POM and Impact on the Naval Reserve and the Marine Corps Reserve
- Recall Issues of 10 USC 673b
- Reemployment Rights of the National Guard and Reserve
- Report from the Regional Conflict Working Group
- Report from the Reserve Officers Association of the United States
- Reserve Component Survivor Benefit Plan
- Reserve Unit Priority System
- Role of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve in National Defense Strategy
- Role of the National Guard and Reserve in National Defense Strategy
- Selective Service System and Health Care Professionals
- Status of Resources and Training
- Surface Effect Fast Sealift Ship
- Transfer of FF 1052 Frigates to the Naval Reserve
- U.S. Atlantic Command and the Role of the Reserve Components



- U.S. Public Health Service Reserve Program
- U.S. Army Forces Command
- Voluntary National Service
- World Intelligence Updates

#### **Meetings with Military and Civilian Leaders**



- Armstrong, Brigadier General Malcom B. (USAF), Vice Director, J-7 (Operational Plans and Interoperability), Joint Staff
- Arthur, Vice Admiral S. R. (USN) Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics)
- Atwood, Honorable Donald J. Deputy Secretary of Defense
- Bandow, Mr. Doug Senior Fellow, Cato Institute Former Special Assistant to President Reagan
- Barlow, Major General Gregory P. (ARNGUS), Commander, 81st Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), Washington Army National Guard



- Bresnahan, Rear Admiral Maurice J., Jr. (USNR), Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Forces
- Brick, Mr. Samuel T., Jr. Director, Legislative Reference Service, Office of the General Counsel, Office of the Secretary of Defense
- Burdick, Major General Donald (USA) Director, Army National Guard
- Byron, Honorable Beverly B. House Armed Services Committee
- Carpenter, Brigadier General Shirley M. (USAF), Deputy to the Chief of Air Force Reserve
- Cheney, Honorable Dick Secretary of Defense
- Duncan, Honorable Stephen M. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
- Flossman, Mr. Lauren Senior Associate, McManis Associates, Inc.
- Fogleman, Major General Ronald R. (USAF), Director of Programs and Evaluation, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force
- Gorman, General Paul F. (USA) (Ret.) Chairman, Regional Conflict Working Group, Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy
- Herres, General Robert T. (USAF) Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Howard, Mr. Robert E. Director, National Security Division, Office of Management and Budget
- Hultman, Major General Evan L. (AUS) (Ret.), Executive Director, Reserve Officers Association of the United States
- Kaufman, Dr. William W. Professor of Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
- Killey, Major General Phillip G. (USAF) Director, Air National Guard
- Lessey, Honorable Samuel K., Jr. Director, U.S. Selective Service System
- Lewis, Major General Reginald W. CMM, CM, CD, President, Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR); Former Chief of Reserves, Canada
- Lively, Colonel C. Judson, Jr. (USA)(Ret.), Director, Retirement Affairs, Reserve Officers Association of the United States
- Loeffke, Major General Bernard (USA), Chairman, Inter-American Defense Board
- Looney, Major General Edmond P., Jr. (USMC), Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps
- Marryott, Rear Admiral R. F. (USN) Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

- Martin, Rear Admiral Edward D. (USPHS), Chief of Staff, Office of the Surgeon General, U. S. Public Health Service
- McCurdy, Honorable Dave  
Member, House Armed Services Committee
- Miketinac, Brigadier General Bruce T. (USA), Director of Health Care Operations, Office of the Surgeon General of the Army
- Mohr, Major General Henry (AUS)(Ret.), Syndicated Columnist  
Former Chief, Army Reserve
- Montgomery, Honorable G. V. (Sonny)  
Chairman, House Veterans Affairs Committee; Member, House Armed Services Committee
- Morin, Brigadier General Carl R. (USA)  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Readiness and Training)
- Oberndorfer, Colonel Gerald (USMC)  
Evaluations and Analysis Division, J-7 (Operational Plans and Interoperability), Joint Staff
- Powell, General Colin L. (USA)  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Ramsay, Major General Charles A. OBE, Army Director General, Territorial Army and Organization, United Kingdom
- Reno, Major General William H. (USA),  
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Headquarters, Department of the Army
- Rice, Honorable Donald B.  
Secretary of the Air Force
- Rosamond, Mr. John B.  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Materiel and Facilities)
- Routson, Mr. Samuel J.  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Reserve Affairs)
- Smith, Rear Admiral F. Neale (USNR)  
Director of Naval Reserve
- Stackpole, Major General H. C., III (USA), Director for Plans and Policy (J5), U.S. Atlantic Command
- Taft, Honorable William H., IV  
Deputy Secretary of Defense
- Temple, Lieutenant General Herbert R., Jr. (USA)  
Chief, National Guard Bureau
- Trump, Major General David S. (USAFR), Mobilization Assistant to Surgeon General of the Air Force, and Deputy Surgeon General for Reserve Affairs





- Vanderboom, Major Kathleen A. (USA), Office of Chief Counsel, National Guard Bureau
- Walsh, Rear Admiral Raymond M. (USN), Director, Operations Division, Office of Budget and Reports, U.S. Navy
- Ward, Major General William F. (USA) Chief, Army Reserve
- Welling, Rear Admiral Paul F. (USCG) Chief, Office of Readiness and Reserve, U.S. Coast Guard
- Whitehouse, Honorable Charles S. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict)
- Wiegand, Major General Robert D. (USA), Deputy Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Forces Command
- Wincup, Mr. G. Kim Staff Director, House Armed Services Committee
- Zimble, Vice Admiral J. A. (USN) Surgeon General of the Navy

### **Committees**

The Board has established standing committees to study and formulate recommendations on issues relating to the following areas:

- Logistics
- Personnel
- Training and Mobilization

Additionally, two Ad-Hoc committees were formed to address significant issues relating to the reserve components. The first committee was formed by the Board Chairman to address proposed program changes

facing the reserve components of the Army and Air Force, which would result in force structure reductions both in personnel and aircraft. The committee conducted meetings and field visits to analyze changes affecting reserve component aviation.

The second Ad-Hoc committee was formed at the request of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. He requested that the Board examine medical personnel readiness in the reserve components. The Board conducted research, visited various reserve personnel centers, and received information from service headquarters staffs and field elements. The Board submitted a report on the study, dated October 2, 1989, through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs to the Secretary of Defense.

### **Visits to Training Activities**

In July 1989, Board members and staff conducted a two-day visit to the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) while on operational deployment in the Atlantic. The purpose of the visit was to observe carrier qualification training of a Naval Reserve Air Wing while on Active Duty Training (AT). The Board also toured and received briefings aboard the frigate, USS Thomas C. Hart (FF 1092), which is of the class being transferred to the Naval Reserve, and received briefings concerning Naval Air Reserve readiness.

Members and staff of the Training and Mobilization Committee visited the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. The purpose of the visit was to familiarize committee members with JRTC operations and observe reserve component forces undergoing infantry training in a low-to-mid-intensity conflict environment. (R)



# Reserve Forces Policy Board Staff

# B

## Staff Directors



Colonel Michael D. Brownell  
US Army Reserve



Captain Donald C. Gillies  
US Naval Reserve



Colonel Billy R. Lingo  
US Air Force Reserve



Colonel Jerry D. Simmons  
Army National Guard of the  
United States



Colonel William R. Young  
US Marine Corps Reserve

## Enlisted Advisor

## Executive Secretary

## Secretary



Master Sergeant Georgianna  
Hildebrandt, US Marine  
Corps Reserve



Mrs. Brenda Dent



Ms. Yvette Carter

## **Adjunct Staff**

The Board is supported by individuals from various offices and reserve components who assist in special projects and activities. Those who have contributed to the Board during the past year, and their unit of assignment, are listed below:

- Colonel A. Bowen Ballard, USAFR  
Air Force Recruiting Command
- Colonel Samuel T. Brick, Jr., USAR  
Headquarters, U.S. Army Central  
Command
- Commander Diane R. Crowley, USNR  
Naval Fleet Hospital Unit 500  
Combat Zone 20 Detachment E
- Yeoman First Class Nancy E. Frey,  
USNR, Maritime Air Patrol Squadron 68
- First Lieutenant Josie F. Jackson,  
USAFR, 403rd Tactical Airlift Wing
- Captain Raymond F. Knapp, USAFR  
Headquarters, Air Force Systems  
Command
- First Lieutenant Lawrence E.  
McDermott, USAFR  
913th Tactical Airlift Group
- Second Lieutenant David P. Ray,  
OKARNG, 1/245th Aviation Battalion  
(Special Operations) (Airborne)
- Staff Sergeant Debra A. Ruf, USAFR  
913th Tactical Airlift Group
- Captain Christopher W. Stoddard,  
USMCR  
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
- Major General Joseph D. Zink,  
ANGUS, (Ret.)  
Consultant to the Board; Former  
Military Executive, Reserve Forces  
Policy Board
- Colonel Ernest R. Zuick, CAANG  
Headquarters, California Air National  
Guard





## Liaison Officers

The Board was assisted by the following liaison officers assigned by the Department of Defense, Department of Transportation, and Military Departments.

- Lieutenant Richard M. Brierly, USCGR Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard
- Lieutenant Colonel Robert Burns, III, USAF, National Guard Bureau
- Colonel Gerald S. Kean, ANGUS Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Reserve Affairs)
- Mr. John Lee  
Office of the Chief, Army Reserve
- Mr. Ernest C. Milner  
Office of the Director of Naval Reserve
- Commander Michael E. Moore, USCG Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard
- Lieutenant Colonel Donna F. Owen, USAR, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)
- Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth R. Powell, USAR, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Headquarters, Department of the Army
- Colonel Aubrey V. Renfroe, USAF, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force
- Lieutenant Commander Peter J. Reynierse, USNR, Office of the Director of Naval Reserve
- Lieutenant Colonel Henry A. Sabine, USAR, National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve
- Mr. Wayne Spruell  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
- Colonel Thomas B. Surles, USA  
Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, Headquarters, Department of the Army
- First Lieutenant Ross J. Thomas  
USMCR, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
- Commander J. W. Venes, Jr., USNR  
Office of the Director of Naval Reserve




### **Former Board Members and Staff**

The following Reserve Forces Policy Board members and staff completed their service during this past year:

- Honorable Will Hill Tankersley  
Chairman, (October 1985–October 1989)
- Honorable Kenneth P. Bergquist  
Assistant Secretary of the Navy  
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
- Honorable Karen R. Keesling  
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force  
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
- Lieutenant General John I. Hudson,  
USMC, Deputy Chief of Staff for  
Manpower and Reserve Affairs,  
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
- Rear Admiral Tammy H. Etheridge,  
USNR, Commander, Naval Reserve  
Readiness Command, Region 10
- Major General Harold G. Holesinger,  
USAFR, Adjutant General, State of  
Illinois
- Major General James C. Wahleithner,  
USAFR, Commander, 4th Air Force
- Rear Admiral Paul A. Welling, USCG  
Chief, Office of Readiness and Reserve  
Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard
- Brigadier General John J. Closner, III  
USAFR, Commander, 10th Air Force
- Brigadier General Maralin K.  
Coffinger, USAF (Ret.),  
Director of Personnel Plans,  
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force
- Colonel Philip R. Fogle, USA (Ret.)  
Staff Director (R)





## **RESERVE COMPONENT ITEMS IN DOD LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM**

<b>Title</b>	<b>Status</b>
● Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA)	To Congress May 11, 1989. Introduced as H.R. 2200 by Representative G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery (D-MS).
● Authorize Limitation on Actual Amount Paid to Members in Combat Overseas	To Congress May 22, 1989.
● Authorize Expeditious Correction of Enlisted Personnel Records	To Congress June 9, 1989.
● Warrant Officer Personnel Act (WOMA)	To Congress June 13, 1989. Introduced as H.R. 2979 by Representative Charles E. Bennett (D-FL)
● Prohibit Withholding of State and Local Income Taxes From Reserve Drill Pay	To OMB April 10, 1989.
● Removal of AGR Grade Ceilings	To OMB April 26, 1989.
● Contingency Legislative Package 1990, Military (Management of DoD Health Care Personnel).	To Congress June 15, 1989. (Partially enacted in DoD Authorization Act FY 1990-91).
● Physical Requirements for Ready Reserve (Increases Physical Examination Interval to 5 Years).	To OMB June 5, 1989. (Budget Analysis of Army and Navy Savings Ongoing).
● 6th QRMC Implementing Legislation	To OMB August 3, 1989.